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ABSTRACT 
 
It is widely agreed that effective citizenship, whether in well-established democracies 
or in those in transition to democracy, require some educational preparation. In post-
apartheid South Africa, education policy and subsequent curriculum development 
placed participatory democracy and active citizenship at its centre. Although South 
African education policy documents have a maximalist tone in places, they 
collectively reflect a minimalist conception of citizenship and of citizenship 
education. The focus of my critique of citizenship education policy is the tendency 
manifest in the state policy documents to undermine democratic participation and 
active citizenry, conceptions first developed and put into practice in the Greek city-
state of Athens. 
 
The conception of education for citizenship does not guide the practice in terms 
accessible to the school’s democratic community. State policy’s concept of students’ 
democratic participation and representation does not reflect a representative model of 
democracy in South African schools. Furthermore, extant policy does not envisage 
democratic citizenship education that is enjoyed by a significant proportion of the 
South African learners. This minimalist conception of citizenship and of citizenship 
education is not appropriate for the South African context.    
 
This thesis, further, mounts a defence of compulsion, arguing that within the 
theoretical framework of current theories of the Athenian prototype of democracy, 
deliberative and representative democracy, compulsory schooling and compulsory 
citizenship education can be justified on the grounds that they promote individual 
autonomy and build social cohesion ― towards the common good in South Africa. 
The recently proposed compulsory citizenship education programmes are not 
compatible with compulsory citizenship education that is designed to promote active, 
critical and inquiring South African citizens. These value-based education documents 
promote obedience, if not unquestioning loyalty, to the South African government. 
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Moreover, neither the Bill of Responsibilities nor the School Pledge offer possible 
strategies for getting from where we are to where we ought to be. In the final 
analysis, post-apartheid citizenship education policy’s lack of conceptual clarity, 
coherence and consistency can be attributed in large part to the conflicting forms and 
conceptions of citizenship in South Africa. The goals of citizenship education in 
South Africa would be better served by cosmopolitan ideals, that is, preparing South 
African learners to act in a local, national and global scale. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
 
 
The first recorded democracy was the Athenian democracy around 500 BC. The word 
democracy combines the elements demos, which means ‘people’, and kratos, which 
means ‘force’ or ‘power’. Theoretically, what does this mean? In the abstract, this 
prototypical (or traditional Athenian) democracy, we are told, was a political system 
in which ‘the people’ ruled: collective self-rule. More concretely, there were three 
political bodies through which ‘the people’ ruled Athens: 1) the popular assembly 
ruled on foreign policy, made laws, tried political crimes and comprised all male 
citizens over the age of 18 years; 2) the Council of Five Hundred was an 
administrative body that prepared the agenda for the assembly, oversaw the meetings 
or day-to-day business of the assembly and prepared legislation for consideration by 
the assembly; and 3) the courts administered justice in Athens. Although the 
Athenians bequeathed to us their conception of democracy and participation, most of 
the basic tenets of prototypical Athenian democracy, such as people’ power, equality 
and freedom, were not pursued with sufficient rigour and consistency.  
 
Athens accommodated citizens and non-citizens. Among the non-citizens were 
slaves, children, women and foreigners. Despite the limitations of prototypical 
Athenian democracy – the hierarchical and exclusive body of citizenship –, ‘the 
people’ through the assembly, the council and law courts testify to the broad, ‘active’ 
participation of citizens in the Greek city-state of Athens. Chapters 2 and 3 will focus 
on theories of participatory democracy and active citizenship that have endorsed and 
interpreted the Athenian conception of democracy and citizenship for and within 
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modern day societies. In the words of Pateman (1970), “it is their stress on this aspect 
of participation and its place at the centre of their theories that marks the distinctive 
contribution of the theories of participatory democracy to democratic theory as a 
whole” (p. 22). It is, therefore, the model first recorded in the Greek city-state of 
Athens that I will be considering when I discuss participatory democracy and active 
citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa schools. 
 
South Africa has undergone dramatic changes since the first non-racial and 
democratic election in the country’s history on 27 April 1994. Among the changes 
that have taken place is the enactment of education policies relevant to the 
establishment of a unitary, non-racial and democratic South Africa. South African 
education policy and subsequent curriculum development placed participatory 
democracy and active citizenship at its centre. The White Paper on Education and 
Training (1995) is concerned with the concept of popular participation, which denotes 
a broad range of participants (or ‘agents’/‘actors’) in education policy processes in 
South Africa. At the heart of the South African Schools Act (1996) lies the idea of 
democratic governance and partnership. In line with the pronouncements in the White 
Paper on Education and Training (1995) and the South African Schools Act (1996) is 
the development of Curriculum 2005 (1997), which declares its commitment to 
active, creative, critical types of citizens in a culturally diverse, democratic society. 
The ‘Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy’ (2001) provides a practical 
framework intended to instil and reinforces democratic values (of the Constitution) in 
young South Africans.  
 
The Guides for Representative Councils of Learners (1999) aim to promote student 
participation and representation in school governing bodies in South African schools. 
The proposed Bill of Responsibilities and the new national Schools Pledge (2008) 
encourage school children to take their rightful place as active, responsible citizens by 
declaring a pledge of allegiance to the Constitution (1996) and the Republic of South 
Africa. According to educational philosopher McLaughlin (1992), the concept of 
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citizenship is mapped in terms of a continuum of minimal and maximal 
interpretations. This mapping is correspondingly true of education for citizenship, 
McLaughlin argues. In this context, the term ‘minimal’ refers to citizenship as 
‘taught’, and by extension to education for citizenship that relies entirely on the 
formal school curriculum. Interpreted maximally, citizenship can be ‘taught’ and 
‘caught’, this is to say, effective education for citizenship covers opportunities for 
teaching about citizenship within and outside the formal curriculum.  
 
Although the post-apartheid South African education policy documents have a 
maximalist tone in places, they collectively reflect a minimalist conception of 
citizenship and of citizenship education. When the National Party came to power in 
1948, they introduced apartheid ― which means apartness or a state of being apart or 
separated ― a policy they used to govern South Africa. The new South African 
government’s intention to dismantle apartheid education and democratise education 
can be seen within the context of transforming the country from an apartheid regime 
to a new democratic order. The central target of my critique of post-apartheid 
citizenship education policy is the tendency manifest in the state policy documents to 
undermine democratic participation and active citizenry, conceptions first developed 
and put into practice in the Greek city-state of Athens. 
 
The seeds for this thesis were sown when I was a Teacher Liaison Officer (TLO) at 
Nirvana Secondary School, south west of Johannesburg, between 2002 and 2003. But 
first, it is important to point out that as I mentioned above, Curriculum 2005 (1997) 
declares its commitment to promote active, creative, critical citizens in South African 
schools. Looking ahead to later discussion on post-apartheid South African 
educational policy development in Chapter 5, Curriculum 2005 (1997) makes 
provision for citizenship education through the Human and Social Sciences Learning  
4 
 
Area
1
, which comprised four components: History, Geography, Archaeology and 
Citizenship/Civics. The Citizenship or Civics education section on Participatory 
Citizenship intends to develop “active participatory citizens able to promote a 
democratic, equitable and just society” (Department of Education, 1997, p. 99). To 
realise its vision of an active, participatory type of character, learners are expected to 
take an active part in democratic representative structures and in decision-making 
processes in the classroom, school or community based organisations. The 
Citizenship/Civics education component of the Human and Social Sciences Learning 
Area
 
that claims to reflect a maximalist conception of citizenship and of citizenship 
education prompted me to make the following observations: 
 
• I became increasingly concerned with pupils’ seeming lack of interest and of 
active involvement in the Representative Council of Learners (RCLs), an 
‘official’ structure set up to promote student participation in representative 
governing bodies in South African  schools. 
• By contrast, there were a few ‘unofficial’ Democracy Projects, such as the  
South African Youth Ministers Project (SAYMP)
2
 that played a crucial role in  
                                                 
1
 The inclusion of a Citizenship/Civic education component was a positive step, although (as I will 
argue later) it was based on a minimal conception of citizenship education. However, Curriculum 2005 
(1997) was reviewed in 2000 and replaced by the Revised National Curriculum Statement (RNCS). 
Again, there is a reinforcement of the minimalist interpretation of citizenship education contained in 
the original Curriculum 2005 (1997), and an equally minimalist emphasis on educating learners to a 
greater extent about rights, and less about the responsibilities of citizens in a democratic society, in the 
later, revised version. 
 
2 The South African Youth Ministers Project was established in mid-2002. The project aims to 
develop leadership skills, strengthen democracy, promote good governance and combat 
unemployment. To date the project is implemented in 15 schools in 3 provinces, with a total of 225 
beneficiaries and the support of national government ministers. Each school has 10 learners 
participating in the project, representing their schools and communities. These learners are elected into 
office as “Youth Ministers” under the auspices of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA).  
The Youth Ministers Project’s mission is “to promote youth participation in active citizenship and 
volunteerism in building our New South Africa, to strengthen our democracy and governance … and 
well-informed skilled citizens for tomorrow” (www.saymp.co.za, 16 May 2006). 
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developing innovative programmes, projects and strategies to enhance 
participatory, community-based citizenship education in South African 
schools, including Nirvana Secondary School.  
• This led me to believe that successful education for citizenship and democracy 
in post-apartheid South Africa sees schools as inseparable from community 
engagement, thus citizenship education in relation to democracy requires a 
range of forms of learning both ‘taught’ and ‘caught’, or ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
schools. 
• This reminded me of the democratic Student Representative Councils (SRCs) 
and progressive Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSAs) in the 1980s 
that equipped young people to be active, critical and inquiring citizens who 
took part in the struggle for a democratic South Africa.   
● Unfortunately, education policy in South Africa after the transition recedes 
from the model of democratic citizenship developed in the anti-apartheid 
movement, with roots in the Freedom Charter tradition.
3
 
 
It is impossible to understand recent educational policy and curriculum developments 
in South Africa without considering the anti-apartheid struggle, and its concept of 
“People’s Education for People’s Power” that embodies the Athenian notion of 
people’s power. The idea of ‘People’s Education’ was first developed by the African 
National Congress (ANC) in protest against the Bantu Education Act of 1953. In 
ensuing years the term ‘People’s Education’ was used to establish an alternative, 
popular education against a racially segregated system of education. In the 1980s, 
anti-apartheid educational organisations like the National Education Co-ordinating 
Committee (NECC) adopted the catch phrase “People’s Education for People’s 
                                                 
3
 The Freedom Charter is the anti-apartheid opposition document drafted in Kliptown, Johannesburg, 
in 1955. The Charter lays out the requirements for a free, non-racial and democratic South Africa. The 
Charter’s preamble has the hallmarks of prototypical Athenian democracy: people’s power, self-rule, 
equality and freedom, and envisages “a government that is based on the will of the people, black and 
white” (The Freedom Charter, 1955). Furthermore, it comprised 10 clauses which committed its 
adherents to strive for the achievement of a democratic state that expressed people’s power or people 
rule in South Africa. One of the clause envisioned South Africa, as a country where “the people shall 
govern” (The Freedom Charter, 1955). 
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Power” to express the strategic objective for the future of the educational struggle. I 
often look back with nostalgia to the days of ‘People’s Education’ and its vision that 
resembled a prototypical Athenian democracy based on mass participation.  
 
This tradition, recalling the Athenian version of democracy, emphasised preparation 
of school pupils for active participation in all social, political or cultural spheres of 
South African society. It is against this backdrop that this project on ‘Citizenship 
education in South Africa: A critique of post-apartheid citizenship education policy’ 
can be seen to be inspired by the anti-apartheid struggle notion of participatory 
democracy or mass-based politics in the 1980s. It is this prototypical concept of 
democracy, with regard to education for democratic citizenship, for which I 
personally have a great deal of admiration. I contend that this notion of active 
participatory citizenry is still relevant in post-apartheid South African schools. The 
thesis contends that successful education for democratic citizenship is more likely to 
be achieved when education policy endorses a modified version of the Athenian 
prototype of democratic participation and citizenship in South Africa schools.  
 
What are the criteria by which we might analyse and judge post-apartheid citizenship 
education policy? McLaughlin’s (1992) concept of citizenship, and education for 
citizenship, that is mapped in terms of a continuum of ‘minimal’ and ‘maximal’ 
interpretations suggests some possibilities. So, too, does the model of democratic 
citizenship developed in the anti-apartheid movement, with roots in the Freedom 
Charter tradition. Further criteria emanate from the international literature on 
citizenship and citizenship education that supports the claim that learning democratic 
citizenship is not limited to the formal school curriculum, but also requires active 
community engagement. For these reasons, I propose some fairly loose, overlapping 
questions and criteria for evaluating post-apartheid citizenship education policy: 
 
• Is the policy conceptually coherent? 
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• Does its concept of education for citizenship guide the practice in terms that 
are accessible to the school’s democratic community: parents, teachers and 
students, non-teaching staff, the principal and co-opted members? In other 
words, does it speak to its intended democratic audience? 
• How, if at all, does it justify its selection of democratic citizenship education? 
In other words, does its concept of student participation and representation, to 
use Pitkin’s (1967) phrase, reflect a representative model of democracy? 
• Does it envisage citizenship education being enjoyed by a significant 
proportion of the South African learners? In other words, does it cover 
opportunities for teaching about citizenship in schools and beyond?  
• Is it appropriate for the South African context? In other words, is it able to 
foster active, critical and inquiring individuals able to build, strengthen and 
consolidate South Africa’s democracy? 
• How does it justify the need for citizenship education? In other words, is 
compulsory citizenship education based on participatory democracy or on 
forced obedience, or even worse, unquestioning loyalty to the state?  
• Does it offer possible strategies for getting from where we are to where we 
ought to be? 
 
Unfortunately, what is emerging in post-apartheid education policy South Africa is a 
concept of citizenship education comprising of complex and contradictory elements 
that provide both continuity and discontinuity with what preceded the 1994 historic 
democratic elections. In short, there is a tension in post-apartheid South African 
educational policy and subsequent curriculum development between minimal and 
maximal conceptions of education for citizenship. Although the policy instruments 
have a maximal tone in place, they fail to provide guidance at the very points where it 
is most required. The positive elements are tentatively expressed and outweighed by 
the general orientation of the instruments. In fact, policy development after the 
transition reflects a minimalist conception of citizenship ― and by implication of 
citizenship education. 
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Using recent educational policy and curriculum developments as a focal point, I 
challenge post-apartheid citizenship education policy’s claim to promote education 
for citizenship and democracy in South African schools. In this context, a modified 
version of the Athenian prototype of participatory democracy and active citizenship 
are used as analytical tools and defended as frameworks for the participation of 
students in citizenship in South African schools. A critique of post-apartheid 
citizenship education policy in South Africa concerns: 
 
• exploration, interpretation and interrogation of what may be called the 
‘classical theory’, especially the democratic zeal for participation and its 
concept of citizenship, generally regarded as having emerged first in the 
prototypical Athenian democracy; 
• analysis of its implications for democratic citizenship education 
(determination, effects and content); 
• philosophical inquiry into the aim, justification and defence of compulsory 
schooling and compulsory citizenship education in schools; 
• evaluation of and prognosis for the recent proposals of compulsory 
schooling and compulsory citizenship education in South African schools. 
 
The thesis is divided into three different parts. Part 1 focuses on conceptual 
clarification, considering the meaning and practical significance of classical theory 
(and theories of ‘participatory democracy’), ‘representation’ and ‘citizenship’, in 
order to set up a framework from which to analyse the assumptions reflected in post-
apartheid education policy in South Africa. Chapter 2 presents and defends a view of 
democracy that reflects the democratic vision of the model of democracy developed 
in the anti-apartheid struggle and envisioned in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa (1996) ― as well as in the Charter tradition. The chapter begins by 
discussing conceptions of democracy practiced in the Greek city-state of Athens. The 
attention then turns to the modern theories of participatory democracy that 
corroborate and throw light on the value of education in democratic participation. The 
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chapter also shows that participatory democracy, as understood in the Athenian city-
state, as an idea and a practice is still relevant in modern societies like South Africa. 
 
In Chapter 3, I provide an account of the development of theories of citizenship since 
its origins in the Greek city-state of Athens. I consider the Athenian view of active 
citizenship as the most fitting model for citizenship in state schools. The chapter 
starts by considering various theories of citizenship that have built and expanded on 
the Athenian concept of citizenship in modern day societies. It argues that it is an 
education towards a maximal interpretation of citizenship that values individual 
autonomy, while at the same time builds modern democratic societies. In addition, it 
suggests that modern democracies such as Britain embrace an updated version of the 
Athenian prototype of citizenship and citizenship education as a foundation for 
citizenship education in schools. This chapter also gives consideration to British and 
United States studies on citizenship education that support the claim that learning 
democratic citizenship is not limited to the formal school curriculum, but also 
requires active community engagement. 
 
Part 2 centres on critical analysis and discussion of post-apartheid citizenship 
education policy in South Africa. Chapter 4 shows that South Africa is marked by 
different phases of citizenship that present challenges for citizenship education 
policy. The chapter begins by reflecting on the hierarchical and exclusive body of 
citizenship in South Africa. It shows how ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ were applied in order 
to foster apartheid and homeland citizenship in South Africa. It also establishes that 
the anti-apartheid vision endorsed a modified version of the Athenian prototype, one 
that was also reflected in the early post apartheid South African education policy 
documents. In addition, it claims that since it reflects different interpretations of 
citizenship, post-apartheid citizenship education policy is preoccupied with balancing 
these conflicting notions, instead of promoting a view of citizenship that embodies 
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attributes of ‘participative’ or ‘maximal’ components inherited from the struggle 
tradition and affirmed in the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses South African educational policy development as a product of a 
negotiated settlement or compromise between the anti-apartheid movement and the 
apartheid state. The chapter discusses how the democratic strengths of the anti-
apartheid movement were considerably curtailed during the interregnum, a 
negotiation period in South Africa. It argues that the anti-apartheid struggle’s vision 
of school democratic governance is undermined in post-apartheid South African 
educational policy development. Against this background, the thesis maintains that 
the main tendency in current state policy documents is to undermine democratic 
participation, the anti-apartheid vision that emphasises a highly participatory 
citizenship, and that their favoured conception of education for citizenship is 
minimalist. This chapter emphasises the need for a maximal approach to democracy 
and citizenship education in South African schools. 
 
In Chapter 6, I explore the claim that the Guides for Representative Councils of 
Learners (1999) attempt to blend the ‘prefect’ and Student Representative Councils’ 
traditions to consolidate democracy at school level. In so doing, the chapter argues 
that the Guides represent in significant respects retrieval of the less democratic 
tradition of student representation in South African schools. The chapter begins by 
looking at the claims and features of three contrasting views of student representative 
organisations in South African schools. In addition, it points out that Student 
Representative Councils were born out of the rejection of the unpopular ‘prefect 
system’, and shows how the Guides attempts to reconcile the ‘prefect’ and SRC 
traditions in post-apartheid South Africa. This chapter also provides a critical analysis 
of the Guides and argues that, despite its intention to promote democratic student 
representation, the policy document in the end regresses to features of the ‘prefect 
system’. The chapter ends by defending the Student Representative Councils’ 
tradition due to its emphasis of the educative potential of learner participation. 
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Part 3 is concerned with fundamental philosophical questions such as the aim, 
justification and defence of compulsory schooling and compulsory citizenship 
education in post-apartheid education policy for South African schools. In taking up 
this issue in Chapter 7, I mount a defence of compulsion, arguing that within the 
framework of the Athenian version of democracy and active citizenship, compulsory 
schooling and compulsory citizenship education can be justified as an essential 
component of the curriculum in South African schools. The chapter begins by noting 
that the concept of compulsory schooling is a recent phenomenon inherited from the 
western education tradition. The chapter argues that claiming the right to free and 
compulsory schooling and, by implication, compulsory citizenship education is 
linked to the struggle for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. It also 
points to the global policies that support universal compulsory schooling, and 
compulsory citizenship education. The chapter concludes that compulsory schooling 
is neither exclusive nor repressive, compulsory citizenship education can be justified 
on the grounds that it develops an active, self-helping type of character and promotes 
democratic citizenship education in South African schools. 
 
Chapter 8 examines the recently proposed compulsory citizenship education 
initiatives in South African schools, namely the Bill of Responsibilities and the 
national School Pledge. The documents aim to forge a democratic national character, 
as reflected in the Constitution of South Africa (1996). The chapter briefly discusses 
the background of the Bill of Responsibilities and the new national Schools Pledge. It 
shows that the language of the Bill of Responsibilities is prescriptive and dictatorial. 
The term ‘dictatorial’ is synonymous with the rise of totalitarian states based on mass  
participation ― that is with the collusion of the masses.
4
 The Bill appears to echo the 
                                                 
4
 According to Pateman (1970), the collapse of the Weimar Republic into fascism “underlay the 
tendency of ‘participation’ to become linked to the concept of totalitarianism rather than that of 
democracy” (p. 2). As a result, participatory democracy based on mass participation has been seen by 
some to pose a threat of ‘tyranny of the majority’ as de Tocqueville (2002) argued. The spectre of 
totalitarianism explains the concern with stability in a democratic polity. The “preoccupation with the 
stability of the political system … has its origins in the contrast drawn between ‘democracy’ and 
‘totalitarianism’ as the only two political alternatives” (Pateman, 1970, pp. 1-2).  
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apocalyptic stereotype of the youth who are dangerous, irresponsible, uncaring, 
reckless and ungovernable, a conception criticised by Seekings (1993) in Chapter 6. 
Unsurprisingly, the authors of the document are preoccupied with stability and 
normality in post-apartheid South African schools, rather than with the educative 
potential of learner participation. It is against this background that the Bill of 
Responsibilities might be seen as dictating or demanding unquestioning obedience 
from learners in South African schools.   
 
It then maintains that the patriotic School Pledge promotes obedience, if not 
unquestioning loyalty, to the South African government. I argue that the Bill of 
Responsibilities and the School Pledge are not compatible with compulsory 
citizenship education that is designed to promote active, critical and inquiring South 
African citizens. Furthermore, I point out that the proposed value-based education 
documents are unlikely to lead the country into its desired future – the promotion, 
strengthening and consolidation of South Africa’s democracy. Finally, the Bill of 
Responsibilities and the national School Pledge do not embrace cosmopolitan ideals, 
that is, they place allegiance to South Africa ahead of universal humanity. A post-
apartheid citizenship education policy that is consistent with the needs and aspirations 
of “the people” resembles the tradition of Athenian democracy, and its conception of 
citizenship. An appropriate model of democratic citizenship was developed in the 
anti-apartheid struggle, reflected in early policy documents, but diluted in the later 
official documents.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
PROTOTYPICAL ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION AND 
EDUCATION 
 
 
[O]ur chief troubles about the classical theory [the Athenian prototype of 
democracy] centered in the proposition that ‘the people’ hold a definite and 
rational opinion about every individual question and that they give effect to 
this opinion ― in a democracy ― by choosing ‘representatives’ who will see 
to it that that opinion is carried out. Thus the selection of the representatives is 
made secondary to the primary purpose of the democratic arrangement which 
is to vest the power of deciding political issues in the electorate (Schumpeter, 
1950, p. 269, addition mine).  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Schumpeter attacks what he calls ‘the classical theory of democracy’, the prototypical 
concept of democracy that expresses the will of the electorate or ‘the people’
5
 as 
reasonable beings. In the course of this chapter, I will examine Schumpeter’s main 
criticism of the notion of democratic theory as a theory of means and ends. The 
classical doctrine, Schumpeter asserts, is a political method designed to produce a 
strong representative government. The theory of democracy appears to be tied either 
                                                 
5
 The term ‘the people’ denotes what Arnstein (1969) refers to as the maximal degree of citizen power 
and control that allows for more participation in political issues. This prototypical concept of 
democracy implies that there is genuine robust debate and engagement with government policies 
which should “articulate the practice of a substantial form of education for citizenship” (McLaughlin, 
1992, p. 245). In other words, in a democracy ‘the people’ are encouraged to participate actively in the 
discourses of educational policy development. I will look at citizenship education policy later on, in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 8; the chapters will show that post-apartheid citizenship education policy is not 
consistent with: 1) an updated/modified version of the Athenian prototype of democracy, especially its 
democratic zeal for participation; 2) McLaughlin’s (1992) maximalist conception of citizenship, and of 
citizenship education; 3) the model of democratic citizenship developed in the anti-apartheid 
movement, with roots in the Freedom Charter tradition; and 4) global trends in liberal democracies that 
support the claim that learning democratic citizenship is not limited to formal school curriculum, but 
also requires active community engagement, all of which I will argue to be essential parts of education 
for and in a democratic South African society. 
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to the classical definition of ‘rule by the people’, or a maximalist conception of 
democracy, on the one hand, or to the revisionists’ argument, on the other, that 
stresses representative rule, or a minimalist conception of democracy. The 
prototypical concept of democracy that puts political power in the hands of the 
electorates, not the representatives, continues to raise questions about its relevance 
and viability in modern democratic societies. In this chapter, I challenge 
Schumpeter’s minimalist conception of democratic participation6 ― where 
sovereignty is exercised by a subset of ‘the people’, usually on the basis of election. 
In the Greek city-state of Athens, maximal participation in decision making was a 
central feature of democracy. At the same time, classical critics (classical Greek 
philosophers) who used the term ‘democracy’ in a minimalist fashion, cast grave 
doubt on the possibility of its attainment. By the middle of the twentieth century 
democracy was still the ideal, but it was the emphasis on participation that had 
become contentious and with it the classical formulation of democratic theory. The 
purpose of this chapter is two-fold: 1) it defends a modified version of the Athenian 
prototype, especially its democratic zeal for participation; and 2) also shows that 
participation does not stand in contrast to representative democracy; it is possible to 
combine the two into representative participatory democracy. To support this 
assertion, a substantial body of philosophical work constituting variations on the 
Athenian prototype of democracy, deliberative democracy and participatory forms of 
representation bear testimony to the relevance and, indeed, the compellingness of the 
classical theory.  
 
                                                 
6
 In the introduction to this thesis I mentioned that McLaughlin (1992) locates citizenship on a 
continuum of maximalist and minimalist conceptions. In Chapter 3, I will show how McLaughlin 
contrasts minimal and maximal conceptions according to how much political involvement is necessary 
for effective citizenship. Since this chapter is concerned with democratic participation, I will confine 
myself to McLaughlin’s notion of political involvement. On minimal views, political involvement and 
participation is limited primarily to voting for elected representatives. In contrast, a maximal concept 
of democracy emphasises the broad participation (decision making) of ‘the people’ in government, that 
is to say, direct democracy. In brief, Schumpeter’s minimalist conception of democratic participation 
is not compatible with the Athenian prototype of democracy and active citizenship as defined in the 
previous chapter.    
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This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1 reflects on the advocacy, 
challenges and criticisms of the prototypical concept of democracy. Section 2 
examines various theories of democracy that endorse and explicate the educational 
value of participation. Section 3 reveals that, notwithstanding the classical and 
revisionists’ critique of it, the prototypical Athenian model of democracy remains 
viable in present-day societies. Section 4 concludes by maintaining that participation 
and representation can be effectively embodied in public institutions that educate for 
democracy, both at the macro and micro level of modern society. These sections are 
intended to introduce a modified version of the Athenian prototype of democracy 
both as an analytical tool and as a framework for the participation and representation 
of learners in post-apartheid South African schools.  
 
2.2  Prototypical Athenian democracy: its problems and its virtues    
This section discusses conceptions of democracy in the times of the Greek city-state 
of Athens. The purpose is to show how classical theorists defend, debate and criticise 
Athenian democracy. Among the Athenian governors was Pericles (Thucydides, 
1972), the first ideologue of a maximal conception of democracy, which he acclaims 
as being the rule of the whole people. The Athenian fervour for democratic 
participation is expressed in Pericles’s declaration of the value of democracy, 
contained in a funeral oration delivered to honour Athenian soldiers who died in the 
Peloponnesian Wars. He said: 
 
Our constitution is called democracy because power is in the hands not of a 
minority but of the whole people. … We are free and tolerant in our private 
lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law. This is because it commands 
our deep respect. … Here each individual is interested not only in his own 
affairs but in the affairs of the state as well: even those who are mostly 
occupied with their own business are extremely well-informed on general 
politics … we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man 
who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all 
(Thucydides, 1972, pp. 145-147).  
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There are two immediate points worth noting about Pericles’s affirmation of the value 
of Athenian democracy. First, the orator proclaims the value of individual autonomy, 
as a central feature of democratic theory. Secondly, he also characterises democracy 
as ‘the rule of the people’. In other words, in a democracy the personal and public 
dimensions of citizenship are not incompatible but, rather, are intimately and 
reciprocally linked. In addition to the above, Pericles’s speech is notable for three 
reasons: 1) in contrast to his contemporaries’ views, as this section will show, it 
affirms the democratic ideals of the Greek city-state of Athens; 2) it encourages more 
citizens to participate in collective self-government than Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle’s vision of appropriate and desirable government permits; and 3) it also 
shows that citizens’ active participation in democracy is likely to be an educational 
one. As Kreibig (2000) maintains, “we might contest Pericles’ claim that ‘the whole 
people’ governed, but here is a powerful statement in support of participatory 
democracy” (p. 94). Nonetheless, this prototypical, maximal concept of democracy, 
which was later revived and famously espoused in 1863 by Abraham Lincoln as 
“government of the people, by the people, for the people” (Rogers, 1984, p. 20), has 
over the centuries remained contentious, both in theory and in practice.  
 
The starting point is to look at the prototypical concept of democracy from the 
perspective of those writing in the context of the Greek city-state, who had pointed to 
the problem of practice, and the realisation of the democratic ideal. In Plato’s 
dialogue, The Republic (1994), Socrates’s ideal (fictitious) city-state was an organic 
unity of reciprocally assisting parts, or classes of people, each of which was needed to 
make up the whole. The city of Socrates’s imagination grouped citizens in three 
classes: 1) the guardians who were properly selected and trained to manage the affairs 
of the city-state; 2) the auxiliaries had a ‘policing’ function, they protected the state, 
suppressed domestic disorder, and repelled attack from outside; and 3) ordinary 
citizens, these were, farmers, artisans and other workers, who engaged in the menial 
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offices of production.
7 
Socrates’ tri-functional system embodies the idea that only the 
wise should rule, and that wisdom was generally the function of bloodlines (although 
Socrates allowed for the possibility of ‘iron and copper’ children to be born to ‘gold’ 
parents, and or potential philosopher-rulers to worker and artisan parents) and of 
specialised education. On Socrates’s elitist model of the state (and of education 
within the state), participation in public affairs is best suited for those who have what 
it takes to be rulers, just as the rational and the spirited are the ruling elements of the 
soul (but not its appetitive element – however important desires may otherwise be). 
According to Socrates, it is difficult to argue that democracy is efficient or indeed 
just; so it would be unwise to encourage more people to participate in government. In 
a nutshell, the prototypical, maximal concept of democracy, or ‘government of the 
people by the people’, is neither feasible nor desirable.   
 
Plato (1994) and Aristotle (1943), then, are among the prominent philosophers who 
have interrogated Athenian democracy, especially its enthusiasm for democratic 
participation. In The Republic, Plato argues that the prototype Greek demos can be 
understood as ‘the people’ or the ‘mob’. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, for 
Pericles the distinct features of Athenian democracy are freedom and equality. In the 
introduction to this thesis I also mentioned that, even though the Athenians 
bequeathed to us their conception of democracy and participation, most of the basic 
                                                 
7
 Socrates referred to his imagined society, as he sketched it, as “a single noble lie” (see Plato, 1994, p. 
118). In other words, by propagating the ‘noble lie’, Socrates, permits the rest of the community to 
submit to the rule of the guardians. At the same, members of the three classes — gold, auxiliaries and 
workers ― have to be made to believe that the mythic character of this postulation — castes of gold, 
silver and copper or iron, is the way God intended, and there was little room for change. Plato writes, 
“with a single noble lie. … I’ll be trying above all to convince the rulers themselves and the military, 
and secondarily the rest of the community … that God included gold in the mixture when he was 
forming those of you who have what it takes to be rulers, silver when he was forming the auxiliaries, 
and iron and copper when he was forming the farmers and other workers” (Plato, 1994, pp. 118-119). 
Socrates openly objected to a form of government that did not conform to his idea of a perfect republic 
where political power and participation were reserved for the guardians and the auxiliaries: democracy 
as understood in the Greek city-state of Athens was not compatible with Socrates’s idea. As a critic of 
Athenian democracy, Socrates was at odds with his fellow Athenians’ conception of democracy that 
denotes people’s power.  
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assumptions of Athenian democracy (such as freedom and equality) were not pursued 
with sufficient rigour and consistency.  
 
Plato criticises this concept of democracy of his time precisely because of its 
emphasis on individual autonomy (freedom) and citizens’ active participation 
(equality) in the polity. In a democracy, Plato writes, citizens have “independence and 
freedom of speech, and everyone has the right to do as he chooses … it’s an 
enjoyable, lax, and variegated kind of political system, which treats everyone as 
equal, whether or not they are” (1994, pp. 295-297). For this reason, Athenian 
democracy runs the danger of excessive freedom, of permitting citizens to do as they 
like, which leads to anarchy. Secondly, Plato argues that strict equality, that is to say, 
the mob’s belief that everyone has a right and equal capacity to rule, is likely to lead 
to instability, since it entrusts the affairs of the state to those leaders with no political 
knowledge (episteme) and skills (techne). The author criticises the arbitrary rotational 
system of government by the mob on the grounds that making political decisions 
required knowledge and skill, not opinion, something that can only be attained by the 
few who are best equipped, who possess the requisite rational and philosophical 
skills. His basic weapon against Athenian democracy, Wolff (1996) tells us, is the 
‘craft analogy’. This means that if ruling is a skill, it seems absurd or irrational to 
leave democracy “to the rabble, the vulgar, the unwashed or the unfit” (Wolff, 1996, 
p. 73). In short, mass political participation will lead to worse results and picking the 
brains of the populace is likely to be harmful to the Athenian city-state.8 
 
Aristotle considered the state (the ‘polis’) to be a creation of nature, and held that 
man is by nature a ‘political’ animal. Aristotle’s ideal city-state has its origins in the 
natural associations of male and female, and of master and slave, freeborn, non-
                                                 
8
 It is often claimed that much of Plato’s anti-democratic orientation came from Socrates’s (Plato’s 
teacher) trial and subsequent death at the hands of the 500-man jury of Athens. Socrates was found 
guilty of corrupting the minds of the youth of Athens and undermining Athenian democracy. Against 
this backdrop, Plato’s charge against the democracy he knew from the Greek city-state of Athens was 
that it opened the gates to blatant injustice, and tyranny by an ignorant and prejudiced majority. 
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artisan males and artisans and manual labourers. Given that the master-slave relation 
is basic and natural, females, slaves and workers’ castes are to be excluded from 
taking part in political decision-making, on the grounds that their occupation deprives 
them of the leisure required both for active political participation and for the 
intellectual development such participation demands. In a democracy, the demos are 
capable of wisdom, but the “decrees of the people override the laws, by referring all 
things to the popular assembly” (Aristotle, 1943, pp. 179-180). In support of Plato, 
Aristotle further argues that if power is in the hands of ‘the people’ the polity “could 
easily degenerate into a form of autocracy, where the popular majority ignored the 
limits of laws and imposed its will regardless” (1943, pp. 178-179). In brief, Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle challenge and criticise the prototypical, maximal concept of 
democracy as a form of government that is both unfeasible and undesirable. On the 
other hand, in the classical canon of democratic theory, there is Pericles, a political 
theorist who had saluted a maximal Athenian prototype as the best possible regime.  
 
In sum, the discussion of democracy and democratic theory can also be construed in 
minimal and maximal terms. At the maximal end is Pericles’s conception of 
democracy that emphasises broad participation in political bodies through which ‘the 
people’ ruled Athens. At the other end are Socrates, Plato and Aristotle who provided 
a minimal and conditional role for the demos, for a number of reasons:  
• The inadequacy of Athenian democracy, as a ‘rule by the demos’, ‘the mob’, 
‘the rabble’, ‘the vulgar’, ‘the unwashed’ or ‘the unfit’, is evident with the 
purge, trial and death of the most upright citizens like Socrates;  
• Plato never saw ‘the best’ social and political order in the democratic city-
state of Athens: “democracy originates when the poor win, kill or exile their 
opponents” (Plato, 1994, p. 295); and 
• for Aristotle, in a democracy, political offices are open to all, and people’s 
power overrides the law by or submitting decisions on policy to the popular 
assembly.  
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The three main concerns I have with the classical critics’ minimalist approach to 
democracy pertain to the following aspects: first, their definition of democracy as 
‘mob rule’ is based on their ideals of a perfect Greek city-state of Athens; second, 
their assumption that mass political participation will lead to worse results and 
picking the brains of the populace is harmful in a democratic polity; and third, their 
denial that the collective ‘will of the people’ is feasible, and desirable. The discussion 
of prototypical democracy that draws from the work of Pericles, Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle has a significant historical bearing on issues addressed later, in particular the 
discourse on education for citizenship and democracy in South African schools. By 
drawing on Pericles’s strong affirmation of democracy, as depicted in this section, I 
hope — in the process of this study — to lay the basis for a model of democracy that 
vouches for an uninterrupted education in citizenship appropriate to the South African 
context. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle’s minimal and conditional role for the demos: 
‘the mob’ who lacks political knowledge and skills anticipates the post-apartheid 
South African citizenship education policy’s tendency that undermines democratic 
participation and active citizenry, conceptions synonymous for the Greek city-state of 
Athens. However, this chapter vouches for the prototypical, maximal concept of 
democracy that promotes broad, ‘active’ participation of citizens in the Greek city-
state of Athens. 
 
Regarding Socrates, Plato and Aristotle’s critique of prototypical democracy, my 
response to their claims is as follows: 1) a major function of participation in the 
theory of democracy is an educative one, that is, the development of an active, self- 
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helping type of character and the pursuit of the common good
9
; 2) there is no 
insurmountable knowledge barrier between the different classes, the guardians, the 
auxiliaries and the farmers, artisans and other workers, as Budge (1993) will show in 
this chapter; and 3) deliberative democratic procedures impart information, promote 
good reason and, generally, heighten moral, social and political awareness of the 
elites and demos alike. There are three thinner conditions than those of shared 
understanding or the goals of finding a common good are essential for 
communicative democracy, Young (1996) argued. These are 1) interdependence of 
people living together in a polity; 2) its members must have a commitment to equal 
respect for one another; and 3) members must also agree on procedural rules of fair 
discussion and decision-making. In contrast to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle’s 
understanding of democracy, the anti-apartheid struggle’s vision of democratic 
participation suggests that a maximal conception of democracy or popular politics is 
feasible, realistic and can, in fact, restore stability.  
 
In Chapter 4 I will also show how the Freedom Charter sought the common good by 
expressing interdependence of the South African people across race and ethnic lines. 
Second, the Charter affirmed the basic assumptions of a prototypical Athenian 
democracy, such as equality and freedom. Thirdly, it declared that no democratic 
state can claim legitimacy if it is not based on ‘the will of the people’. In short, the 
Freedom Charter’s political and educational goods were later reflected in the anti-
                                                 
9
 Schumpeter (1950) and Young (1996) have shown how problematic, and yet useful, the idea of the 
common good is, especially where democracy is pursued. According to Schumpeter, the common good 
means different things to different people. Furthermore, even if a definition of the common good 
proved acceptable to all, this will not imply equally definite answers to individual issues, Schumpeter 
argued. The author concludes that there is no such thing as a uniquely determined common good. 
Young questions the deliberative theorists’ assumption that deliberation must “either begin with shared 
understandings or take a common good as their goal” (1996, p. 120). There are at least two problems 
with the way the common good is formulated, Young argued. Firstly, contemporary pluralist societies 
lack sufficient shared understandings that appeal in many situations of conflict and solving collective 
problems. Secondly, the assumption of prior unity obviates the need for self-transcendence as an 
important component of a communicative model of democracy (see Young, 1996, p. 125). In the next 
section of this chapter, I will show, as Pericles pointed out earlier in this chapter, how Rousseau (1968) 
and Mill (1975) defend the pursuit of democracy as a way of achieving the common good and as an 
expression of freedom and equality.  
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apartheid struggle and, its concept of “People’s Education for People’s Power”. For 
example, Chapter 5 discusses how the National Education Co-ordinating Committee 
and its concept of “People’s Education for People’s Power” saved the student 
movement from destroying itself and gave them a practical political perspective in the 
1980s. A defence of compulsory citizenship education that promotes social cohesion 
— which is the common good of all South Africans, will receive attention in Chapter 
7. In the next section, the attention turns to the modern theories of democracy that 
corroborate and throw light on the role of education in democratic participation.   
 
2.3 Theories of democracy: participation and education  
Inspired by the Athenian prototype, not to mention Pericles’s (Thucydides, 1972) 
affirmation, theorists such as Rousseau (1968) and Mill (1975) testify to and 
elucidate the educational value of democratic participation. Let us examine these 
theories of participation and democratic theory in more detail. To recapitulate, 
Pericles’s praise of the Athenian prototype of democracy is based on a conception of 
the Greek city-state as comprising two reciprocal dimensions, namely the personal 
(autonomous, individual) and the public (political) dimension. Echoing Pericles’s 
assertion, Rousseau’s hypothesis as stated in The Social Contract (1968) makes two 
points clear: 1) that participation in democratic institutions helps ‘the people’ to make 
decisions that affect their lives; and 2) participation is a way of ensuring good 
government. In order to understand Rousseau’s theory of participatory democracy, it 
is essential to be clear about the problem of the political system he describes, that is:  
 
To find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each 
member with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, 
while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains 
as free as before. … Just as the sovereignty is inalienable, it is for the same 
reason indivisible; for either the will is general or it is not; either it is the will 
of the body of the people, or merely that of a part. In the first case, a 
declaration of will is an act of sovereignty and constitutes law; in the second 
case, it is only a declaration of a particular will or an act of administration, it 
is at best a mere decree (Rousseau, 1968, pp. 60-70). 
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Rousseau sets out to defend a prototypical, maximal concept of democracy, both on 
instrumental grounds (as a way of achieving the common good) and in itself (as an 
expression of freedom and equality). Rousseau’s ideal system is designed to develop 
the personal and public dimensions of citizenship in three ways: 1) participation 
increases individual freedom by enabling the individual to be (and remain) his/her 
own master; 2) a participatory process ensures that all citizens are equally dependent 
on each other and equally subject to the law; and 3) participation has an integrative 
function; it increases the feeling among individual citizens that they belong to their 
community. Considering the implications of Rousseau’s theory of participatory 
democracy for the education of citizens, it promises to teach an active, participatory 
citizenry how to preserve individual liberties and appeal to the public good.  
 
In contrast to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle’s minimalist account of democracy, 
Rousseau’s participatory or maximal conception of democracy aims to educate the 
entire citizenry to take an active part in government to discharge, as Pericles already 
advocated, their public functions, local or general. In Rousseau’s theory of 
participatory democracy, participation has a profound effect on the education of all 
citizens, using the term ‘education’ in the widest sense. For example, during this 
participatory mode in decision making, the individual learns that individual and 
collective interests are linked, and “each one of us puts into the community his person 
and all his powers under the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body, we 
incorporate every member as an indivisible part of the whole” (Rousseau, 1968, p. 
61). Put differently, through their participatory role, citizens “come to feel little or no 
conflict between the demands of the public and private sphere … the citizen is 
educated to distinguish between impulses and desires, learning to be a public as well 
as a private citizen” (see Pateman, 1970, p. 25).  
 
Looking ahead to later discussion regarding citizenship education, this implies that, 
unless learners are educated to contribute both in their own affairs, namely how best 
to develop their characters along with taking part in matters concerning the state, 
24 
 
South Africa’s democracy will witness declining levels of political participation. In 
Chapter 7, I will argue that within the theoretical framework of a modified Athenian 
democracy, compulsory schooling and compulsory citizenship education can be 
justified on the grounds that they: 1) promote individual autonomy, a citizen’s ability 
and inclination to act for himself; and 2) build social cohesion by strengthening and 
consolidating South Africa’s democracy – which is a political goal or common good. 
The commitment to the public good is likely to produce remarkable change among 
learners in terms of “putting aside their particular interests and seeking the good of 
the whole” (Young, 1996, p. 126). This moral/personal development from egoism to 
autonomy enables learners to become free and fulfilled beings. Rousseau’s argument 
that centers on the pursuit of the public good and individual freedom had an influence 
on a number of theorists. 
 
In his essay ‘Representative Government’ (1975), Mill defends a popular form of 
government. In a similar fashion to Rousseau’s argument, Mill bases his defence of 
popular government on two considerations. Firstly, popular government promotes the 
good management of the affairs of society. Secondly, popular government promotes a 
better and higher form of moral character. Of note in the present conjecture is that the 
emphasis on a self-helping, active individual is not in conflict with the idea of a more 
collective, public democracy. On the whole, Mill’s theory adds a further dimension to 
Rousseau’s participatory conception of democracy. Mill claims that it is only within a 
context of popular participatory institutions or large-scale society that one sees an 
active type of character fostered: 
  
 The active, self help character is not only the best, but is the likeliest to 
acquire all that is really excellent. The private citizen is called upon to weigh 
interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another 
rule than his private partialities to apply at every turn, principles and maxims 
which have for their reason of existence the common good. He is made to feel 
himself one of the public and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit 
(Mill, 1975, pp. 340-341). 
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For this reason, Mill’s preferred form of government is to be judged by its effects on 
individuals, whether they are able to transcend their subjective, self-regarding 
perspective and take the public interest into account. What comes out in Mill’s work 
is that all citizens should play their role in the exercise of sovereignty. Mill’s defence 
of popular government favours a participatory or maximal conception of democracy. 
For example, when local government institutions promote debates on current issues 
or allow citizens to share in collective decisions affecting the political life of the 
community, Pateman (1970) maintains, this is more than likely to force an individual 
“to widen his horizons and take the public interest into account” (p. 30). There is a 
stress here on practising popular government at local level, as an enabling condition 
for participation on a large scale. As the last section of this chapter will emphasise, 
the educational aspect of participatory democracy relies on active engagement in 
many spheres of society, namely in schools, community organisations, mass 
movements and so on. Rousseau and Mill see the educative function of participation 
in much the same way.  
 
For both theorists, Rousseau and Mill, the Athenian democratic prototype and 
education for citizenship are inseparable. In contrast to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle’s 
scepticism of Athenian democracy, Rousseau and Mill’s interpretation suggests that 
participation of citizens in government develops an active character and contributes to 
the common welfare of society. By also participating in all aspects of public life, 
critical and rational thinking allow individuals to actively engage in the attempt to 
improve the public good. In sum, at odds with the anti-democratic critiques, 
Rousseau and Mill’s theories uphold a maximal conception of democracy that 
informs the orientation of subsequent chapters here, regarding a conception of 
democracy based on the participatory vision of the anti-apartheid struggle in South 
Africa. In Chapter 4, I will show how the vision of the Freedom Charter embodies 
attributes of ‘participative’ or ‘maximal’ components of democracy. Chapter 5 
examines ‘People’s Education’ movement’s conception of democracy that 
emphasised democratic participation and greater involvement of students, teachers, 
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and parents in school affairs. In Chapter 6 I defend the Student Representative 
Councils’ democratic tradition on the grounds of its emphasis on the educative 
potential of learner participation. In other words, the theory of participatory 
democracy has the effect of empowering and educating the student population in 
South African schools. Yet, substantial doubts and reservations about participatory 
theories of democracy — such as the works of Rousseau and Mill — emerged from 
revisionist writers on democratic theory in the mid-twentieth century, and it is to 
these that we now turn.  
 
Spearheaded by Schumpeter (1950), the revisionists’ scepticism of the classical 
notion of popular participation in politics derives from the conviction that theories of 
earlier writers on democracy are in need of drastic revision. Having expressed his 
uneasiness about the classical theory, as stated in the citation that precedes the 
introduction on the present chapter, Schumpeter provides an influential revision of 
the theory of democracy. 
 
[T]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals [i.e. representatives] acquire the power 
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. … The 
classical theory … attributed to the electorate an altogether unrealistic degree 
of initiative. … The principle of democracy then merely means that the reins 
of government should be handed to those who command more support than do 
any of the competing individuals or teams (Schumpeter, 1950, pp. 269-273, 
addition mine). 
 
As the quotation indicates, the basis of Schumpeter’s main criticism of the classical 
doctrine is that democracy is a method, rather than an ideal of political culture, where 
competing individuals, rather than the public at large, acquire the power to decide on 
public affairs. Its modus operandi, therefore, is a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote and in contrast with Lincoln’s ideal of ‘government of the people, by the people, 
for the people’ that places faith on the demos to decide on matters of self-government. 
In Schumpeter’s revised theory, competition for leadership, not citizen participation 
and involvement in the making of decisions, is the distinctive and vital feature of 
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democracy. There seems to be no room for active participation of ‘the people’ as far 
as political decision-making is concerned. The only means of participation open to 
Schumpeter’s citizens is voting for political leaders. The “citizens’ votes serve the 
purpose of electing a government from among candidates competing for leadership, 
which entitles them to act on behalf of the electorate” (Enslin, 2000, p. 146). The 
electorate do not normally control their leaders except by replacing them at election 
with alternative leaders. Since the focus of the theory of democracy is on the 
minority, this is to say, the leaders, the electoral mass “is incapable of action other 
than stampede”, according to Schumpeter (1950, p. 283).  
 
Schumpeter’s minimalist conception of democracy has a good deal to say about the 
masses’ lack of rationality in political matters. As Schumpeter puts it: 
 
The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon 
as he enters the political field. He argues and analyses in a way which he 
could readily recognise as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He 
becomes a primitive again. His thinking becomes associative and affective 
(Schumpeter, 1950, p. 262). 
 
Schumpeter’s claim that the ordinary citizens are incapable of making everyday 
political decisions is not without contradictions, as the next section of this chapter 
will show. Part of what Schumpeter says here is that in the domain of politics the 
masses have no well-defined role. It is leaders who must be active, who initiate and 
decide on political issues. It is competition between leaders for votes that is the 
characteristically democratic element in this account of political method. For 
Schumpeter ‘participation’ has no special or central role in democratic citizenship 
education. My disquiet about Schumpeter’s minimalist conception of democracy, 
which also applies to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, is that it regards the demos or 
electorates as passive, apathetic, inactive and generally uninterested in public affairs. 
Theorists of popular government, such as Pericles, Rousseau and Mill have shown 
that citizenship participation in a democracy is likely to be an educational one. The 
criticisms of the prototypical concept of democracy I have examined were advanced, 
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for the most part, by classical critics who thought of democracy, or at least of the 
Athenian democracy, as unrealistic — indeed, as an illusion. Schumpeter too, as he 
examines the idea of people’s power, emphasises the masses’ lack of initiative in 
political matters.  
 
At this point, it would appear that Socrates, Plato and Aristotle and Schumpeter’s 
challenge and criticism of the prototypical concept of democracy are not incompatible 
but, indeed, intimately and reciprocally linked. The next section of this chapter will 
challenge Schumpeter’s minimalist account of democracy. Overall, the problems and 
objections raised against the Athenian democracy can be summarised as follows:  
• In the Greek city-state of Athens, democracy was understood as legitimising 
mob rule;  
• as such, the Athenian prototype picture of democratic man is hopelessly 
unrealistic;  
• to partake in (and decide on) political issues and affairs requires judgement, 
skill and rational commitment, essentials that only the elites possess; 
• the Athenian prototype of democracy does not recognise, indeed ignores, the 
importance of leadership; 
• therefore, democracy is a specialist business which should be conducted by 
the experts until electors choose other representatives. 
 
I do not concur with Schumpeter’s ‘revisionist’ model of democracy that also sees 
tyranny in the masses and virtue in the elites. On the contrary, the next section will 
defend a modified version of the Athenian prototype that has sought to challenge the 
anti-popular-participation arguments, especially the alleged inability of Schumpeter’s 
electoral citizens to participate in political life. The last section will take participation 
and representation as two interrelated and complementary elements of democratic 
theory. The debate about the classical doctrine proves to be far from over, as 
contemporary theories have re-launched a defence of Athenian democracy in the 
context of modern democratic societies.  
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2.4 Popular participation and democracy: a deliberative perspective  
Thus far, we have noted that the classical critics and revisionist theorists have 
objected that the common people are too ignorant, uneducated and unmotivated to 
hold the key to a truly democratic polity. This claim, that the ordinary citizens are 
incapable of making everyday political decisions, is not without contradictions. For 
instance, if the multitude should be naturally excluded from direct decision-making 
because of ignorance and lack of initiative, why would they participate in electing a 
government from among ‘entitled’ candidates competing for leadership? A different 
standpoint to this seemingly anti-democratic and paradoxical stance is worth quoting 
at length, for what it reveals about both human agency and the political nature of 
democratic processes:  
 
[T]erms like ‘political ignorance’ and ‘expertise’, ‘uneducated’, 
‘unsophisticated’ and ‘apathetic’ are all controvertible from differing points of 
view. This is particularly true when they are regarded as static and 
unresponsive to changes in political circumstances. … To accept that these 
characteristics are not static and that they change with political circumstances 
is to accept the thesis of participatory theorists, namely that an extension of 
opportunities will itself change the political nature of many citizens from the 
apathy and lack of interest, which produce withdrawal and ignorance, to 
involvement and interest, which produce more sophistication and information 
(Budge, 1993, p. 148). 
 
The quotation above endorses a modified version of the Athenian prototype of 
democracy that provides for a broad, ‘active’ participation of citizens in making 
political decisions that affect their lives. In opposition to the classical critics’ and 
revisionists’ attack on Athenian democracy, Budge admits that while the masses 
certainly need information and the time to make sense of democracy, they are 
nevertheless capable of acting responsibly when asked to do so. Just as we expect all 
adults to take responsibility for directing their own personal lives, so they are also 
capable of taking a share in decisions affecting the life of their society. There is a 
30 
 
need to extend Plato, Aristotle and Schumpeter’s circumscribed democracy of the 
‘demos’ in local decision-making so that ordinary people are able to contribute to the 
public good. Even more importantly, if we leave decisions on any subject to the 
experts (Plato), freeborn, non-artisan males (Aristotle) or elites (Schumpeter), we 
may be deceiving ourselves about their abilities. Moreover, giving unchecked powers 
to the ‘natural born leaders’ might lead to feathering their own nests. In support of 
this claim, Chapter 6 will show how the prefectorial system was resented and rejected 
because prefects enjoyed privileges and powers and were easily distinguished from 
the rest of the student population in South African schools in the 70s.  
 
Budge has challenged the classical and revisionists’ minimalist conception of 
democracy. In his essay ‘Direct Democracy: Setting Appropriate Terms of Debate’ 
(1993), he retrieves elements of a prototypical Athenian democracy. The author 
defends Athenian democracy that was direct and argues for its relevance even in 
states that have grown increasingly large and densely populated. His argument is that 
a modified version of the Athenian prototype is self-improving and has educational 
value through the effects of debate and decision-making. According to Budge, the 
minimalist claim that ordinary citizens are ‘ignorant’, ‘uneducated’ ‘unsophisticated’ 
and ‘apathetic’ misses the point. The prototypical version of democracy, in Budge’s 
view, maintains that there is no insurmountable “knowledge barrier looming between 
population and elite which inevitably debars the former from full political 
participation; the longer a debate goes on the more citizens absorb specialised 
knowledge” (Budge, 1993, p. 151).  
 
Virtually all claims to expert knowledge, as opposed to substantial emphasis on 
participatory citizenry as a model of education for citizenship, are fallible. Theorists 
of a prototypical, maximal concept of democracy, such as Pericles (Thucydides, 
1972), Rousseau (1968) and Mill (1975), have also shown that citizens’ active 
participation in a democracy is likely to be educational, that is, to contribute to the 
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education of the people’s intellectual, moral and practical capacities. In other words, 
in a democracy equable participation is likely to foster active, critical and inquiring 
citizens appropriate in western democratic societies like South Africa. Horsthemke 
and Enslin (2005) posed the question, “Is there a philosophical foundation for 
thinking about education that is distinctly and uniquely African” (p. 54). In an 
attempt to answer this question, Chapter 7 looks at Adeyemi and Adeyinka’s (2003) 
“customary education in Africa based on sound philosophical foundations” (p. 431). I 
will show that Adeyemi and Adeyinka’s account of the principles of African 
traditional education “are either not particularly or uniquely African or do not 
constitute obvious ‘sound’ foundations” (Enslin and Horsthemke, 2004, p. 554). In 
support of Enslin and Horsthemke (2004), I maintain that the basic principles of 
democratic citizenship education are neither western nor (South) African but apply to 
any society. In short, the discussion of citizenship education in South Africa draws 
from modern democracies in other parts of the globe.   
 
In contrast to a minimalist account of democracy, participatory democracy strives to 
create opportunities for all members of a political community to make meaningful 
contributions to decision-making and seeks to broaden the range of people who have 
access to such opportunities. An extension of opportunities will itself change the 
political nature of many citizens from apathy and lack of interest, which produce 
withdrawal and ignorance, to involvement and interest, which produce more 
sophistication and information. Budge’s account seeks to establish that general 
discussion lessens the knowledge barrier between specialists’ knowledge and that of 
ordinary citizens. The important point to note about a modified version of the 
Athenian prototype in the contemporary world is that electronic democracy may 
allow people to participate in politics actively and comprehensively. 
 
Through modern technologies such as DVDs, the Internet, cellular telephones, radio, 
television, satellite TV, computers and videoconferencing, electronic democracy 
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potentially allows decision-making to be made effective and efficient along the same 
lines as popular assemblies. Instead of merely providing the representatives who 
decide legislation, voting on laws, rules and policies would be done by ‘the people’ at 
large, registering their preferences electronically. This characterisation of 
participatory democracy looks more like the example of historical Athens, where the 
vast numbers required for the assembly, the council and law courts to work testified 
to a breadth of ‘active’ participation of citizens in the Greek city-state. The objections 
to the quality of electronic debate are certainly relevant to the matter in hand: “I have 
also and concurrently held that an electronic, ‘referendum democracy’ while 
technically feasible, would be disastrous and, in all likelihood, suicidal” (Sartori, 
1987, p. 283). However, there is no denying that the technologies or ‘electronic 
democracy’ testifies to the vitality and renewal of the democratic ideal.10 With 
technological advances, citizens are easily informed by increased access to media 
through debates, documentaries and educational programmes. At this point I would 
like to address some of the concerns raised against Athenian democracy, and, by 
implication, a participatory or maximal conception of democracy: 1) the tendency to 
irrationality on the part of ‘the people’ or ordinary citizens in a polity; 2) its 
detraction from promoting individual autonomy; and 3) its claim that broad 
participation leads to greater equality in a democracy. 
 
                                                 
10
 In the White Paper on e-Education (2004), “the government has expressed strong commitment to the 
use of ICT in education … to encourage creativity, analytical skills, critical thinking and informed 
decision-making” among South African learners (Department of Education, 2004). Using information 
and communication technologies (ICT) to participate in democratic processes implies that South 
African learners have access to modern technology. This is not given, especially due to historical 
inequalities that still persist in post-apartheid South African schools. In her address at the World 
Ministerial Seminar on Technology in Education on 09 January 2007, Naledi Pandor, the Minister of 
Education in South Africa, acknowledged that the majority of learners and schools do not have access 
to ICT infrastructure. The use of ICT is a recent phenomenon in South Africa. In her own words, South 
Africa has 26 000 schools for 12 million learners. “Only 3 in 10 schools have access to ICT. …  Only 
1 in 10 schools have access to the Internet” (Department of Education, 2007). Nevertheless, the White 
Paper on e-Education’s commitment to ‘electronic democracy’ is admirable. Without government’s 
provision of technologies cyber-democracy will remain a mirage in South African schools. It is hoped 
that in South Africa, modern technology will transform the prospects of direct democracy in the near 
future.   
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In Changing Citizenship (2005) Osler and Starkey assert that in the context of 
globalisation, there is a need for a critical assessment of liberal, communitarian and 
classical republican traditions as well as the development of new models. In what 
follows, various authors, such as van Gunsteren (1994), have criticised the Athenian 
prototype of citizenship as making “one community absolute and [showing] little 
appreciation for the particular meaning and diversity of other communities” (pp. 36-
42). I am aware of the debate about the changing nature of citizenship, along with the 
challenges that the unparalleled speed of globalisation presents to many countries. 
Nonetheless, I do not consider growing global interdependence to warrant a 
philosophical rearrangement of this prototypical, maximal concept of democratic 
citizenship in South Africa, or elsewhere in the world.  
 
The Athenian perspective seeks to foster equal and active citizenship, be it local, 
national or continental in context. In a modern society, the prototypical concept of 
citizenship has become a transnational affair, which implies that citizenship is 
possible both within a restricted geographic domain and within the larger global 
community. In other words, a modified version of citizenship of the Athenian 
prototype promotes not only individual rights and freedoms, group solidarity and 
nationalism (loyalty to the nation) — but also the social and moral duties individuals 
owe the world and its people. This means, and this is where I agree with Osler and 
Starkey (2005), that people need to be given the chance to acquire an understanding 
of the ways in which their own lives and those of others are linked — globally as well 
as locally — as well as a capacity to contribute to shaping the future they have in 
common with others across the globe. In Chapter 8 I will argue that the goals of 
citizenship education would be better served by cosmopolitan ideals, that is, 
preparing (South African) learners to act in a local, national and global scale. 
 
Benhabib (1996) has defended deliberative democracy as a variant of the Athenian 
version of democracy. In her recent book The Claims of Culture: Equality and 
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Diversity in the Global Era (2002), Benhabib’s account of democracy also shows that 
deliberative democracy, as understood in the Athenian city-state, as an idea and a 
practice is still relevant in modern societies. Pericles maintains: “We Athenians, in 
our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper discussions” 
(Thucydides, 1972, p. 147). When properly conducted, deliberative democracy 
becomes a cooperative enterprise among citizens considered to be free and equal 
moral beings. Benhabib writes, “democracy is best understood as a model for 
organising the collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions of a 
society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well-being of a 
collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned 
deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals” (Benhabib, 
2002, p. 103). 
 
Given that the critics of Athenian democracy are concerned with the public’s lack of 
rationality, Benhabib has argued for a deliberative model of democracy that aims to 
generate legitimacy and assure practical rationality with regard to self-government in 
a polity. According to the deliberative model of democracy: 
 
The institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is considered in the 
common interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation 
conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals. The more 
collective decision-making processes approximate this model the more [it] 
increases the presumption of their legitimacy and rationality (Benhabib, 1996, 
p. 69, addition mine).  
 
According to Benhabib, in deliberative institutions of democracy democratic 
legitimacy results from free and unconstrained public deliberation about matters of 
common concern. As deliberators, Benhabib’s democratic citizens are considered as 
moral and political equals. The author challenges the classical critics’ assertion that 
once ‘the people’ begin to ‘reason’ all is lost. Again, contrary to Schumpeter’s 
archetypal, ordinary citizen who succumbs “to extra-rational or irrational prejudice 
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and impulse” (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 262), the citizen in a deliberative democracy 
relishes the opportunity of becoming and being informed. In addition, deliberative 
procedures promote good reason and encourage one to adopt a considerably less 
narrow point of view. In short, in a democracy decisions that come as a result of 
deliberation remain acceptable until they are challenged by good reasons. Notably, in 
a deliberative model of democracy, society’s members’ points of view are examined, 
challenged, tested, criticised and rearticulated, as in parliamentary procedures. 
 
Cohen’s (1989) ideal of a deliberate democracy sketches a procedure that captures the 
principles of freedom and equality. The ideal deliberation is free and equal because: 
 
Participants regard themselves as bound only by the results and preconditions 
of the deliberation. They are free from any authority of prior norms or 
requirements. The participants suppose that they can act on the decision made, 
the decision through deliberation is a sufficient reason for compliance with it 
… anyone can put forth proposals, criticise, and support measures. … The 
participants … do not regard themselves as bound by the existing system of 
rights, except insofar as that system establishes the framework of free 
deliberation among equals (Cohen, 1989, pp. 22-23).  
 
The case for deliberative democracy employs Rousseau (1968) and Mill’s (1975) 
argument that there is, to use Pateman’s (1970) words, “an interrelationship between 
the authority structures and the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals, 
and with the related argument that the major function of participation is an educative 
one” (p. 27). The strength of the deliberative democracy is that it promises both 
inclusion and empowerment. Interlocutors recognise one another as having 
deliberative capacities to deliberate as free and equal moral beings. Given this 
framework, it cannot be accurate for Schumpeter to say that the electorates have less 
sophisticated knowledge and understanding of their rights and duties as citizens; 
therefore, “participatory democracy fails when too much is expected of participants, 
without sufficient guidance, support and even control from the centre” (Ndlovu and 
Dieltiens, 2004, p. 7). In Cohen’s model, there are free and equal participants in the 
democratic process, not only the elitist decision-makers. In this process deliberative 
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democracy generates ideal conditions of impartiality, rationality and knowledge of 
the relevant facts. In the end, a deliberative democracy has educational implications 
for its deliberators.  
 
Benhabib’s deliberative theory of democracy promises to educate citizens by teaching  
them practical reason.
11
 Agreed procedures of deliberation generate legitimacy by 
formulating norms of moral equality, freedom and respect among deliberators. Most 
importantly, citizens learn how to impart information, articulate good reasons and 
thus acquire a heightened social awareness. In addition, they learn institutional 
procedures and practices for reaching decisions in societies characterised by 
pluralism, conflict of interests and contestation. Unlike the classical and revisionists’ 
minimalist accounts of democracy, participation is open to all deliberators and access 
to deliberation is not restricted to Schumpeter’s elites. Benhabib’s norms of universal 
moral respect and reciprocal recognition imply that citizens can be taught to put 
themselves in the place of others in making both moral and political judgements. By 
so doing, democratic citizens learn about the relations between equality, symmetry 
and reversibility.     
 
Budge and Benhabib’s enabling accounts of participation challenge both the classical 
and the revisionists’ defence of what is arguably a narrow and impoverished idea of 
participation, in this way providing grounds for its heightened educational worth 
                                                 
11
 Benhabib is sympathetic to Young’s (1996) broad theory of communication in which the 
accommodation of diverse styles of communication (greeting, rhetoric and storytelling) provide for 
participation by the oppressed or disadvantaged groups. In South Africa, I will argue in Chapter 6, 
post-apartheid citizenship education policy seems to suggest that learners lack rationality in political 
matters. On the contrary, the anti-apartheid struggle and, its concept of “People’s Education for 
People’s Power” encouraged collective input and active participation by all, and stimulate[d] critical 
thinking and analysis” (Chisholm and Fuller, 1996, p. 701). I will look at the ‘People’s Education’ 
movement in greater detail in Chapter 5. How is deliberation to be encouraged in post-apartheid South 
Africa that enforced obedience, if not unquestioning loyalty, to the state? According to Young (1996), 
contemporary democracies that discourage deliberation “ought to be reformed to create more 
opportunities for deliberation” (p. 121). In Chapter 7, I will argue that within the framework of current 
theories of Athenian democracy, deliberative democracy and participatory forms of representation, 
participatory citizenship education can be justified and should underpin a revised approach to post-
apartheid education policy in South Africa. 
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regarding citizenship. It would seem, then, that the arguments against Athenian 
democracy (which are based on a static and utopian conception of specialist 
knowledge) have been met, in the light of a contemporary perspective on the 
correlation between democracy, participation and education. The anti-democratic 
arguments examined in this chapter ultimately fail to acknowledge historical and 
contemporary developments in democratic theory, which show that the educational 
value of participation in “democracy is no dim and distant chimera, confined to the 
Greek city or the idealistic affinity group, remote from people’s needs … but a very 
real, practical human enterprise of the greatest possible political significance, 
repeatedly undertaken by ordinary people” (Pitkin and Shumer, 2000, p. 453). In a 
nutshell: 
 
Participation … together with democracy and education … forms a three-
piece suit advertising one’s enlightenment and fellow-feeling, showing one’s 
good taste and sympathy, and putting one among the pure and innocent. … 
Participation then is educative in that it is itself a learning process with the 
crucially valuable function of developing what is essentially human about 
persons (Margetson, 1978, pp. 35-40). 
 
Margetson’s verdict echoes Rousseau (1968) and Mill’s (1975) claim that Athenian 
democracy, its enthusiasm for democratic participation and education of citizens are 
indivisible. Dewey interpreted “democracy as a way of life that may be expressed as 
the necessity […] for participation … which is necessary from the standpoint of both 
the general social welfare and the full development of human beings as individuals” 
(Dewey, 1939, p. 404). From this quotation one might deduce the following 
argument: popular participation, even in the smallest public function, has both 
individual and social educational value: this form of engagement is most likely to 
develop within a democratic system; therefore, education for citizenship is likely to 
be more effective in a democracy, where rule is by ‘the people’ and not the rulers. In 
this way, democracy, participation and education seem to be interwoven in some 
crucial ways. 
 
38 
 
As in Dewey’s assertion, democracy is vitally important for participation, which is 
necessary from the viewpoint of developing learners’ critical faculties so that they 
can play their part in the democratic society. An important part of education for 
democratic participation involves practical experience of democracy in schools. In 
Chapter 6 I will argue that learners’ practical experience in democratic Student 
Representative Councils was valuable in its own right, and not simply as a 
preparation for the future. In other words, the SRCs constituted the potential to 
educate for citizenship in a democratic society, because through participation in them 
students found a ‘free space’ that produced active, informed and critical citizenry 
convinced that they can influence government in their quest to achieve an equitable, 
democratic and participatory schooling system. 
 
In the chapters that follow I will attempt to draw together these arguments about 
democratic theory, and its emphasis on participation, and relate them to the education 
of school children in a democratic South Africa. In the face of extant scepticism, 
contemporary theorists of deliberative democracy show that participation and the 
decision-making role of ‘the people’ rest on actual, attainable principles. Firstly, they 
agree that there is no insurmountable knowledge barrier between the elites and the 
demos. Secondly, ‘electronic democracy’ may allow citizens to participate in politics, 
thus eliminating some of the distance constraints in participatory democracy. Thirdly, 
deliberative democratic procedures impart information, promote good reasoning and, 
generally, heighten moral, social and political awareness. In the words of Ross 
(2004), “deliberation then becomes the heart not only of education for democratic 
citizenship, but also of democracy itself” (p. 251). At the heart of the debate lies the 
transformation of this prototypical concept of democracy that gave rise to the modern 
representative democracy.   
 
2.5 Participation and representation: parallel models of democracy 
The argument in this section does not constitute a departure from defending a 
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classical theory, a prototypical, maximal concept of democracy that is tied to the 
notions of autonomy and the common good. In a democracy, as Pericles’s 
(Thucydides, 1972) affirmation of the value of Athenian democracy showed, the 
pursuit of individuals’ rights does not stand in contrast to the quest for the common 
good – it is possible to combine the two central features of democratic theory. In the 
second section of this chapter, I examined Rousseau’s (1968) theory of participatory 
democracy for the education of citizens, which promises to teach an active, 
participatory citizenry how to preserve individual liberties and appeal to the public 
good. Mill (1975) defended a popular form of government on the grounds that it 
develops an active character and contributes to the common welfare of society. It is 
evident that in modern societies the prototypical concept of democracy, as an idea 
and a practice, has undergone a metamorphosis.  
 
In More Participation, More Democracy (2000) Parry and Moyser point to the 
discontinuities between the Athenian prototype and modern experiences of 
democracy. The authors argue that “citizenship participation ceased to be the 
paramount indicator of democracy. … It has been joined by several others — the 
competitiveness of elites, the representativeness of representation” (p. 443). In other 
words, participatory and representative models of democracy are no longer 
alternatives to be chosen between on the basis of personal proclivity. Enslin (2000) 
points out Schumpeter’s theory of democracy “is only one possible, rather bleak 
alternative to a vision of active, participatory democratic citizenship” (p. 146). This 
means that in a contemporary society, the prototypical notion of democracy can 
assume a participatory form of representation, dissimilar to Schumpeter’s theory of 
democratic elitism, where the only means of participation open to the citizen is voting 
for leaders. The focus of the theory is on the representatives, the leaders — who must 
be active, and initiate and decide on political issues.  
 
Let us look at some of the advocates of representative democracy who argue for 
limited political participation in a democratic society. Theorists of representative 
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democracy like Burke (2000) see “the representative as a member of a superior elite 
of wisdom and reason”, to use Pitkin’s (1967) phrase. In November 1774, Burke told 
his constituents: “Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his 
judgement; and he betrays you, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your 
opinion” (Burke, 2000, p. 150). According to this Burkean view of political 
representation, a citizen’s primary responsibility was to elect representatives who 
would make decisions on their behalf, rather than delegates who would act in 
accordance with constituents’ wishes. In support of a Burkean view of representation, 
Milbrath (1971) argues that limited political participation is meaningful even in 
countries like the United States:  
 
Governments flourish and are effective without active citizens, and this 
enable(s) citizens to keep politics as a peripheral concern in their lives … 
present (low) levels and patterns of participation in politics do not constitute a 
threat to democracy; they seem, in fact, to be a realistic adjustment to the 
nature of modern society (Milbrath, 1971, p. 154). 
 
Milbrath holds the view that citizenship participation would produce wide and deep 
divisions which would be detrimental to good government. According to Kreibig 
(2000), such claims suggest that the political representative system works because 
citizens are not active — the passive citizen is necessary for representative 
government. In other words, the post-classical form of democracy, which came to be 
known as representative democracy, was meant, in contrast to the democracy of the 
Athenian prototype, “to be epitomised by a system of political representation, that is, 
a form of representation in which the representative who is called on to pursue the 
interests of the nation cannot be subject to a binding mandate”, as Bobbio (1999, p. 
300) argued. Although advocates of representative democracy, such as Schumpeter 
(1950), Burke (2000) and Milbrath, (1971) have provided an influential account of a 
restricted model of representation, representative democracy has regained some 
favour, in a more participatory form, in the last decades of the twentieth century.  
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By way of illustration, instead of a concept of democracy in its Rousseauian version, 
it is possible to imagine a form of Athenian democracy that takes to their limits 
participatory devices that currently exist in restricted form in representative 
democracies. A notable case in point is Pitkin’s (1967) essay, ‘The Concept of 
Representation’, which develops the idea of substantive political representation. Her 
formulation of this view is as follows: 
 
Political representation is primarily a public, institutionalised arrangement 
involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex ways of 
large-scale social arrangements. What makes it representation is not any 
single action by any one participant, but the over-all structure and functioning 
of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many 
people. It is representation if the people are present in the governmental 
action, even though they do not literally act for themselves (Pitkin, 1967, p. 
425). 
 
According to Pitkin, a participatory representative body is one that demonstrates that: 
its subjects have control over what it does; its actions have substantive content, 
meaning the subjects really do act through their government and are not merely 
passive recipients of its actions; representative bodies not only control and promote 
public interests, but are also responsive to these interests; the governed are capable of 
action and judgement, capable of initiating government activity, so that the 
government may be conceived as responding to them; representatives provide for the 
expression of the wishes of the represented and the government responds to these 
wishes unless there are good reasons to the contrary (see Pitkin, 1967, pp. 430-431). 
In other words, selecting delegates to a participatory representative assembly serves 
two purposes: 1) it affirms that participation does not stand in contrast to 
representation — the two elements of democracy are not incompatible but, rather, 
intimately and reciprocally linked, and 2) it guarantees a maximal degree of 
electorates’ power and control over the representatives.  
 
There is an element of truth in Sartori’s (1987) assertion that when we declare that 
“there are two types of democracy … we are not discussing interchangeable systems 
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but the modern large-scale solution of a problem left unresolved by the ancients” (p. 
283). Surely, some would argue, representative democracy exemplifies what is 
democracy, though the context is fundamentally different from the framework of the 
Athenian city-state of ancient Greece. It is for this reason that arguments for 
increased participation are significant. They do not rule out a representative system of 
government as being legitimate. Of particular importance in this transformation of 
democracy is that the active and participatory role of ordinary people remains 
valuable. Both the representatives and those represented must acquire considerable 
knowledge, skills, values and attitudes — that come with a participatory or maximal 
conception of democracy, if well-established democracies or those in transition, like 
South Africa, are to work.  
 
The idea of substantive representative democracy is compatible with popular 
participation, as opposed to the elitist and restricted model suggested by Schumpeter. 
Indeed, it is amenable to a considerable degree of participation and citizenship 
education. In the words of Budge (1993), “participatory (or direct) and representative 
democrats should bury their specific differences and work together, recognising that 
what they have in common is much more than what separates them” (p. 154). Both 
Pitkin (1967) and Sartori (1987) contend that representative bodies need to encourage 
collective input and active participation by all stakeholders, in order to promote 
representative democracy in modern societies. It follows, as I will show, that South 
African education policy and subsequent curriculum developments should aim to 
promote democracy and participatory forms of representation in schools. 
 
Whereas the Constitution of South Africa (1996) depicts a representative mode of 
democracy at national level, the South African Schools Act (1996) also takes the 
representative mode of democracy to the level of the school. The Act paved the way 
for democratically elected and representative structures, officially known as School 
Governing Bodies (SGBs) and Representative Councils of Learners (RCLs). In other 
words, the notion of ‘school community’, that is, parents, educators, learners, may be 
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interpreted as invoking participatory democracy and representation in post-apartheid 
South African schools. This means that current SGBs and RCLs can be taught to be 
responsible, responsive and accountable to the wishes and interests of every voter in 
schools. Although the Act’s declaration and commitment to co-operative governance 
and partnership, and representative democracy, has a maximal tone in place, it 
essentially reflects a minimalist conception of democracy. In Chapters 5, 6 and 8, I 
will argue that the discontinuities between the anti-apartheid struggle vision of 
participatory democracy, on the one hand, and policy development after the 
transition, on the other, can be attributed to a lack of conceptual clarity, coherence 
and consistency in post-apartheid South African educational policy.  
 
The discussion of conceptions of democracy undertaken in this chapter will 
contribute to the thesis in a number of ways. First, the latter maintains that South 
Africa is a democratic state committed, at least in theory, to “government [being] 
based on the will of the people” (Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 1, addition 
mine), people who have power and control over their representatives. Second, post-
apartheid citizenship education policy embraces an updated version of the Athenian 
prototype of democracy, which promises to develop active characters that contribute 
to the common welfare of South African society. Third, this prototypical, maximal 
concept of democracy remains a viable model of democracy for many present-day 
societies, including South Africa. Last, student participation and representation are 
parallel models of democracy in South African schools. It is against this background 
that a prototypical, maximal concept of democracy, as depicted in this chapter, 
provides the basis for critiquing post-apartheid citizenship education policy’s 
tendency to undermine democracy and participatory forms of representation in South 
African schools.   
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I began by exploring the reservations of classical Greek philosophers 
who critically interrogated democracy, especially the classical zeal for democratic 
participation. I showed how the prototypical concept of democracy is characterised 
by tensions and has also encountered contemporary criticism. Against this backdrop, 
later theories of democracy have reaffirmed the three-part description of democracy, 
seeking to (re)establish a defensible theory of participation as a viable model of 
democracy. As an ideal, it is not difficult to see the attraction of democracy in the 
classical mode: as a human way of life, individually — to ‘improve’ the citizens and 
socially — to manage their public affairs. The various theories of democracy 
discussed in this chapter have endorsed and explicated the value of democratic 
participation, i.e. the development of an active, self-helping type of character and the 
pursuit of the common good. With recent developments in communication 
technology and electronic access, a modified version of the Athenian prototype has 
regained its democratic fervour for participation. It has also been argued that the 
Athenian prototype of democracy is not based on outmoded and unrealistic 
theoretical and practical foundations. For this reason, Athenian democracy as such 
remains a viable model in deliberative procedures and practices in modern democratic 
societies. Given this transmutation of the prototypical theory, representation and 
participation can be effectively embodied in existing political institutional 
arrangements that provide opportunities for political participation by the ordinary 
citizen. The next chapter looks at international debates and trends in liberal 
democracies that suggest that the prototypical Athenian concept of citizenship offers 
the most promising underpinning for citizenship education.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
PROTOTYPICAL ATHENIAN CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION: MODERN 
DEBATES AND TRENDS 
 
A polis or state belongs to the order of ‘compounds’, in the same way as all 
other things which form a single ‘whole’, but a ‘whole’ composed, 
nonetheless, of a number of different parts. In other words, a state is a 
compound made up of citizens; and this compels us to consider who should 
properly be called a citizen and what a citizen really is. … The nature of 
citizenship in general emerges from these considerations. … We may thus 
conclude that the citizen of our definition [one holding the indeterminate 
office of judge in a court and member of an assembly] is particularly and 
especially the citizen of a democracy (Aristotle, 1943, pp. 125-128, addition 
by Blaug and Schwarzmantel, 2000, p. 210).    
 
3.1 Introduction 
The term citizenship has been debated in democratic theory ever since the time of the 
Greek polis, as the extract from Aristotle makes clear. Aristotle’s definition of 
citizenship in the Athenian city-state not only reiterates the hierarchical and exclusive 
body of citizenship, but also “raises the question of inclusion and exclusion [in 
modern democratic societies]: who forms the citizen body? Who exactly are the 
citizens? And what exactly should citizens do?” (Blaug and Schwarzmantel, 2000, p. 
206, addition mine). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle’s critique of the prototypical concept of democracy sheds light on these 
philosophical questions. According to Socrates, the ideal city-state was an organic 
unity of reciprocally helpful parts, each of which was needed to make up the ‘whole’. 
For Plato’s imagined society, the guardians were entitled to participate in office, as 
office holders. It is against this backdrop that Aristotle defined a citizen of a 
democracy as a person entitled to hold public office, that is, to active participation in 
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the exercise of power, as a member of the popular assembly, the Council of Five 
Hundred and the courts of justice in the Greek city-state of Athens. In contrast, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, for Pericles, the Greek city-state of Athens recognised all 
citizens as fully participating members who had the right to make decisions and speak 
in public gatherings. In modern times, the distinction between ruling and subject 
class, based on differences in social and professional function is being challenged by 
theories of citizenship that embrace a modified version of the Athenian prototype of 
citizenship. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: 1) it examines various theories of 
citizenship that espouse and build on this prototypical, maximal concept of 
citizenship; 2) it also shows how the notion of citizenship that emanates from the 
Greek city-state of Athens is widely regarded as the most fitting model for citizenship 
education in schools, and thus constitutes a prospect for a revised post-apartheid 
citizenship education policy in South Africa. Through a brief review of some of the 
theories of citizenship I hope to indicate the relevance, effectiveness and practice of 
the Athenian concept of citizenship, and correlated notion of education in modern 
democratic societies.   
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 provides an account of the 
development of theories of citizenship since its origins in the Greek city-state of 
Athens. Section 2 shows that modern democracies like Britain embrace an updated 
version of the Athenian prototype of citizenship as a foundation for citizenship 
education in schools. Section 3 gives consideration to a selection of British and 
American studies on citizenship education that support the claim that successful 
citizenship education can be ‘taught’ and ‘caught’, namely learning for democratic 
citizenship is not limited to the formal school curriculum, but also requires active 
community engagement. The discussion of citizenship education in Britain is crucial 
for a critique of post-apartheid citizenship education policy in South Africa in the 
later chapters, for two reasons: 1) although the British case undoubtedly has its 
idiosyncrasies, it will nonetheless show how the prototypical, maximal concept of 
citizenship has regained currency, and 2) the report of the Advisory Group on 
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Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools (1998), chaired 
by Bernard Crick, presents an opportunity, not only in England, but also in South 
Africa, to put into practice the educational benefits of citizenship participation which 
theorists of participatory democracy, such as Pericles (Thucydides, 1972), Rousseau 
(1968), Budge (1993) and Benhabib (1996) have advocated.  
 
From a historical perspective, Britain and South Africa have ties that date back to the 
early nineteenth century. The British colonial domination or control of South African 
spheres of society provides a useful basis for discussions in the coming chapters: 1) 
the notion of citizenship in South Africa has its roots in English law pertaining to 
citizenship and nationality, and I will examine this claim in Chapter 4; 2) the concept 
of student participation in school governance in South African schools has its origin 
in the British prefect system, and this point will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 6; 
and 3) the idea of compulsory schooling in South Africa was inherited from the 
British tradition. I will discuss the British and South African notions of compulsion in 
schools in Chapter 7. Furthermore, the contemporary British government’s decision 
to introduce compulsory citizenship education in schools as a matter of national 
policy (in May 1999) speaks directly to the argument in Chapter 7 that compulsory 
schooling, and compulsory citizenship education, can be justified as an essential 
component of the curriculum in South African schools.  
 
3.2 The classical concept of citizenship: its origins and its virtues    
In this section of the chapter I will examine various theories of citizenship that have 
endorsed and interpreted the Athenian concept of citizenship in modern societies. The 
word ‘citizen’, derived from civitas, is distinctively Latin in origin, but historically 
the emergence of the concept of citizenship is bound up with the development of the 
Greek city-states. The starting point is to look at how classical theorists interpreted 
citizenship in the times of the Greek city-state of Athens. From a historical Athenian 
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perspective, the concept of citizenship can be interpreted from two viewpoints that 
are hardly complementary. First, there is Pericles’s participatory notion of citizenship, 
where every citizen took turns at ruling and being ruled — democracy by rotation or 
ruling by lot. Second, there is Aristotle’s interpretation of a hierarchical and exclusive 
body of citizenship that permitted adult male citizens to participate in the popular 
assembly, the Council of Five Hundred and the courts of justice, on the one hand, and 
denied participation to non-citizens, such as women, children and foreigners, on the 
other hand. Athenian citizenship thus implied both an active and a passive mode. In 
short, Pericles’s prototypical, maximal concept of citizenship is incompatible with 
Aristotle’s notion of exclusive citizenship. The essence of this version of the 
Athenian prototype of citizenship is captured in Pericles’s claim, “a man who minds 
his own business … has no business [in Athenian democracy] at all” (Thucydides, 
1972, p. 147, addition mine).  
 
Pericles’s conception of citizenship is active citizenship which encourages more 
citizens to participate in collective self-government than Aristotle’s polis or state 
permits. It is, therefore, Pericles’s idea of citizenship that promotes broad ‘active’ 
participation of citizens in the Greek city-state of Athens we shall be considering 
when I examine various theories of citizenship that espouse and build on this 
prototypical concept with regard to education. In other words, education is associated 
with democratic participation and active citizenry, conceptions first developed and 
put into practice in the Greek city-state of Athens. This chapter maintains that 
Pericles’s interpretation of the prototypical, maximal concept of citizenship remains 
pertinent in modern democratic societies.  
 
Although the beginning of discourse about citizenship is linked to the classical Greek 
polis, the concept did not gain wide currency in modern social theory until Marshall 
put it on the map in his influential discussion Citizenship and Social Class (1950). 
Marshall took a historical approach, which focused upon the development of 
citizenship rights in a modern society. His thesis was that modern citizenship includes 
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three different kinds of rights: civil, political and social rights. Civil rights are the 
rights necessary for individual freedom, such as speech, property and fair trial. Civil 
rights emerged largely in the eighteenth century. The second wave of citizenship 
rights, political rights, including the right to vote and to stand for political office, 
followed in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, social rights constituted 
the third wave of rights. By the ‘social’ element, Marshall meant entitlement to 
welfare rights, including education. Marshall’s analysis of the three elements of 
citizenship was, I would argue, influenced by classical theory: 
 
In early times these three strands were wound into a single thread. These 
rights were blended because the institutions were amalgamated. … When the 
three elements of citizenship parted company, they were soon barely on 
speaking terms. These periods must, of course, be treated with reasonable 
elasticity, and there is some evident overlap, especially between the last two 
(Marshall, 1950, pp. 173-174).   
 
Marshall’s concept of citizenship incorporates citizens’ rights as understood in the 
Greek city-state of Athens. In Chapter 1, I mentioned that despite the limitations of 
prototypical Athenian democracy — the hierarchical and exclusive body of 
citizenship — ‘the people’ through the assembly, the council and law courts testify to 
the broad, ‘active’ participation of citizens in the Greek city-state of Athens. From a 
civil rights perspective, citizens took part in public debates; they owned properties 
and respected the law. With regard to political rights, there was direct or popular 
voting and participation in political decision-making bodies or daily government. 
Regarding social rights, citizens’ active participation in democracy, as Pericles’s 
speech affirmed, was likely to have substantial educational value. In practice, of 
course, it is important to note that social citizenship is a recent phenomenon or 
modern idea inherited from the western education tradition, as Chapter 7 will show. 
In short, although there is little evidence that the idea of social citizenship had any 
currency in ancient Greece, the Athenian prototype of citizenship as expressed in 
Pericles’s declaration of the value of democracy, remains viable in modern societies. 
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Marshall seeks to (re)establish a defensible theory of (Athenian) citizenship as a 
central theme in western democratic societies. In terms of the civil and political 
dimensions, Marshall’s picture and assumptions can be summarised as follows: 
individual citizens and their institutions of political power cannot be considered in 
isolation from one another. In other words, the citizenship rights of all those who 
remained outside the citizenship body in historical Athens, that is, children and 
women, “because they had no recognised role in the public life of society and lacked 
the relevant knowledge to participate in the affairs of state” (Enslin and White, 2003, 
p. 111), and foreigners who were hated by locals because they were perceived as 
outsiders, should be taken into account. In modern times, the notions of Athenian 
citizens’ rights can readily be found in the South African Constitution (1996). For 
example, among the founding principles of the Constitution is equal enjoyment of an 
array of citizen rights, including both civil rights and political rights. These rights are 
promoted by public participation projects whose task is to provide the public with 
access to central and provincial government (sections 59, 72, and 118). In the next 
chapter I will discuss how the Athenian concept of citizenship is echoed in the 
Freedom Charter, as well as the Constitution of South Africa (1996).  
 
Our present discussion of citizenship has focussed on Marshall’s civil and political 
elements that could be traced back to the Greek city-state of Athens. Marshall’s idea 
of citizenship was broadened to include social elements where every citizen is 
entitled to the ‘right’ to education. In Chapter 7 I will discuss an important aspect of 
social citizenship: that is, state provision of compulsory schooling and its impact on 
citizenship education in South Africa. In this chapter I aim to set the scene for this 
discussion by quoting Marshall, that “the right to education is a genuine social right 
of citizenship, because the aim of education during childhood is to shape the future 
adult” (1950, p. 172). In other words, a right to education aims to prepare the youth 
for active participation in civil and political responsibilities of adult society. 
Marshall’s social aspect endorses a modified version of the Athenian prototype of 
citizenship as the most fitting model for citizenship education in schools, not only in 
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England, but also in South Africa. In a nutshell, Marshall’s social rights enable school 
pupils to participate in a civilised society, and in some sense they complete the 
achievement of civil and political dimensions of citizenship. According to Roche 
(1992), Marshall’s theoretical framework represents the ‘dominant paradigm’ in 
citizenship theory in Britain and has continued to represent the touchstone for 
discussions about citizenship. It is to the conception of citizenship elucidated by 
McLaughlin that we now turn our attention.  
 
The concept of citizenship is complex and contested even when discussion is 
confined to citizenship in the context of western democratic societies (McLaughlin, 
1992). In the introduction of this thesis I mentioned that McLaughlin (1992) maps 
citizenship along a continuum of minimal and maximal conceptions. The differences 
between the minimal and maximal ends can be broadly expressed in several kinds of 
comparison, for example, between thin/ thick, private/ public, representative/ 
participatory, passive/ active, and the like. McLaughlin (1992, pp. 236-237) contrasts 
minimal and maximal conceptions by reference to four features of citizenship: 
identity, citizenship virtues, the individual’s degree of political involvement and the 
prerequisites required for citizenship. Since this chapter endorses a modified version 
of the Athenian prototype, one that puts emphasis on active participatory citizenry, I 
will confine myself to McLaughlin’s (1992) discussion on individual political 
involvement. In the context of this chapter, the term ‘minimal’ refers to citizenship as 
‘taught’, and by extension education for citizenship that relies entirely on formal 
school curriculum. Interpreted maximally, citizenship is both ‘taught’ and ‘caught’, 
and by extension education for citizenship covers opportunities for teaching about 
citizenship within and outside the formal curriculum. Drawing again on Enslin 
(2000), interpreted maximally, McLaughlin’s citizens engage in a participatory 
democracy, a prospect that is essential for citizenship education. McLaughlin’s (1992, 
p. 245) mapping is correspondingly true of education for citizenship.  
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A major point of divergence between these two interpretations of education for 
citizenship is the extent of political involvement and participation that is seen as 
required by citizenship. On minimal interpretations, there is a degree of scepticism 
about widespread political involvement and participation, and the citizen is seen 
primarily as a private citizen (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 237). In her article, ‘In defence 
of minimalism: beyond a robust approach to citizenship education’ Dieltiens (2005), 
defends this minimalist account of citizenship on the educational grounds that it 
develops individual autonomy and contributes to the democratic project that seeks the 
common good. Conversely, the author criticises a maximal concept of citizenships for 
“slip[ping] too far from education’s other central role – that of developing 
autonomous individuals” (Dieltiens, 2005, p. 191). In other words, maximalism 
“strains against the more traditional liberal idea of education’s primary task as 
cultivating the autonomy of individuals apart from a socially or culturally defined 
role”, Dieltiens (2005, p. 194) argues.  
 
There are two difficulties with this argument. First, one could reject Dieltiens’s 
interpretation of a maximal approach that overrides individual freedom and argue 
instead that the pursuit of individual autonomy does not stand in contrast to the quest 
for the common good — indeed, that it is possible to combine the two central features 
of democratic theory, as argued in Chapter 2. Second, in Chapter 2, I also examined 
various theories of democracy which have endorsed and explicated the educative 
value of democratic participation, i.e. the development of an active, self-helping type 
of character and the pursuit of the common good. As the third section of this chapter 
will show, global trends in liberal democracies also tend towards participatory, 
community-based citizenship education. Put differently, a prototypical, maximal 
concept of democratic citizenship ‘improves’ the citizens (i.e., values individual 
autonomy) and promotes the good management of the affairs of society (contributes 
to the democratic project that seeks the common good). 
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In Chapter 7, I will challenge Dieltiens’s interpretation of maximal account of 
citizenship by arguing that, within the theoretical framework of the Athenian version 
of democratic citizenship, maximalism can be justified on the grounds that it 
promotes individual autonomy and builds social cohesion — which is the common 
good in a democratic South African society. Importantly, the maximal project is not 
only admirable, as an educational project, but it also educates citizens in how to 
preserve individual liberties and appeal to the public good. Unlike the maximal 
theorists who rely on coercion and force, the Athenian version of democratic 
citizenship guarantees children the freedom to opt out of the ‘official’ school 
democracy projects. The remainder of this chapter will show that an education 
towards a maximalist citizenship, to use Dieltiens’s, words, “offers a way of 
achieving both (the development of individuality, while at the same time contributes 
to the democratic project that seeks the common good) educational objectives” (p. 
189).  
 
In terms of the Athenian concept of citizenship discussed thus far, Aristotle (1943), 
Pericles (Thucydides, 1972), Marshall (1950), and McLaughlin’s (1992) theories can 
be summarised as follows:  
• For Aristotle a citizen of a democracy is a person who possesses political 
power and partakes in the popular assembly and the Council of Five Hundred, 
and sits at the courts of justice, although this historical Athenian concept of 
citizenship excluded women, children and workers. 
• In contrast, Pericles’s participatory notion of citizenship encourages more 
citizens to participate in collective self-government than Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle’s vision of prototypical Athenian city-state democracy permits. 
• Marshall’s analysis of citizenship is concerned not only with the Greek 
legacy, but with the understandings of citizenship in postwar western 
societies, in particular the arenas of citizenship (the civil, political and the 
social) and institutions (the law courts, parliament and the schooling system) 
in respect of which those citizenship rights are effectively pursued.  
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● McLaughlin’s political involvement feature favours a modified version of the 
Athenian prototype of citizenship, a fuller more participatory approach to 
democracy, an aspect that is essential for citizenship education. In other 
words, the prototypical, maximal concept of citizenship endorses democratic 
participation and active citizenry. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a maximal 
conception of citizenship, and of citizenship education, has as its major 
priority the development of active, critical and enquiring citizens in schools. 
 
In the previous chapter, I reiterated Osler and Starkey’s (2005) argument that people 
need to be given a chance to acquire an understanding of the ways in which their own 
lives and those of others are linked – globally as well as locally – as well as a 
capacity to contribute to shaping the future they have in common with others across 
the globe. As McLaughlin states, 
 
Perhaps one of the most salient points of contrast for educational purposes 
concerns the degree of critical understanding and questioning that is seen as 
necessary to citizenship. Maximal conceptions require a considerable degree 
of explicit understanding of democratic principles, values and procedures on 
the part of the citizen together with the dispositions and capacities required for 
participation in democratic citizenship generously conceived (McLaughlin, 
1992, p. 237).  
 
According to McLaughlin, terms like ‘understanding’, ‘dispositions’ and ‘capacities’ 
suggest that the prototypical concept of citizenship has an ambitious purpose, that is, 
the education of the entire citizenry. It would appear, then, that a major function of 
participation in the theory of democratic citizenship is an educative one (including 
both the psychological aspects, such as the building of self-confidence, and the 
gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures). While McLaughlin does not 
explicitly dismiss minimalist notions, his analysis demonstrates a number of 
shortcomings of the type of approach adopted in Dieltiens’s article: “the most notable 
of these is that it may involve merely an unreflective socialization into the political 
and social status quo, and is therefore inadequate on educational, as well as on other, 
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grounds” (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 238).  
 
To recall from Chapter 2, central to theories of participation and democratic theory is 
the stress on maximum participation in a political system. In short, a minimalist 
interpretation of citizenship can be dismissed as inadequate on educational grounds. 
As a result of the above shortcoming the minimal interpretation of education for 
citizenship is open to a number of notable objections: 
• The pursuit of individual autonomy does not stand in contrast to the quest for 
the common good — indeed, that it is possible to combine the two central 
features of democratic theory; 
• various theories of democracy have endorsed and explicated two features of 
the educative value of democratic participation, i.e. the development of an 
active, self-helping type of character and the pursuit of the common good;  
• therefore, participation of citizens in government develops active characters 
who contribute to the common welfare of society. 
 
I agree with Osler and Starkey (2005) that people need to be given a chance to 
acquire an understanding of the ways in which their own lives and those of others are 
linked — globally as well as locally — as well as a capacity to contribute to shaping 
the future they have in common with others across the globe. A maximal conception 
of citizenship, as I will argue throughout the thesis, is likely to address the persistent 
challenges confronting citizenship universally, including South Africa, such as the 
historical and current exclusion of young adults from the sphere of citizenship. For 
putatively obvious reasons: 1) children are seen as consumers of citizenship 
education, rather than as partners in programmes, projects and strategies to enhance 
citizen democracy; 2) they are portrayed as threatening yet politically apathetic 
(Seekings, 1993; Osler and Starkey, 2005); 3) at best, they are viewed as citizens-in-
waiting who need to be inducted into their future role; and 4) all too often, however, 
they are seen as needy individuals whose incompetence needs to be addressed. This 
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deficit model of the youth is then applied in education and particularly in the 
construction of citizenship education in schools.  
 
A focus on obedience or loyalty works against the kind of active, critical and 
inquiring citizen many maximal theorists, such as Pericles (Thucydides, 1972), 
Marshall (1950), and McLaughlin (1992), assumed is required in a democratic 
society. It would appear, then, that a maximal concept of democratic citizenship 
values individual autonomy and contributes to the common welfare of society. 
Various theories of citizenship, such as Pericles (Thucydides, 1972), Marshall (1950) 
and McLaughlin’s (1992), have endorsed a maximal concept of citizenship and 
citizenship education on the grounds that it is democratic and participative in its 
outlook. Let us turn our attention to the establishment of the Citizenship Advisory 
Group (1998) in England, a sign of faith in the Athenian concept of citizenship. 
 
3.3 The Citizenship Advisory Group: a prototypical Athenian view 
In this section of the chapter, I will argue that the Advisory Group reflects a vision of   
active, participatory citizenry of the Greek city-state of Athens. In the previous 
chapter, I discussed theories of democracy that place high value on educating the 
young for democratic citizenship. I also stated that participation takes place in many 
spheres of society, one such sphere being the school. In Britain, citizenship education 
was included for the first time as part of the school curriculum in 2002. It is a new 
foundation subject for students at Key Stage 3 (11-14 years of age) and Key Stage 4 
(14-16 years of age). I must hasten to say that this section does not offer a critical 
evaluation of the report, but focuses on the concept of citizenship and related notion 
of citizenship education which is embodied in the Crick Report. The discussion on 
the Citizenship Advisory Group will show that: 1) the Group’s terms of reference 
endorsed the importance of the prototypical, maximal concept of democracy, and its 
notion of active citizenship; 2) in doing so, the group absorbed Marshall’s (1950) tri-
partite approach to citizenship in its attempt to lay down stronger foundations for 
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citizenship education in schools; and 3) the report’s theoretical framework embodied 
McLaughlin’s (1992) notable attributes of ‘participative’ or ‘maximal’ components of 
citizenship.  
 
It may be illuminating, in the present context to examine the background to the 
introduction of citizenship education in England. In 1997 the Secretary of State for 
Education and Employment in England appointed an Advisory Group on Citizenship, 
with wide ranging terms of reference relating to the provision of advice on effective 
citizenship education in schools:  
 
To provide advice on effective education for citizenship in schools — to 
include the nature and practices of participatory democracy; the duties, 
responsibilities and rights of individuals as citizens; and the value to 
individuals and society of community activity (Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority, 1998, p. 4). 
 
These terms of reference, ‘participatory democracy’, ‘citizens’ rights and 
responsibilities’ and ‘community involvement’, already bear the language inherited 
from the classical Greek. In the Greek city-state of Athens as discussed in the first 
three chapters of this thesis: 1) Athens bequeathed to us their conceptions of 
participatory democracy and active citizenship; 2) a citizen had a right to participate 
in the exercise of political power as a free and equal member of the assembly; 3) 
individual citizens had duties that include participation in government affairs and the 
administration of justice; and 4) citizens were not only interested in personal affairs, 
but in the affairs of the state too. Similarly, the Advisory Group’s terms of reference 
have wide implications for our understanding of education for citizenship and 
democracy in schools, as a popular participatory institution. Thus it is envisaged that 
the Advisory Group’s concept of education for citizenship in relation to democracy is 
likely to foster an active type of characters guided by a sense of duty to maximise the 
welfare of their society.  
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In practice this means that citizenship education is meant to: 1) develop knowledge, 
skills, values and attitudes that would enable school-pupils to participate in modern 
democratic society; 2) enhance the awareness of rights and duties, and a sense of 
responsibility required to develop school-pupils into active, participatory future 
citizenry; and 3) establish the value of pupils in playing an active part in citizenship, 
i.e. of local and the broader involvement and service. Against this background, a 
major task of the Advisory Group was to adopt as a starting point the understanding 
of citizenship found in Marshall’s analysis of citizenship that draws on the civil, 
political and social elements of classical Greek tradition. 
 
In his article ‘Citizenship in the National Curriculum (England): Issues and 
Challenges’ (2000), Kerr explains how Marshall’s revised version of the Athenian 
prototype has weighed heavily on the Advisory Group, particularly its attempt to 
define citizenship education in a parliamentary democracy.
12
 In the 1980s and early 
1990s, the British Conservative government championed the individualism of the free 
market and placed emphasis on the importance of civic obligation or active 
citizenship (Kerr, 2000). The term ‘active citizenship’ that is a central feature of the 
Greek city-state of Athens “was part of a wider Conservative philosophy based on the 
primacy of the rights and responsibilities of the individual over those of the state” 
(Kerr, 2000, p. 75). The Conservative government urged individuals to take up 
actively their civic responsibilities rather than leave it to the government to carry 
                                                 
12
 The latest policy review of citizenship education undertaken by the Advisory Group was influenced 
largely by different phases of citizenship in England. The term citizenship was interpreted broadly to 
reflect different traditions: First, a liberal citizenship whose features include the preservation of 
individual rights and maximising freedom of choice. Second, a communitarian citizenship that borders 
on the communitarian rhetoric of community, with a particular emphasis on group solidarity rather 
than individualism. In a democracy, as Pericles’s (Thucydides, 1972) affirmation of the value of 
Athenian democracy showed, the pursuit of individuals’ rights does not stand in contrast with active 
participation in public affairs of society – it is possible to combine the two central features of 
democratic theory. Third, the Athenian prototype of citizenship is characterised by a sense of 
community, enthusiastic loyalty and zealous engagement in civic duties. This Athenian version of 
citizenship, as the discussion of citizenship education in Britain will show, favours a more 
participatory or maximal conception of democracy. It is the purpose of this discussion to show that a 
classical tradition, a reference to a revised version of the prototypical Athenian concept of citizenship 
embraces both the private (liberal) and the public (communitarian) dimensions of citizenship, a 
prospect for effective education for citizenship and democracy in schools, as the section will show. 
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them out. The idea of the specificity of active citizenship and preserving individual 
rights is the key point of much of Marshall’s work, especially the civil element that is 
composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom — liberty of the person, 
freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid 
contracts, and the right to justice. It was not long before the Labour government 
promised to foster an active, participatory citizenry that preserve individual liberties 
and appeal to the public good.  
 
The New Labour government, which came to power in May 1997, championed a 
communitarian view of citizenship. This different approach to citizenship “was one 
centred on the communitarian rhetoric of community … based on the civic 
responsibilities of the individual in partnership with the state” (Kerr, 2000, p. 75). In 
contrast to the British Conservative government, the Labour government put 
emphasis on the primacy of public life, or public responsibilities, rather than egoism. 
The notion of active citizenship and obligation to the community is also at the centre 
of Marshall’s work, especially the social element that is composed of the right to play 
a full role as members of society. The shifting emphasis in citizenship over the past 
two decades had an influence on how the Advisory Group was formed and 
approached its work, particularly on its ability to set out a clear definition of 
citizenship education.  
 
The definition of the Advisory Group centred on ‘civic participation’ based on the 
prototypical version of Athenian citizenship. The Advisory Group unanimously 
agreed that ‘effective education for citizenship’ in schools would cover: 
 
The teaching of civics, participatory democracy and citizenship, and may be 
taken to include some understanding of the democratic practices and 
institutions, including parties, pressure groups and voluntary bodies, and the 
relationship of formal political activity with civic society in the context of the 
UK, Europe; and an awareness of world affairs and global issues 
(Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998, p. 4). 
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Interestingly, the Advisory Group’s definition carries a personal, social and political 
agenda. Education for citizenship is concerned with the personal development of 
students, as well as the political and social development of society at a local, national 
and international level. In its introduction, the Advisory Groups declared its 
commitment to active participatory citizenry, a vision that resembled a prototypical 
Athenian democracy, “Active citizenship is our aim throughout” (Qualifications and 
Curriculum Authority, 1998, p. 25). If British school-pupils are to be effective 
citizens, political engagement and participation in democratic society at local, 
national and international level is required. The Advisory Group’s definition of 
citizenship education is compatible with the Athenian prototype of democracy, 
especially its democratic zeal for participation and with Marshall’s analysis of 
citizenship that is concerned not only with the Greek legacy, but with the 
understanding of the arenas of citizenship (the individual, political and social) and 
institutions (the schooling system) in respect of which those citizenship rights are 
effectively pursued. In short, the Advisory Group reflects a tradition of a prototypical 
Athenian democracy that is rooted in an active or maximal conception of citizenship. 
 
The Citizenship Advisory Group agreed that ‘effective education for citizenship’ 
consists of three strands, interrelated but also distinct, which combine to make up 
such an education:  
 
Firstly, social and moral responsibility: children learning from the very 
beginning self-confidence and socially and morally responsible behaviour 
both in and beyond the classroom, both towards those in authority and 
towards each other. … Secondly, community involvement: learning about and 
becoming helpfully involved in the life and concerns of their communities, 
including learning through community involvement and service to the 
community. … Thirdly, political literacy: pupils learning about and how to 
make themselves effective in public life through knowledge, skills and values 
(Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998, pp. 11, 12 and 13; emphasis 
in original). 
 
There seems to be a conscious effort on the part of the Advisory Group to forge a 
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definition of citizenship that achieved an acceptable balance between the 
Conservative Party’s liberal and Labour’s communitarian concepts of citizenship in 
England. According to Kerr (2000), the Advisory Group’s interpretation of the 
prototypical Athenian tradition “provided a workable ‘third way’ between the 
competing ‘individualist’ and ‘communitarian’ concepts of citizenship” (p. 78). As a 
result, the Advisory Group’s definition reinstated the second element — the political 
— which had been strangely absent from the Conservative government’s notion of 
active citizenship in the early 1990s. In this context, the Advisory Group’s 
participatory, community-based approach to citizenship education is compatible with 
McLaughlin’s (1992) maximal concept of citizenship, and of citizenship education 
that covers opportunities for teaching about citizenship within and outside the formal 
curriculum, both of which I will argue to be essential parts of education for and in a 
democratic South African society. 
  
Along all three lines the Advisory Group emphasised that citizenship education “is 
not just knowledge of citizenship and civic society; it also implies developing values, 
skills and understanding” (1998, p. 13). The group placed considerable stress on the 
outcomes of effective citizenship education, namely the pursuit of individuals’ rights 
and the quest for the common good. Interestingly, this is in line with what some 
commentators like Kerr (2000) and Kerr and Sardoč (2002) called the ‘missing 
element’ in Marshall’s triology, from both the Conservative and new Labour 
governments’ approach to citizenship education: democratic participation and active 
citizenry, conceptions synonymous for the Greek city-state of Athens. Above all, the 
group stated that the teaching of citizenship and democracy is so important for 
schools and for society that it must be an entitlement for all pupils. I will examine the 
influence of British compulsory schooling and compulsory citizenship education in 
South African schools in Chapter 7.  
 
It seems clear that, although the Crick Report seeks to embody a broad conception of 
citizenship and citizenship education, the conception does contain marked evidence 
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of ‘maximal’ or ‘active’ elements. This is apparent in the following bold statement by 
the Advisory Group that the central aim of strengthening citizenship education and 
promoting democracy in British schools is to effect:  
 
No less than a change in the political culture of this country both nationally 
and locally; for people to think of themselves as active citizens, willing, able 
and equipped to have an influence in public life and with the critical capacities 
to weigh evidence before speaking and acting; to build on and to extend 
radically to young people the best in existing traditions of community 
involvement and public service, and to make them individually confident in 
finding new forms of involvement and action among themselves 
(Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998, pp. 7-8). 
 
According to the Advisory Group, education for citizenship and democracy has as its 
prime concern the promotion of active, critical and inquiring pupils in British schools. 
In this regard, the Advisory Group’s maximal approach seeks to produce pupils who 
can “… participate in society effectively as active, informed, critical and responsible 
citizens” (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998, p. 9), thus constituting “… 
an active and politically-literate citizenry convinced that they can influence 
government and community affairs at all levels” (Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority, 1998, p. 9). In contrast to Dieltiens’s (2005) interpretation of maximalism, 
the Advisory Group’s account of citizenship education takes seriously the 
development of individuality. The group cannot be said to subordinate individual 
autonomy to the needs of the state, as it attempts to balance universal political 
participation with an emphasis on defending individual rights. It is evident that the 
group’s interpretation of citizenship calls for “critical understanding and questioning 
that is seen as necessary to citizenship” (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 237). The Advisory 
Group’s definition of citizenship, that is, its updated version of the Athenian 
prototype of democratic citizenship, bears testimony to the relevance and, indeed, the 
compellingness of the classical theory. With the recovery of the Athenian concept, an 
updated version of citizenship as an extreme form of participatory democracy is now 
being recognised and implemented in the British schooling system.  
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The Advisory Group’s modified version of the Athenian prototype furnishes the basis 
for the discussion of citizenship education in South Africa that lies ahead. It will be 
shown that: 1) the anti-apartheid struggle reflected Marshall’s classical definition of 
citizenship concerned with the personal growth of students and the political and 
social development of society; 2) the anti-apartheid struggle, and its concept of 
“People’s Education for People’s Power”, had an integrative effect and was able to 
encourage collective input and active participation by parents, teachers and students 
in schools; and 3) post-apartheid education policy and subsequent curriculum 
development nonetheless reflects a minimalist conception of citizenship, and of 
citizenship education. In other words, the Advisory Group’s view of citizenship 
shows similarities to developments in South Africa but also a crucial difference. A 
brief review of the Advisory Group’s recommendations indicates that effective 
education for citizenship and democracy requires public spaces, both in schools and 
in communities, in which to thrive. To this effect, modern debates and trends bear 
elements from individualistic and communitarian trains of thought. A group of 
scholars have recently argued that a new ‘civic field’ is emerging, a narrative of 
citizenship distinct from a liberal and communitarian views of citizenship. 
 
3.4 Prototypical Athenian Citizenship: a civic-centred view  
This section argues that a narrative of ‘civic fields’ and civic agency is not a new 
phenomenon in South Africa. The resurgence of ‘civic fields’ or ‘public spaces’ 
understood as democratic energy of the masses, that is, where ordinary people act as 
agents of their own development is also reflected in South Africa’s struggle history. It 
is the purpose of this discussion to reiterate a classical tradition, a reference to a 
revised version of the prototypical Athenian concept of citizenship that is two-
dimensional: it promotes individual freedom, the pursuit of the general 
enlightenment; and builds social cohesion–the political goal or common good across 
the borders of communities. A crucial task of establishing an account of this emerging 
‘civic field’ is to make the following claims: 
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1) That the term ‘civic’ ― and by implication ‘civic fields’ as a narrative of 
citizenship is a slippery or convoluted concept;  
2) That a modified version of the Athenian prototype of democracy is not 
incompatible with a civic-centred view of citizenship, that is, it has elements 
of individualism, communitarianism and cosmopolitanism in its outlook; and  
3) A proposed shared perspective of civic agency that puts emphasis on citizens’ 
capacities, individually and collectively, to be agents of their lives is 
consistent with the anti-apartheid tradition in South Africa. Let us turn our 
attention to the advocates of civic driven change who point to different and 
often divergent conceptions of civic agency.  
 
In his essay ‘Civic Driven Change and Developmental Democracy’ (2008), Boyte 
argues that there is a re-emergence of civic agency in democratic societies. Boyte 
defines agency as “the navigational capacities to negotiate and transform the world 
around us, which is understood to be fluid and open” (Boyte, 2008, p. 2). In other 
words, the term civic agency has two dimensions: it promotes individual freedom, 
understood as human capacity and empowerment and it builds social cohesion, 
interpreted as organisation or collective discourse and action to shape the general 
good: 
  
…. a bottom-up development paradigm in which people are agents of their 
own development, contrasted with top-down development in which people are 
‘helped’ or ‘saved’ by others … the capacity not only to direct one’s life and 
shape one’s environment but also to collaborate with others across differences 
to address common challenges and to make a common world (Boyte, 2008, 
pp. 2-3). 
 
Boyte’s concept of civic agency reinforces the idea that democratic agency is about 
the (democratic) development of its citizens. The author argues that civic agency 
remains alive in community organisations and in popular education sites. To illustrate 
this point, he draws on the experience of organising and self-directed popular 
education movement in KwaZulu-Natal, a province in South Africa. The Abahlali 
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movement and the University of Abahlali were created by tens of thousands of shack 
dwellers in 34 townships in KwaZulu-Natal to: “fight for land and housing, for an 
end to forced removals, and for access to education, water, electricity, sanitation, 
health care and refuse removal” (Boyte, 2008, p. 5). The impact that Abahlali has on 
civic life corroborates and throws light on how democratic agents are able to “shift 
from conceiving themselves as victims or narrow interests, and learn to see 
themselves as shapers of the world and as citizens” (Boyte, 2005, p. 2). Abahlali’s 
collective action dimension shows that citizens’ active participation in democratic 
communities is likely to be an educational one. As Boyte maintains, “organizing and 
popular education … expand the civic talents and energies … to reverse patterns of 
civic decay and regenerate civic muscle” (Boyte, 2008, pp. 6-10). Is people’s 
capacity, individually and collectively to shape their destiny the only distinctive 
feature of civic agency? 
 
In her essay ‘Civic Driven Change and Political Projects’ (2008), Dagnino claims that 
civic agency “should not be reduced to mobilisation/organising, as if civic is to be 
thought of as a set of specific contents and drives for action” (p. 2). Interestingly, 
Dagnino points out two interrelated but different meanings of ‘civic’:  
● civic as a ‘location’, defined as pertaining to citizens and/or to civil society, to 
‘lifeworld’, as opposed to state and to the market;  
●  civic as an ‘attribute’, an ‘inherent’ virtue, which derives from that ‘location’ 
and only from it, and, therefore, is not present in other locations (Dagnino, 
2008, pp. 1-3).  
 
The author identifies two profound problems with the above meanings of civic. First, 
they homogenise a field (citizens and/or their organizations) that is heterogeneous and 
diverse by nature. Second, by naturalizing a ‘virtuous’ quality, as being intrinsic to 
this field, they end up by idealising and mystifying it. In contrast, Dagnino puts 
forward two important enabling conditions for a civic-driven narrative to have 
practical meaning: 
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1) To recognise that the notion of civic-driven change (CDC) is moot under 
conditions where the ‘right to have rights’ is denied;  
2) To be critically attentive to what terms mean to those using them, for multiple 
interpretations of the same terms hinder an understanding of what a civic-
driven paradigm actually stands for and implies for action (Dagnino, 2008, pp. 
1-3).      
 
There are two points worth mentioning about Dagnino’s enabling conditions for a 
civic-driven narrative. First, in South Africa, the mass democratic movement of the 
1980s was a direct response to the colonial-apartheid authorities’ denial of civil, 
political and social rights of citizenship to the black majority. Second, there seems to 
be no agreement on the meaning of civic agency in democratic societies. Against this 
background, Dagnino advised that “the pseudo unanimity of the perverse confluence 
and the opacity it creates impose… a rigorous analysis of what hides behind the 
divergent and often antagonistic uses of the ‘civic’ and its correlates” (Dagnino, 
2008, p. 11). In a nutshell, the discussion between Boyte (2008) and Dagnino (2008) 
confirms that there is no single meaning but rather differences and divergent views on 
what is ‘civic’ and civic agency.  
 
In ‘Civic Driven Change for Deepening Democracy’ (2008), Fowler and Biekart 
suggest a shared perspective on civic agency to be found in the following 
propositions and characteristics: 
●   a paradigm (or narrative) of civic-driven change needs to be explained within 
the ‘political project’ it aspires to, making explicit the meaning of core 
concepts (Dagnino, 2008). 
● civic agency is a self-directed ability and right of citizens to shape their lives 
and circumstances as well as solve common problems through individual and 
collective action (Boyte, 2008). 
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●   the ‘civic’ in CDC recognises people acting as citizens with rights and 
obligations in relation to states with duties as guarantors of rights (Dagnino, 
2008). 
●  CDC is intentional in acting to bring about a transformative change in society 
towards an imagined new situation. By definition, citizens will have different 
ideas, images and priorities for what transformative change should be (Boyte, 
2008). 
●  derived from citizenship, civic agency is not located within one institutional    
sector or realm. Both civic and “uncivic” (or undemocratic) agencies can be 
found in all walks of life and the social structures that people create: families, 
business, government, political parties and civil society. Civic-driven change 
does occur and can be further developed in all of them (Dagnino, 2008).  
●  CDC relies on a civic agency as a normative pro-social value-based human 
predisposition. This behaviour should be based on respect for differences 
between people and a concern for society and its environment as a whole 
(Boyte, 2008) (see Fowler and Biekart, 2008, pp. 7-8). 
  
The authors’ framework of civic-driven change testifies to the contested notions of 
civic agency in modern democratic societies. There are two general points worth 
noting about Fowler and Biekart’s proposed shared perspective on civic agency. First, 
the authors points to a false consensus on a single meaning among the proponents of 
civic driven change. Second, the term civic agency reflects two distinct formulations 
— citizenship as a legal status (to enjoy the rights, privileges and benefits of 
citizenship) and citizenship as a practice (the obligations to play an active part in 
citizenship, that is, public participation in political, socio-economic life). That, in 
effect, is a capacity of individuals to influence political institutions, a sense of 
agency, which leads citizens to exert themselves on behalf of others.  
 
In addition to the above, Fowler and Biekart’s view on civic agency is notable for 
three reasons:  
68 
 
1) it shows that civic agency is a dynamic, complex and ambiguous concept, i.e., 
it is multi-dimensional in its approach;  
2) it reiterates Mill’s (1975) claim that it is only within a context of popular 
participatory institutions or large-scale society that one sees an active type of 
character fostered; and  
3) it endorses Young’s (1990) politics of difference as a product of social 
processes, where voices of the oppressed as well as the privileged are 
recognised in democratic deliberations. As Gould (1996) observed, citizens 
learn about principles of equal right and social justice in the public sphere and 
institutions of economic, social and political life. How distinct is this new 
‘civic field’ from a liberal theory — the preservation of individual rights and 
freedom, the pursuit of the general enlightenment and a communitarian theory 
— characterised by a sense of community, enthusiastic loyalty and zealous 
engagement in civic duties? 
 
In his paper ‘Everyday Politics: Reconnecting Citizens and Public Life’ (2004), 
Boyte looks at liberalism, communitarianism and civic agency as three separate, 
competing models of citizenship. For Boyte (2004): 
 
The idea of the citizen as a voter, protester, or claimant, associated with 
liberal political theory, produces civic classes, with perhaps a complementary 
focus on student government. The idea of the citizen as a volunteer, associated 
with communitarian theory, leads to the modern service movement, where the 
dominant focus is on individual helping, the concepts like power, politics, and 
self-interests are normally missing, and real world civic products are seldom 
discussed. The concept of the citizen as a civic producer or co-creator of the 
commonwealth leads … expands the roles and capacities of the citizen by 
retrieving a nonprofessional conception of politics, as the activity of citizens 
(Boyte, 2004, p. 12). 
 
The two main concerns I have with Boyte’s mutually exclusive competing notions of 
citizenship pertain to the following aspects: first, his distinct and competing models 
are not consistent with a revised version of the prototypical concept of citizenship that 
embraces both the private (liberal), the public (communitarian) dimensions of 
69 
 
citizenship — it is possible to combine the two central features of democratic theory; 
second, Boyte’s idea of citizenship undermines global trends in liberal democracies 
that tend towards participatory, community-based citizenship education. In his essay, 
Civic Drive Change for Deepening Democracy (2008), Tandon argues that 
“individual rights and obligations are important. … But, collective fellowship and 
solidarity is also important, and citizens must act in ways that make it happen … this 
is a rationale for situating civic agency in the communitarian context” (p. 5). 
Tandon’s quotation shows that a narrative of ‘civic fields’ is not distinct from a 
liberal and communitarian notions of citizenship. In a nutshell, the Athenian concept 
of citizenship is not after all “uncivic” or anti-civic it its outlook.   
 
I mentioned in the second section of this chapter that the Athenian concept of 
citizenship is two-dimensional: it develops human capacities — agency approach; 
and helps people forge social solidarity with their peers — communitarian approach. 
The argument presented by the civic agency advocates is not sufficient since 
individuals do not exist independently of their communities. A communitarian 
approach is also inadequate as communities are not fixed in their membership or their 
characteristics. Individuals are able to feel solidarity with others at local, national and 
global levels. In addition, Chapter 8 will show how a classical tradition embraces 
cosmopolitan ideals, that is, it promotes the primacy of citizens’ voices at local as 
well as global spheres. There is little difference between Fowler and Biekart’s (2008) 
civic agency approach and the Athenian view of individualism, on the one hand, and 
a more communitarian rhetoric of community, on the other. Both philosophical 
conceptions of citizenship put emphasis on agency not as an isolated individual but as 
equal co-creator operating in a free association with the agency of others. This long 
tradition and recent revival of ‘organising’ approach is evident in South African 
public philosophy. According to Coughlan et al (2007), “the anti-apartheid struggle 
tradition developed models of public consultation in which leaders of trade unions 
and civic organisations sought mandates, consulted and reported back to 
constituencies” (p. 83). 
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Chapter 4 will show how the United Democratic Front (UDF) brought together a 
number of political and organisational strands. They included civic associations, trade 
unions, youth organisations, student movements, women’s groups, religious groups, 
political parties, professional organisations and so forth. In Chapter 5, I will argue 
that at the centre of the anti-apartheid struggle, and its concept of “People’s 
Education for People’s Power” in the 1980s lies the democratic energies of parents, 
teachers, students, community leaders, religious bodies, NGOs, academic institutions, 
workers. These political and organizational strands were “mobilised into appropriate 
organisational structures to participate actively in the initiation and management of 
‘People’s Education’ in all its forms” (Chisholm and Fuller, 1996, p. 701). In taking 
up this issue in Chapter 6, the term ‘student movement’ refers to the sum total and 
intentions of students, individually, collectively and organisationally, directed 
towards change in the students’ own circumstances and for educational and wider 
social change (see Jacks, 1975, p. 13). In other words, ‘student’ activists were able to 
link educational demands to a broader national political struggle.  
 
Furthermore, I point out in Chapter 6 that the objectives of the Charter Campaign 
were inter alia: to reach out to and consult all students … to develop the 
organizational network of ‘student movement’ and all other participatory 
organizations (see Christie, 1988, p. 251). In sum, given that civic driven change is at 
its infant stage, there is no unanimity on the definition, meaning and direction it 
should adopt. The challenge of deepening this new ‘civic field’ movement is to 
acknowledge that liberalism, communitarianism and civic-oriented view of 
citizenship are not incompatible but, rather, are intimately and reciprocally linked. 
The focus now turns to the international literature on citizenship education that 
supports the claim that learning for democratic citizenship is not limited to the formal 
school curriculum, but also requires active community engagement. 
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3.5 Active community engagement and doing citizenship: international 
trends  
Influential authors like Barber (1984) and Boyte (2004) argue that learning 
democratic citizenship is most likely to be achieved through active community 
engagement rather than through the formal school curriculum. In his book Strong 
Democracy (1984), Barber argued for a strong democratic theory of citizenship. 
Strong democracy is given the following formal definition: “strong democracy in the 
participatory mode … creates a political community capable of transforming 
dependent private individuals into free citizens and partial and private interests into 
public goods” (Barber, 1984, p.151). In other words, strong democracy enables 
genuine participation, where individual citizens retain their autonomy and come to 
political decisions through deliberation with other autonomous citizens in the 
community. There are two points worth noting about Barber’s definition of 
democracy. First, the author emphasised the value of citizens’ participation, as a 
central feature of democratic theory. Secondly, in support of Pericles (1972), 
Rousseau (1968) and Mill (1975), Barber shows that the private and public 
dimensions of citizenship are inseparable. In the process of creating a self-governing 
community:  
 
Individual autonomy is preserved because their vision of their own freedom 
and interest has been enlarged to include others; and their obedience to the 
common force is rendered legitimate because their enlarged vision enables 
them to perceive in the common force the working of their own wills (Barber, 
1984, p. 232).  
 
In a strong democratic community, individual members are transformed, through 
their participation, from their narrow interests and acquire the capacity for common 
vision. Barber’s theory of strong democracy is already found in the work of Rousseau 
(1968). In Rousseau’s words, a democratic community “produces a remarkable 
change in man”; that is to say, through participation in it, “man’s faculties are 
exercised and developed, his ideas broadened, his feelings ennobled, and his soul 
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elevated” (Rousseau, 1968, pp. 64-65). Importantly, the educative factor is not 
limited to the individual denizen, but spreads in many spheres of society, one such 
sphere being the school. Drawing from Barber’s theory of a strong democracy, in this 
section of the chapter I maintain that the two terms participation and community are 
also features that characterise Athenian citizenship, and by implication citizenship 
education. 
 
Nieborg and Vos (1983) investigate the relationship between community 
participation and learning. The authors establish that there are two types of learning 
resulting from community activities, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ learning.13 Soft learning 
involves special learning through training programmes. Hard learning refers to 
learning by doing. The writers conclude that both forms of learning are important to 
the citizen development process. Much of the international literature on education for 
citizenship and teaching of democracy supports both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ notions of 
community participation and learning. A typical understanding of a maximal 
acquisition is summarised by Hoodless (1992), when she quotes the Speaker’s 
Commission: “Tell me and I forget. Show me and I remember. Involve me and I 
understand” (p. 69). British educators have also added their voices to the verdict that 
citizenship is caught and taught, as Sutherland (2001) maintained. In ‘Everyday 
Politics: Reconstructing Citizens and Public Life’ (2004), Boyte, too, argues that 
citizenship education is a craft, not only a programme. The following paragraphs 
elaborate on the understanding of citizenship as a craft and a programme, that is, that 
successful citizenship education is more likely to be achieved through active 
participation in popular or grassroots organisations rather than through the formal 
school curriculum. There is striking empirical evidence that shows the attraction of 
citizenship in the classical mode: learners play an active part in citizenship, namely 
                                                 
13
 In this context, the term ‘soft’ refers to a minimalist conception of citizenship, and by extension 
education for citizenship, that relies entirely on the formal school curriculum. Interpreted maximally, 
learning democratic citizenship in a ‘hard’ way covers opportunities for teaching about citizenship 
within and outside the formal curriculum. Nieborg and Vos’s (1983) forms of learning are compatible 
with the prototypical concept of citizenship, a successful or effective education for citizenship that can 
be ‘taught’ and ‘caught’. 
73 
 
children are seen as partners, not as consumers or portrayed as threatening, nor as 
citizens-in-waiting in community projects, programmes and services that enhance 
democratic citizenship in schools.  
 
British and American studies indicate that a ‘modern’ version of Athenian citizenship 
is crafted and fomented by participating in schools that have ties with local 
community organisations.14 Edwards and Fogelman’s (1991) study ‘Active 
Citizenship and Young People’, reviews research evidence of active citizenship 
concerning young people in Britain. With a specific focus on student participation in 
democratic school governance, Edwards and Fogelman reveal that school 
representation gives students a degree of power and responsibility in matters relating 
to the curriculum, assessment, extra-curricular activities, and so on. Of particular 
importance in Edwards and Fogelman’s school study of representative democracy is 
that the active, participatory role of the students is beneficial not only for their own 
self-development, but also for the management of the school as a public, 
institutionalised arrangement involving parents, teachers and school authorities.  
 
In resonance with McLaughlin’s (1992) ‘maximal’ element of individuals’ degree of 
political involvement, school teachers in Edwards and Fogelman’s survey saw the 
benefits of pupil participation in promoting competent, self-reliant and responsible 
citizens. Comparable to Pitkin’s (1967) concept of representation, the Athenian view 
of citizenship education regards active participation in local institutions as a multi-
faceted arrangement where the young and old are active participants, not merely 
passive recipients of representative structures. Edwards and Fogelman suggest that 
                                                 
 
14
 The following are some of the individual organisations Edwards and Fogelman (1991) looked at as 
part of the review of research evidence on active citizenship concerning young people. International 
Voluntary Service is a movement founded in 1920 that aims to promote international understanding 
and peace through sending volunteers to work in developing countries. A Community Projects 
Foundation that was established in the 1960s focused its work on community development, for 
instance, developing skills of collective self-reliance and participation in public decision making and 
so on. The Politics Association has existed for nearly twenty years and aims to foster an informal 
political awareness among young people in Britain. 
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students’ participation in democratic citizenship is imperative in promoting and 
consolidating democracy in British schools. A look at the authors’ review provides a 
practical case in point for discussions in later chapters. Referring to the case of South 
Africa, Chapter 6 will show that pupils are one of the most indispensable components 
of democratic school governance at secondary schools. Against this background, I 
will defend the Student Representative Councils’ (SRCs) tradition on the grounds of 
its emphasis of the educative potential of learner participation. Unfortunately, as I 
will show, post-apartheid educational policy represents in significant respects 
retrieval of the less democratic tradition of student representation in South African 
schools. 
 
In ‘Citizenship in Schools’ (1991), Gyte and Hill observed a Community Planning 
Research organisation that carried out a survey that sought out the views of young 
people on citizenship and volunteering. The survey uncovered that all those 
interviewed would have welcomed the opportunity to learn about citizenship that 
focuses on a wide range of local activities boosting the community’s sense of 
identity, and that looks at community-state of affairs while still at schools. One 17-
year old expressed his regret this way: “You should know about it [the community]. 
It’s your community — and you really have a responsibility to yourself to know 
about it” (Gyte and Hill, 1991, p. 81). A university student’s comment referred to a 
host of issues also embedded in the teaching of citizenship: 
 
What you are taught at school is to obey what you are told to do by a teacher. 
That is absolutely opposed to good citizenship. Good citizenship is that you 
use your brain and teach yourself about things. What you’re told to do is: 
‘don’t question, just do what you’re told’. You are actually being taught to be 
a bad unresponsive, passive, stupid citizen (Gyte and Hill, 1991, p. 81).    
 
Both interviewees deplored the inability of schools to engage pupils in learning 
through active community involvement and its minimal citizenship education 
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project that seems not to foster active, critical and inquiring young citizens. The 
non-existence or lack of community involvement strands in citizenship programmes 
in schools deprives pupils of the opportunity to develop their intellectual, practical 
and moral excellences, a prospect that is paramount in the Advisory Group’s 
emphasis on ‘civic participation’ based on the prototypical version of Athenian 
citizenship. The level of personal commitment and enthusiasm for community 
participation promotes active, participatory citizens who are likely to provide a 
solid foundation for democracy, in schools and beyond. Referring to South Africa, 
Chapter 6 will show that the anti-apartheid struggle points to SRCs’ steadfastness 
to serve the interest of the community. The clarion call was that students must 
serve the community because they were members of society first, and an 
indispensable component of democratic school governance second, in that order.   
Jones and Jones (1992) review the national survey that was carried out by Fogelman 
in 1990. Some 57% of the mainstream secondary schools in England and Wales 
responded to the inquiry. It highlighted the very local nature of activities pursued by 
pupils — with the elderly, the disabled and the people in health-care institutions, for 
example. Community-link tutors and teachers from a number of schools devised a 
Modular Course on Citizenship in Oxfordshire. The practical aspects are focused on 
work experience, community placements, residential experience plus a practical 
project in response to an identified need in the community, and an investigation into 
some aspect of provision of services in the community. The source confirmed the 
active and participative nature of citizenship. It was more important to do citizenship 
than to learn about citizenship. The course also emphasised problem solving and 
decision making in both theoretical and practical aspects. It also provided an 
appropriate methodology for assessing the learning taking place — of the knowledge, 
understanding, and skills for citizenship.  
 
Jones and Jones’s (1992) study points to the ameliorative feature of a modified 
version of the Athenian prototype of citizenship where schools’ authorities identify 
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and repair deficiencies in local community life. These examples together with others, 
where young people gave informal help to neighbours and the needy, illustrate sites 
of learning for citizenship in homes and the community that can be built upon in 
schools. Schools can, as this investigation shows, play a very important role in 
helping young people work collaboratively to solve problems and achieve a just, 
healthy, and democratic community. In South Africa, the national Department of 
Education (DoE) introduced the Bill of Responsibilities as part of the national 
curriculum in 2008. It sought, among other things, to teach young people democratic 
values such as equality and fairness; reverence, respect and dignity; compassion; 
responsibility; diligence; tolerance and so on. Unfortunately, the language of the Bill 
of Responsibilities is prescriptive — an instance of ‘top-down’ transmission teaching.  
 
In contrast to Jones and Jones’s (1992) survey, the Bill exemplifies Hyslop (1988) 
and Seekings’s (1993) apocalyptic stereotype of the youth who are dangerous, 
irresponsible, uncaring, reckless and ungovernable. It is against the background of 
this image that the Bill appears to tend towards dictating or demanding unquestioning 
obedience from learners in South African schools. This approach to education for 
citizenship and teaching democracy is likely to treat pupils disdainfully, in the 
process fanning resentment and alienation. Against this I will argue that compulsory 
schooling, and compulsory citizenship education, but ‘bottom-up’ citizenship 
education intended to develop moral character, can be justified on the grounds that: 1) 
they promote individual autonomy, a citizen’s ability and inclination to act for 
himself; and 2) they build social cohesion by strengthening and consolidating South 
Africa’s democracy – which is also a political goal or a common good; and 3) they 
are open to students’ right to ‘optional’ participation in citizenship as an integral part 
of their learning.  
 
Mosher, Kenny and Garrod (1994) look at school democracy in the United States of 
America. Vincent from Hanover High School spoke of personal changes stemming 
from his participation in local community meeting:   
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Town meeting has put some order in my life. I used to skip over my 
homework, but now that I have a position of responsibility, I feel and act more 
responsibly. … [B]eing in Town Meeting has made me interested in politics. I 
watch the news and read the newspaper. … This kind of stuff never interested 
me before (Mosher et al, 1994, p. xiii). 
 
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the Athenian concept of citizenship 
underlines the gravity of civic virtue. To be a citizen was a way of being among 
others, a ‘political being’ — set apart by one’s knowledge of and interest in political 
life. However, it is often assumed that, as non-voters, young people like Vincent 
cannot be expected to have an interest in or a comprehension of general politics. How 
can one explain young people’s modern indifference to political participation? This 
chapter maintains that there are persistent challenges confronting citizenship 
universally, including South Africa, such as the historical and current, ongoing 
exclusion of adolescents and young adults from the sphere of citizenship. As a result 
of this exclusion, little attempt is made to build on their political knowledge or 
experience and to use this as a basis for learning citizenship and teaching democracy 
in schools. The quotation by Mosher et al (1994) seeks to draw attention to 
citizenship education programmes that have the tendency to depoliticise the concept 
of citizenship, which generally excludes adolescents and young adults from the 
sphere of citizenship.  
 
The survey indicates that the infusion of the political element in citizenship education 
programmes promises students substantive engagement as active citizens. The study 
by Mosher et al (1994) draws attention to the political implications of citizenship 
education in South Africa. These are some of the issues to be visited later in the 
thesis: 1) Chapter 6 will show that SRCs became representatives of social change, 
and played a critical role in the general struggle for democracy and emancipatory 
education in South Africa, particularly in the struggle for educational transformation; 
2) the SRCs contained the potential to educate for citizenship in a democratic society, 
because through participation in democratic ‘student-government’ students found a 
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‘free space’ that produced an active, informed and critical citizenry convinced that 
they can influence government in their quest to achieve an equitable, democratic and 
participatory schooling system.  
 
In sum, what is worth noting from the understanding of citizenship learning as both 
‘taught’ and ‘caught’ is that it is compatible with the Citizenship Advisory Group’s 
concern with the teaching of citizenship and democracy in schools, which comprises 
three strands: social and moral responsibility; community involvement; and political 
literacy. For example, Jones and Jones’s (1992) survey highlighted the social and 
moral responsible behaviour of pupils towards the elderly, the disabled and the 
people in health-care institutions. Mosher et al (1994) spoke of a transformed citizen 
as a result of student participation in community involvement. Edwards and 
Fogelman’s (1991) review of research showed how political literacy can foster 
students’ civic ‘power’ and experience of (some degree of) control.  
 
Global trends in liberal democracies tend towards participatory, community-based 
citizenship education. Much of the international literature reveals that the ‘taught’ and 
the ‘caught’ notions of citizenship education need not be in conflict with one other. 
The gulf might be narrowed if our understanding of effective education for 
citizenship in well-established democracies or in those in transition to democracy 
enables pupils to experience citizenship education beyond the school perimeters, thus 
putting community participation at the centre of democratic citizenship. Those who 
are locked out, or lock themselves out, of ‘community participation’ have fewer 
opportunities to learn. Quoting Aristotle, Mosher et al (1994) remind us that “people 
do not naturally grow up to be democratic citizens; they learn as a result of lifelong 
personal and community effort” (Mosher et al, 1994, p. xii). When the school 
socialises each child of society into membership within such a political community 
we shall arguably have the deepest and best guarantee of a larger democratic society. 
What this means is that pupils may be instructed in the duties of citizenship in two 
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ways: first, by learning that citizenship, as we saw on our brief exploration of a 
classical Greek tradition, both in Chapters 2 and in this chapter, is related to the 
notion of participatory democracy; and second, by playing an active part in 
citizenship, namely local community and wider involvement and service, with the 
hope to equip learners for their future, as this chapter maintains. A prototypical, 
maximal concept of citizenship is crucial for a highly educated democratic citizenry, 
not only in Britain and America, but also in a post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the focus of Chapters 2 and 3 is on 
conceptual clarification, on establishing the meaning and practical significance of the 
classical theory (Athenian democracy), ‘representation’ and ‘citizenship’, in order to 
set up a framework from which to analyse the assumptions reflected in post-apartheid 
education policy in South Africa. These chapters build a conceptual framework for 
the detailed discussion that comes later: 1) the prototypical, maximal concept of 
democracy reflects the democratic vision of the model of democracy developed in the 
anti-apartheid struggle and envisioned in the Constitution of South Africa (1996) — 
as well as the Charter tradition; 2) this concept of democracy, as understood in the 
Greek city-state of Athens, as an idea and a practice is still relevant in modern 
societies like South Africa; 3) the prototypical Athenian concept of citizenship, I will 
argue is the most fitting model for citizenship preparation in South African schools; 
and 4) the interpretation, effectiveness and practice — the ‘viability’ of prototypical 
Athenian democracy, and its notion of citizenship and citizenship education, is 
affirmed by the global trends in liberal democracies like Britain and America that 
tend towards participatory, community-based citizenship education. These modern 
debates and trends on citizenship and citizenship education offer prospects for a 
revised post-apartheid citizenship education policy in South Africa.  
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3.6 Conclusion  
What is a citizen? How do we define a citizen? In prototypical Athenian democracy a 
citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind of rule or office. This 
Aristotelian designation indicates that the citizen is not identical to the entire or the 
ordinary person. The prototypical concept of citizenship, as an idea and a practice, 
has also gone through a metamorphosis, i.e. has been reformed, rethought and 
reinvented since the mid twentieth century. In terms of its relevance in modern 
society, the Athenian concept of citizenship, and by association citizenship education, 
might be recommended for its attempt to balance the disparate, competing 
philosophical conceptions of citizenship, such as individualism and 
communitarianism. The Citizenship Advisory Group’s interpretation of the 
prototypical Athenian tradition sets out to enable pupils, parents, teachers, local 
communities and all those with an active interest in education for citizenship to 
experience citizenship education beyond the school perimeters, thus reinvigorating 
the participative or maximal element in modern society. A re-emergence of ‘civic 
fields’ and civic agency is not a new phenomenon in South Africa’s struggle history. 
Africa. Against this background, global trends in liberal democracies tend similarly 
towards participatory, community-based citizenship education. At this stage, the 
focus on global debates and trends points to the modification of the prototypical 
Athenian concept of democracy and its related concept of citizenship. The next 
chapter focuses on competing concepts of citizenship, which shows the challenges 
posed for democratic education in post-apartheid South African schools. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
CONTESTED NOTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
We the people of South Africa believe that South Africa belongs to all who 
live in it, united in our diversity. There is a common South African 
citizenship. … All citizens are — equally entitled to the rights, privileges and 
benefits of citizenship; and equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of 
citizenship (Republic of South Africa, 1996, pp. 1-3). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In South Africa’s Constitutional democracy, the term citizenship reflects two distinct 
formulations — citizenship as a legal status (to be a citizen) and citizenship as a 
practice (to act as a citizen). In other words, to be a citizen means to enjoy the rights, 
privileges and benefits of citizenship. Citizens’ rights and responsibilities include the 
obligations to play an active part in citizenship, that is, public participation in central, 
provincial and local government. I contend in this chapter that there is a tension in the 
1996 Constitution between ‘symbolic’ and ‘substantive’ conceptions
15
 of citizenship 
and, by implication, of citizenship education. The difficulty is that presently a 
common South African citizenship is at the crossroads; it is stretched and pulled in 
different directions. In support of this claim it will be argued that South Africa does 
not have a settled conception of citizenship to draw on. By implication, education for 
                                                 
15
 According to Christie (2008), “policies always engage with what already exists, either to change it 
or to preserve it” (p. 122). In South Africa, the Constitution (1996) sets out an ideal common 
citizenship that cannot necessarily be achieved in practice. It may be understood, to use Christie’s 
words, as symbolic policy. By contrast, the set of policy instruments listed in the introduction to this 
thesis are regarded as substantive policies, i.e. they instil and reinforce democratic values of the 
Constitution that can be promoted in South African schools. In the context of this chapter, the term 
‘substantive’ is synonymous with the Athenian concepts of democratic participation and active 
citizenry. The Constitution (1996) and post-apartheid citizenship education policy tend towards 
symbolic (transformative) rather than substantive (preservative) notions of education for citizenship 
and democracy in South African schools. For example, the 1996 Constitution provides a framework 
for a transformed citizen who will strive to overcome the apartheid past. 
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democratic citizenship, too, is still at a formative stage (Enslin, 2003, p. 73). This 
chapter builds on the discussion of the prototypical concept of democratic citizenship 
that I regard as the most fitting model for citizenship education in post-apartheid 
South Africa schools. In South Africa, a revised version of the ‘classical theory’, 
especially the democratic zeal for participation and its concept of citizenship, first 
emerged in the Freedom Charter. This vision of the Freedom Charter embodies 
attributes of maximal components of democracy and citizenship. The purpose of this 
chapter is two-fold: Firstly, it shows that South Africa is marked by different phases 
of citizenship; Secondly, it also shows that since South Africa reflects different 
interpretations of citizenship, post-apartheid citizenship education policy is torn 
between ‘transformative’ goals, on the one hand, and ‘democratic’ goals, on the 
other. To support this claim, I will rely on the South African Citizenship Acts that 
shed some light on the official pronouncements of the rulers. Significantly, the 
chapter will trace the formation of South African citizenship in three phases: 
apartheid race-based citizenship; homeland ethnicity-based citizenship; and a 
modified version of the prototypical concept of democratic citizenship envisioned in 
the Freedom Charter.  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1 reflects on the origins of separate 
and unequal citizenship in South Africa. Section 2 shows how ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ 
identities were applied in order to foster nationalist and traditionalist
16
 conceptions of 
citizenship in South Africa. Section 3 asserts that the Freedom Charter endorsed a 
modified version of the Athenian prototype, one that was also echoed in the 
Constitution of South Africa (1996). Section 4 claims that post-apartheid South 
African citizenship and citizenship education put more emphasis on the 
‘transformative’ goals as compared to the ‘democratic’ project. Consequently, the 
                                                 
16
 The term used to refer to the National Party (NP) government’s appointed ‘traditional chiefs’ in 
Bantu states or homelands. In the words of the chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission in 1968, the 
National Party government “did not view all Bantu as one single people, but as several … divided by 
language, culture and traditions into several peoples or nations” (Barker et al, 1988, p. 425).  In other 
words, in South Africa the Nationalists acted as the guardians of the Bantu self-governing nations. 
83 
 
democratic elements are tentatively expressed and outweighed by the general 
transformative orientation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). 
In the end post-apartheid citizenship education policy’s lack of conceptual clarity, 
coherence and consistency can be attributed in large part to these conflicting forms 
and conceptions of citizenship in South Africa.17 
 
4.2 South African citizenship: common but not inclusive   
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that Britain and South Africa have ties that date 
back to the early nineteenth century. The British colonial domination or control of 
virtually all spheres of South African society provides a useful basis for the 
development of contested notions of citizenship in this country. The concept of 
apartheid citizenship in South Africa has its roots in “the English law of citizenship 
and nationality that originated in the common law concept of allegiance” (Schmidt,  
1993, p. 212). As a consequence of this dominant-subsidiary relationship, when the  
Boer republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State) and the British colonies (Cape 
Colony and Natal) formed the South African Union government in 1910; there were 
no South African citizens, only British subjects and Union nationals. The Hertzog 
government (1924-1934) with its policy of ‘South Africa First’ was eager to enhance 
the rights and status of South Africa by placing the Union, Britain and other 
dominions on an equal footing. This was a pivotal moment in the development of a 
legal or formal ‘South African citizenship’. It was at this period that the Union began 
to entertain the concept of nationality, the status of a Union national, outside and 
independent of British territorial control. As the debate around national identity 
                                                 
17
 For Ramphele (2001), citizenship is a dynamic, complex, even ambiguous concept. In her essay 
‘Citizenship Challenges for South Africa’s Young Democracy’, Ramphele explores the complexities 
of defining citizenship and challenges the tendency to assume that there is one form of citizenship and, 
by implication, of citizenship education in post-apartheid South Africa. It is against this background 
that post-apartheid citizenship education policy’s conceptual incoherence can be attributed to these 
conflicting forms and conceptions of citizenship in South Africa. In ‘Citizenship Education in Post-
Apartheid South Africa’, Enslin (2003) examines the tensions between what she calls “the official 
conceptualisation of citizenship and a more popular interpretation of citizenship as access to socio 
economic rights” (p. 73). She raises some of the tensions that are likely to pose potential problems in 
South Africa’s democracy, as well as a challenge for citizenship education in schools. The present 
chapter builds on Ramphele (2001) and Enslin’s (2003) work, by examining conflicting forms and 
conceptions of citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa. 
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unfolded domestically, the Union government quickly passed a number of laws that 
divided the South African demographic landscape, and later citizenship, into black18 
and white.    
 
The beginning of disparate ‘South African citizenship’ under the Union government 
came with the Natives Land Act (26) of 1913 that set up reserves (later known as 
‘homelands’) for black people. The Act provided for setting aside existing black 
reserves as ‘scheduled areas’ reserved for black ownership and occupation, and also 
prohibiting blacks from purchasing land outside them. The Act read in part:  
 
a) a native shall not enter into any agreement or transaction for the purchase, 
hire, or other acquisition from a person other than a native, of any such 
land or of any right thereto, interest therein, or servitude thereover; and 
b) a person other than a native shall not enter into any agreement or 
transaction for the purchase, hire, or other acquisition from the native of 
any such land or of any right thereto, interest therein, or servitude 
thereover (Union of South Africa, 1913, p. 438). 
 
The Natives Land Act provided the base for territorial separation of white and African 
in the rural areas. Reflecting on the Natives Land Act, it can be observed that 
Marshall’s (1950) classical typology of civil rights indicates that, by law, black and 
white South African citizens were only allowed to own land in certain separate areas, 
and neither group was allowed to buy land in the other’s designated area. Only 7, 5% 
of the land surface in the country was set aside for black African occupation, even 
though Africans formed the majority of the population. The results were 
overcrowding, land hunger, poverty, and people forced to leave the designated land 
often ended up in the cities or working in the Witwatersrand mines. The Act laid the 
basis of a ‘South African citizenship’ that was later permeated by racism, that is, a 
systematic process of discrimination based on one’s race or colour. The introduction 
of the explicitly racial conception of apartheid citizenship will be discussed in the 
                                                 
18
 In this thesis the term “black” is used to refer to all the oppressed groups, namely: Coloureds, 
Asians/Indians and Africans under apartheid South Africa. Disaggregation (i.e. Coloureds, Indians and 
Africans) of this generic term will be used particularly in Chapter 7 to describe the full and differential 
impact of colonial-apartheid education policies on the various oppressed groups in South Africa. 
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next section. The effects of the Land Act on citizenship education were far reaching. 
For Ramphele (2001), the prohibition of the right of black South Africans to own 
land denied them “not only the [civil element of] citizenship, but also the kind of 
education that would prepare them to become morally autonomous agents” (p. 3, 
addition mine).  
 
In the third section of this chapter, I will show three contradictory conceptions of 
citizenship education programmes in South Africa, from three viewpoints that are 
hardly complementary: the British Girl Guide Movement, the National Party’s Youth 
Preparedness Programme and Veld Schools19 and the democratic citizenship 
education of the anti-apartheid movement. The purpose is two-fold: 1) to show that in 
apartheid South Africa, there were different languages of education policy debate, 
which were roughly labelled as ‘official’, the hierarchical and exclusive body of 
citizenship, where power and control was used to foster both subservient and superior 
forms of citizenship, on the one hand, and 2) a ‘popular’ concept of citizenship based 
on some of the basic tenets of the Freedom Charter, such as people’s power or 
democracy, equality and freedom, conceptions, on the other hand, that emerged first 
in the prototypical Athenian democracy. In Chapters 5, 6 and 8, I will show that there 
is a tension in post-apartheid South African education policy between official 
(minimal) and popular (maximal) conceptions of education for citizenship and 
democracy.    
 
                                                 
19
 In brief, Veld Schools were part of the white education system in the Transvaal province which were 
specifically set aside for physical and moral teaching. As the name tells us, they were schools in the 
veld. Buwalda (1979) set out the aims and objectives of a typical Veld School as follows: 
 
To lead the pupil on the road to maturity and adulthood. … The aim of this course is 
not simply to impart knowledge but to reinforce the norms, values and morals 
(customs) of our society. … To encourage the pupil to be a better South African. … 
To encourage pupils to become better Christians. … To show that a threat to South 
African’s existence and stability does exist, and what we can do about it. … To 
prepare our young for emergencies which may take place (quoted in Christie, 1988, 
p. 172). 
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The South African government gave effect to the colonial provisions of the Land Act 
of 1913 by introducing the Natives Urban Areas Act (20) of 1923. By separating 
native locations from towns administratively, the Act segregated black and white 
people socially (territorially they had been separated earlier, purportedly on hygienic 
grounds). According to the Act, urban local authorities were given powers to “define, 
set apart and lay out one or more areas of land for the occupation, residence and other 
reasonable requirements of natives, either as extensions of any area already set apart 
for that purpose or as separate areas” (Union of South Africa, 1923, p.142). The 
establishment of any location, native village or hostel, as the case may be, depended 
on Ministerial approval once he was satisfied that the land was not in the arid and 
hostile areas reserved for use by the government. Resulting in the separation of black 
townships from white administrative areas, the government and municipal 
administrators during the first half of the twentieth century were very concerned 
about towns increasingly becoming racial melting pots. To prohibit this racial cross-
fertilisation, the government insisted that towns belonged to white citizens, who 
would be responsible for controlling them.  
 
The Native Trust and Land Act (18) of 1936, among others, made further provision 
for the acquisition and occupation of land by ‘natives’, thus increasing the blacks’ 
total acreage to 13,7% of South Africa’s total land area. The Act aimed to enlarge the 
reserves to ease congestion and curb the urban inflow of blacks to the ‘white’ cities. 
To speed up the process the South African Native Trust fund was set up to administer 
the settlement, support, benefit, and material and moral welfare of the ‘natives’ of the 
Union. On the whole, these three ‘bedrock’ legislations established the basis of a 
partitioned ‘South African citizenship’. Firstly, by confirming the loss of black-
owned land in favour of white landowners, the legislation left South Africa with no 
black (African) ‘citizens’ at all. Secondly, the regulation of African mobility and the 
confinement of blacks to the reserves translated into a substantial denial of civil, 
political and social rights of citizenship. For example, on the civic side, as already 
stated, the natives lost the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts. 
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Politically, Africans were not entitled to participate, vote or stand for government 
office in the ‘white’ South African Union. On top of that, with the basic principles of 
segregation enshrined in the statutes, a separate system of education was designed to 
prepare the African for an inferior type of citizenship. These enforced measures 
constituted three of the cornerstone policies of white supremacy in South African 
history of citizenship. The segregationist policies provided the basis for the further 
racial segregation policies after the National Party’s victory in the 1948 elections. On 
the international front, the Union government persisted with its attempts to establish a 
South African citizenship independent of the British Empire and Commonwealth. 
 
At the Commonwealth Conference of 1926, the Balfour Declaration stated that 
Britain and the dominions including South Africa, were independent countries within 
the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect 
of their domestic or external affairs.
20 
However, in terms of the English law of 
citizenship South Africa was still tied to the British Crown and remained an affiliate 
member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In an unprecedented move, the 
South African Citizenship Act (44) of 1949 was essentially substituted for that of 
Union nationality.
21
 The Act repealed the existing statutes dealing with British 
subjects and Union nationals. The Act read as follows:  
 
Any reference in any law to a Union national or to Union nationality shall be 
deemed to be a reference to a South African citizen or to South African 
citizenship, as the case may be, and any reference to a British subject shall be 
deemed to be a reference to a South African, a citizen of a Commonwealth 
country or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, and any reference to natural- 
                                                 
20
 At the conference all questions regarding relations within the British Empire, that is, the 
relationships of the dominions of the Empire to one another and to Britain, were referred to a special 
committee. The chairman was Lord Balfour, at that time chief whip of the House of Lords under 
Baldwin’s government. 
 
21
 The Union Nationality and Flags Act (40) of 1927 created a distinct South African nationality, the 
status of a Union national. According to Klaaren (2000), “while not all British subjects had status as 
Union nationals, all Union nationals were considered by South African legislation as British subjects, 
and the overlap was nearly complete” (p. 223). Another step towards South Africa’s resolve to have a 
definite nationality, section 7(1) of the Union Nationality and Flags Act (1927) also made provision 
for two South African flags: the Union Jack and the national, official flag. 
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born British subjects shall be deemed to be a reference to persons who by 
virtue of birth or descent are South African citizens or citizens of any 
Commonwealth country or of the Republic of Ireland, or who have at any 
time been such citizens and are not aliens (Union of South Africa, 1949, p. 
448). 
 
The South African Citizenship Act (1949) was ground-breaking in three ways: 1) it 
created the new status of South African citizenship, essentially substituting the status 
for that of Union nationality; 2) the Act highlighted the Union’s long struggle to give 
substance to the original Hertzog motto of ‘South Africa First’ and to free the country 
from all the confines of its colonial past; and 3) unsurprisingly, the Act ushered in a 
seemingly common albeit unequal South African society. As the next section will 
show, while the Act’s concept of citizenship sounded inclusive, in reality it did not 
include non-citizens, that is, the already secluded majority of the South African 
population both in the black reserves and in native locations. Although, at that stage, 
the South African Citizenship Act (1949) did not place any emphasis on race 
regarding the acquisition or loss of South African citizenship, “citizenship was later 
employed as an element of the intended establishment of sovereign black nation 
states in the deployment of separate development” (Schmidt, 1993, p. 228).  
 
Thus far, I have been concerned with the history of South African citizenship from 
1910 to 1949. This historical background provides insight on the formulation of 
South African Citizenship (1949) based on ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ classifications. In 
other words, the formation of apartheid South African citizenship, and its related 
notions of citizenship education, is rooted in the nationalists’ pronouncement that 
within the borders of the Republic there are two types of nations: the White nation 
and several Bantu nations — hence the policy of separate development. It is to the 
racial conception of apartheid citizenship, the first phase of formal South African 
citizenship that we now turn to.  
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4.3 Apartheid and homeland citizenship in South Africa       
The groundwork for a hierarchical and exclusive body of citizenship involving white 
and black South Africans, as the previous section indicated, was laid during the first 
half of the twentieth century. When the National Party assumed power in 1948, the 
policy they used to govern South Africa was called apartheid, the definition of which 
has already been given in Chapter 1. While black South Africans were denied full 
citizenship, the nationalists espoused a form of apartheid race-based citizenship — a 
concept of citizenship that classified the South African population into different race 
groups. As regards citizenship and race relations, the National Party leader, D.F. 
Malan (1948-1954) stated, as two main principles of the nationalists: 
• that there should be no racial equality in the white areas, and 
• that the Natives should develop along their own lines in their own areas 
(quoted in Hepple, 1967, p. 113).   
 
If formal South African citizenship was to be so rigidly organised around racial 
differences, there had to be a governing system for telling people to which race group 
they belonged. With the Union government Natives Land Act and the Natives Urban 
Areas Act already established as the basis of a partitioned ‘South African citizenship’, 
that is, effectively withholding civil, political and social rights from Africans, the 
nationalist government enacted racial policies that served to buttress apartheid 
citizenship.  
 
The Population Registration Act (30) of 1950 was one of many racial policies that 
reinforced apartheid citizenship. The Act classified South African citizens into four 
different race groups, Europeans (whites), Coloureds, Indians and Africans (blacks):  
   
Every person whose name was included in the register shall be classified by 
the Director as a white person, a coloured person or a native, as the case may 
be, and every coloured person and every native whose name is so included 
shall be classified by the Director according to the ethnic or other group to 
which he belongs. The Director shall assign an identity number to every 
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person whose name is included in the register (Union of South Africa, 1950, 
p. 279). 
 
These racial classifications provided definitions of race based on physical appearance 
and identity cards in which the race of a person would be clearly marked. Because 
(non-) citizenship was determined on the basis of race membership, the Act caused 
enormous personal suffering, since it classified, declassified and reclassified 
“thousands of coloureds into whites, whites into coloureds, Indians into ‘Malays’, 
Cape coloureds into ‘other’ coloureds, ‘Malays’ into Chinese, Chinese into whites, 
and so on” (Barker et al, 1988, p. 376). The nationalists’ emphasis on racial 
differences signalled not only a separate, but also, a racial sort of citizenship in South 
Africa. The next section analyses the fine points of the nationalists’ apartheid 
citizenship, starting with its propagation of a distinct Afrikaner identity, rather than a 
South African identity that belongs to all racial groups, united in their diversity.    
 
For the National Party, apartheid citizenship entailed serving one’s country and God. 
In other words, citizenship emphasised loyalty to the Christian-National Republic of 
South Africa based on the word of God. On the announcement of the Afrikaner 
victory in the 1948 election, D.F. Malan was reported to have said, “We feared that 
we would lose our fatherland. Now South Africa is our own in a deeper sense than 
before — May God grant that it remains our own” (Van Rooyen, 1988, p. 18). At the 
core of the nationalists’ view lies a religious and political myth which held that God 
had appointed by providence the Afrikaners to rule South Africa. Apart from putting 
blacks in their own place, to various sections of the Afrikaners — particularly the 
professionals, educators and civil servants — the 1948 victory also meant that 
national unity and self-realisation through service of ‘the people’ had finally dawned. 
This concept of citizenship relates first and foremost to membership of the Afrikaner 
community. By implication, apartheid citizenship promoted by the National Party 
government is bound up with communitarian features, such as fraternity, solidarity, 
civic pride, social obligation and tradition, attributes that are rarely present in the 
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liberal vision of citizenship. In this context, the nationalists’ concept of citizenship 
created a struggle between the Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans.    
 
The majority of English-language speakers have argued that there has long been 
another tradition, a non-apartheid dimension in South African history, one that may 
be called the liberal tradition. But historically it is a tradition that has expressed an 
‘individual ethic’ rather than the ‘communal’ ethic’ of Afrikaner nationalism. South 
African liberals share with others certain convictions, among them the beliefs that the 
individual is of supreme importance and that his legitimate interests should not be 
overridden by the Afrikaner Republic. The liberals had constantly advocated a liberal, 
non-racial, democratic South Africa at the time when the nationalists were 
consolidating Afrikaner national unity. After 1948, the Afrikaners and blacks who 
supported a liberal vision of citizenship were soon to learn that in apartheid South 
Africa, individuals’ rights and responsibilities and traditional communal obligations 
co-exist in a state of tension. A closer look at nationalism and liberalism as 
conflicting modern political ideologies provides a useful basis for explaining this 
tension in citizenship as antimonies, viz, as contradictions which simply could not be 
solved under the circumstances. 
 
A nationalist member of parliament, Nico Diederichs, articulates this space of tension 
well, when he expressed the National Party’s attitude to the liberal ideal of equality, 
non-racialism and democracy in South Africa: 
 
We are not concerned here purely with a fight between two ordinary political 
parties [the National Party and the United Party] … what is at issue is two 
outlooks on life, fundamentally so divergent that a compromise is entirely 
unthinkable. … The fight in South Africa is between Nationalism and 
Liberalism — this doctrine of Liberalism that stands for equal rights for all 
civilised human beings (quoted in Hepple, 1967, pp. 63, 269, addition mine).   
 
Both the Afrikaner nationalists and the English liberals quibbled among themselves 
over the proper understanding of ‘white’ South African citizenship. Interestingly, the 
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contested notions of the South African Citizenship Act (1949) took place at a time that 
black South Africans were treated as civil, political and social outcasts. Moreover, 
despite the contest between the nationalist and liberal perspectives, the South African 
government’s apartheid citizenship continued to be propagated by white politicians, 
academics and ordinary people. Despite ideological differences, both the nationalists 
and the liberals were entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of the South 
African Citizenship Act (1949). For black South Africans, citizenship (manifested in 
the form of the Afrikaner nationalism as well as English liberal traditions) remained a 
distant dream.  
 
The second phase of South African citizenship got into full swing when the 
Nationalist government imposed ethnic identities to repress blacks, pushing them 
further down in the hierarchy of apartheid citizenship. According to Abercrombie et 
al, (1984), “ethnicity as a concept refers to shared social elements such as language, 
religion, customs, traditions, and history within a particular social group, which in 
some way contributes to the distinct identity of that group” (p. 275). In South Africa, 
with a long history of racial exclusion of the majority population from full 
citizenship, the racial categories of ‘White’ ‘Coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘Black’ became 
the categories that were then used to define ethnic groups. In other words, the 
concepts of ‘racial groups’ and ‘ethnic groups’ were used interchangeably to attempt 
to invent distinctly separate ethnic identities, in order to strengthen the argument for 
distinctly separate races. As a first step towards a ‘racialisation’ of ethnicity, the 
Bantu
22
Authorities Act (68) of 1951 imposed government-appointed ‘traditional 
chiefs’ as the local administrators in ‘tribal areas’. Through the Act, the chiefs were 
given powers to promote what amounted to ethnic identity.  
 
Prime Minister Verwoerd (1958-1966) got parliament to agree in 1959 to the 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (45), which provided for the establishment 
                                                 
22
 The term ‘Bantu’ was an adaptation of the Zulu word abantu, meaning ‘people’. In a democratic 
South Africa, Bantu is synonymous to African sub-groupings, defined by languages such as Setswana, 
isiZulu, isiXhosa, and so on. 
93 
 
of ten independent/autonomous black states. Of these, four were ‘independent’: 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei (TBVC). The other four were ‘self-
governing’, Lebowa, QwaQwa, KwaZulu and Gazankulu. The last two were still in 
the formative process: Kangwane and Kwandebele. The salient feature of the 
Nationalist government’s native policy was that Africans belong to different ‘ethnic 
nationalities’, each possessing a distinct language, culture, lifestyle, values and 
traditions. The concept of Bantustans was entrenched in the principle that these ten 
separate ‘nations’ would exercise democratic rights and citizenship in their traditional 
tribal homelands, which together comprised just over 13% of the total area of the 
country. Although the Act was intended to repatriate Africans who had lost their 
South African citizenship to their alleged ‘ethnic nationality’, beneath this 
qualification was an ambitious scheme to leave South Africa with no African citizens 
whatsoever.  
 
On 17 September 1958, as the Minister of Native Affairs in the National Party 
government (1950-1958), Verwoerd succinctly summed up the nationalists’ 
prescriptive and conditional political involvement and participation granted to the 
Bantus in South Africa: 
 
The Bantu in the cities are not distinct from the Bantu in the Native Reserves. 
They belong to one another. … Their roots are in the Native Reserves. The 
opportunities for them to enjoy rights, whether they are social or political 
rights, are available in their home areas (quoted in Hepple, 1967, p. 120). 
 
Effectively, Africans had no civic, political and social citizenship rights, save in the 
Bantustan states. In practice, homeland citizenship meant that all the Bantu in the 
Republic of South Africa, whether domiciled in established African reserves or not, 
were considered to be citizens of the black areas for their ethnic group, and to have 
citizenship rights there. In order to foster homeland ethnic-based citizenship, the 
National Party’s strategy took two forms: 1) an enforced division of the Bantu along 
ethnic lines; and 2) an imposed separation between urban (town) and rural 
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(countryside). With the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959), black South 
Africans were able to exercise rights, albeit restricted, to own property and to 
conclude valid contracts. They were entitled to participate, vote or stand for political 
office. Each homeland established its own education system.  
 
As Verwoerd indicated, the Nationalist government believed that the Act would give 
Africans full civil, political and social citizenship in their respective states. The Act 
was perceived as a form of ‘African representative democracy’, in the eyes of a 
number of office holders. In other words, local chiefs interpreted the homeland 
system as the National Party’s attempt to transform existing neo-traditional African 
areas into states in which Africans would be party to their newly found rural 
governance and citizenship, that is to say, were they are expected to participate, and 
attend to matters of democracy or self-government. Savoury as it sounds, the guise of 
a Western-style democracy was a white ploy to “separate black struggle into eight 
different struggles for eight false freedoms that were prescribed long ago” (Biko, 
1996, p. 83). A closer look at the nationalists’ claim to democratic citizenship in these 
‘independent’ and ‘self-governing’ Bantustans indicates that it is not without 
contradictions. 
 
As a point of departure, the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (26) of 1970 attested to 
the National Party’s commitment to race- and ethnicity-based notions of citizenship. 
For example, for the purpose of determining which ethnic-based citizenship was to be 
conferred upon a person, it had to be established: 
 
… that every Bantu was not a citizen of any other self-governing territory … 
and spoke any Bantu language used by the Bantu population of that area, 
including every Bantu person belonging to any associated linguistic group 
which normally uses any dialect of any such language; … that every Bantu 
person in the Republic was related to any member of the Bantu population of 
that area or who has identified himself with any part of such population or 
who was associated with any part of such population by virtue of his cultural 
or racial background (Republic of South Africa, 1970, p. 5). 
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This form and expression of ethnicity encouraged self-determination based on ethnic 
nationalities, which in effect signalled a setback for those who rejected both racial 
and ethnic identities during the anti-apartheid struggle. The rejection of imposed 
‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ conceptions of citizenship in South Africa will be discussed in 
detail in the next section. The Act’s segregationist and, in fact, exclusionist view of 
‘democratic citizenship’ is apparent in that citizens of these separate traditional 
entities were expected to exercise and enjoy their right to vote, including “privileges 
and benefits and be subject to all the duties, obligations and responsibilities of 
citizenship of that territorial authority area as are accorded to or imposed upon him in 
terms of any law” (Republic of South Africa, 1970, p. 3). The homelands policy 
represented what might be called a common ‘whitism’, aiming to preserve white 
political dominance over those destined to perpetual servitude.  
 
The intended outcome of homelands citizenship was articulated by C.P. Mulder, in 
his capacity as Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. On February 7, 
1978, Mulder stated in Parliament: 
 
If our policy is taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the black people 
are concerned, there will be no black man with South African citizenship. … 
Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some 
independent new state in this honourable way and there will no longer be a 
moral obligation on this Parliament to accommodate these people politically 
(quoted in Dugard, 1980, p. 16).      
 
Mulder’s statement supported the nationalist ideologues who maintained that African 
people who resided in ‘white’ South Africa were not entitled to the rights, privileges 
and benefits of the South African Citizenship Act (1949). In 1980, the policy of 
separate development was denounced by black people in general, including the  
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leaders of the self-governing homelands
23
, who remained opposed to homeland 
citizenship unless and until two stern conditions were met. These, according to the 
report by Dugard (1980), are that, firstly, “the condition that citizenship on 
satisfactory terms is negotiated which gives non-residents [of ‘self-governing’ states]  
the choice of either independence or South African status or both” (p. 18). Secondly, 
the South African government should attempt to secure international recognition for 
those homelands that opt for independence. It is important to note that traditional 
leaders expressed the latter concern in the wake of the unsurprising failure of 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda to secure such recognition. 
 
All the same, because the Bantustans’ self-government continued to be imposed on 
reluctant participants and were an extended arm of the apartheid regime, the South 
African “government […] patently failed to enlist general black acceptance of the 
homelands as the ultimate channel for black political participation” (Geldenhuys, 
1981, p. 79). As far as citizens’ participation is concerned, the apartheid race-based 
and homeland ethnicity-based citizenship phases can be summarised in the following 
way: 1) blacks were not really citizens since they did not exercise full civil, social and 
political rights in ‘white’ South African government affairs; and 2) in order to arm 
against the accusation of ‘injustice’, the apartheid South African government resorted 
to the device of giving black citizenship, that is civil, political and social rights, in the 
homelands. However, it was precisely the racial and ethnic orientation of citizenship 
that prompted the development of a modified version of the Athenian prototype of 
democracy and its notion of citizenship with roots in the Freedom Charter.  
                                                 
23
 The 1970 Act provided that all Bantu in South Africa would be made citizens of one of the 
Bantustans, even those who had never lived outside of the white areas. Until 1976, citizenship 
certification in ‘self-governing’ territories implied a form of dual citizenship, which meant that 
Bantustan citizens retained South African citizenship. However, the citizens of the four Bantustans that 
became independent since 1975 the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, were unilaterally 
deprived of their South African citizenship. 
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4.4 The Freedom Charter and citizenship education    
In South Africa, the formulation and defense of democratic ideals of citizenship are 
attributed to the broader anti-apartheid struggle. The ANC was founded on the basic 
values of unity, non-racialism and democracy in 1912. On behalf of the Bantu, in 
1923, the organisation pronounced that it “claimed equal rights for all civilised men 
south of the Zambezi, as well as the democratic principles of equality of treatment 
and equality of citizenship in the land, irrespective of race, class, creed or origin” 
(quoted in Asmal, 2005, p. 47). The struggle conception of citizenship was reignited 
when the United Democratic Front (UDF) was launched as a national body at a 
meeting in Cape Town on 20 August 1983. The UDF slogan was ‘Apartheid Divides, 
UDF Unites’, aimed to counter the apartheid government’s strategy of divide and 
rule, by maximising unity of the oppressed within and outside the borders of South 
Africa.
24 
It is against this background that the ANC demanded the granting of full 
citizenship rights and equal opportunities such as those enjoyed exclusively by all 
whites in South Africa from its inception until 1994. 
 
In June 1955, to put the ideal of citizen participation into action, the Congress of the 
People was held in Kliptown, Johannesburg, to draw up a Charter for the democratic 
South Africa of the future. The convention was dubbed the people’s assembly 
because more than two thousand delegates of all different race groups, Europeans, 
Indians, Coloureds and Africans from various cities, towns, villages, factories and 
farms throughout the country participated in this extraordinary gathering. The 
people’s demands for an alternative to the imposed racial/ethnic template of 
citizenship upon the black population were collected, debated and expressed in the 
Charter. The Charter’s preamble called for a highly participatory notion of 
democratic citizenship:  
 
                                                 
24
 Although the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 made provision for democratic participation 
and citizenship in Bantustan states, these assumptions were based on the policy of separate 
development, thus lacked political legitimacy and widespread support both inside and outside the 
homelands. 
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We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to 
know: that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white … that 
our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in 
brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities … that only a 
democratic state, based on the will of the people, can secure to all their 
birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief (The Freedom 
Charter, 1955). 
 
There are two points worth noting about the Freedom Charter’s concept of democracy 
and citizenship. First, the reference to ‘the will of the people’ is strongly reminiscent 
of the prototype of democracy sketched by Pericles (Thucydides, 1972). Second, it 
also affirms its basic assumptions, i.e. collective self-rule, equality and freedom. In 
other words, the prototypical, maximal concept of democracy and citizenship is 
clearly incompatible with the hierarchical and exclusive body of South African 
citizenship, namely apartheid race-based and homeland ethnicity-based notions of 
citizenship. Furthermore, the Charter’s preamble is noteworthy in three senses: 1) it 
starts from the premise that South Africa does not have citizens and non-citizens; 2) 
by so doing, it offers an early indication that both the racial and ethnic presumptions 
underlying of South African Citizenship Act (1949) and Bantu Homelands Citizenship 
Act (1970) seem to be inconsistent with the democratic project in the maximalist 
sense; and 3) it also makes the highly plausible claim that only a democratic state 
based on ‘the will of the people’ is likely to bring prosperity and secure individual 
liberties. In short, in South Africa, the Athenian concept of active, participatory 
citizenship was echoed in the Freedom Charter as well as in the anti-apartheid 
struggle movement of the 1980s. 
 
Against attempts by the apartheid government to separate black from white and to 
divide blacks amongst themselves, the Charter proclaimed that South Africa belongs 
to the nationalists, liberals and traditionalists alike. What this means is that those who 
support the Charter sought no reprisal against racists and traditionalist governments, 
but demanded citizens’ rights which black South Africans did not have. In South 
Africa ‘the people’ would have the authority — the legitimate power — to enjoy the 
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rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship on the one hand, as well as engage in a 
participatory vision of democracy, thus fulfilling the full potential of the status. By 
and large, the concept of ‘the people’ in the Charter tradition referred to all South 
Africans, regardless of race and ethnicity that defined citizenship in apartheid 
legislation. The Charter heralded the beginning of a new era where citizenship, as 
envisaged by the volk, the ‘chosen (Afrikaner) people, would not be defined by fixed 
and enduring qualities such as race, religion, language, culture or history. Despite the 
hierarchical and exclusive body of citizenship in apartheid South Africa, the 
homeland citizenship won support from prominent people in the tribal or ethnic 
reserves.25 Nevertheless, the document symbolised a beacon of hope for the National 
Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC) and Student Representative Councils 
(SRCs) broad goals of setting up a democratic system of education relevant to the 
establishment of a unitary, non-racial and democratic South African society, as the 
next three chapters will show. The overwhelming majority of the oppressed South 
African population also rejected Bantustan citizenship as a fraud designed to maintain 
apartheid and thwart the political demand for democracy in a unified country. 
 
Given these varying conceptions, what were the implications of a separate, racially 
segregated schooling for citizenship education in South Africa? I would like to 
discuss at least three contrasting conceptions of citizenship education programmes in 
South Africa. These are: the British Girl Guide Movement that prepared both black 
and white pupils for a ‘good’ and ‘useful’ subservient citizenship; the National 
                                                 
25
 These were many of the chiefs who saw the separate policy as a way of gaining more power and 
status. Among those who collaborated with the apartheid government was Chief Kaizer Matanzima 
from the Transkei, Eastern Cape. At the first sitting of the Transkei Assembly, 18 May 1964, Chief 
Matanzima, then chief minister, declared that his government wholeheartedly endorsed the policy of 
separate development and the traditional system of chieftainship. He said: 
 
Separate development offers the Africans of the Transkei the opportunity of getting 
their land back. … We must revert to the old system where the land belonged to the 
people with the Chief as trustee. … We don’t want to mix with Whites. … Africans 
must be able to buy properties in the towns of the Transkei. That is why I support the 
government. They have offered us land. Dr Verwoerd is a friend of the African 
people … the Congress people have brought misery to their people (Mbeki, 1984, 
pp. 137-138). 
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Party’s Youth Preparedness Programme that trained white children for an ‘uncritical’ 
and ‘supportive’ role under the status quo, while at the same time assigning them to a 
superior form of citizenship; and a democratic citizenship education consistent with 
the Freedom Charter tradition. The philosophy of racial and ethnic segregation, as far 
as education was concerned, “sought to socialise black students so that they can 
accept the social relations of apartheid as natural. That is, to accept the supposed 
superiority of whites and their own inferiority” (Nkomo, 1990, p. 2). It was the 
intention of the segregationists and the nationalist officials to provide a formal 
education that would make the African child, whether in the reserves or in the 
township locations, a ‘good’ and ‘useful’ citizen. The Girl Guide Movement for 
Africans in the Transvaal in the 1930s among non-European girls shed some light on 
the aims of citizenship education during the segregation era.  
 
In the first section of this chapter, I mentioned that British colonial control of most 
spheres of South African society provided a useful basis for the development of 
citizenship, and citizenship education. The South African Girl Guide Movement owes 
much to this British control. In South Africa, Guiding started as early as 1910. Within 
two decades, there developed a pronounced keenness in joining the Guides among 
African girls on the Reef. In an attempt to mould them into better citizens, reflecting a 
true sense of the ‘ideal native’ in the colonial era, good citizenship was interpreted by 
education authorities to mean: 
 
better Christian habits of truthfulness, obedience, industry and courtesy; 
teaching them services and handcrafts useful to others as well as to 
themselves; promoting their physical development; making them good 
homemakers and capable of bringing up good children (Gaitskell, 1991, pp. 
234-235).  
 
In the main, under colonial regimes schooling for blacks and whites was aimed at 
producing subservient citizens — not active, critical and inquiring members of the 
South African Union. On the whole, the colonialists’ purpose in education was to 
enable at best minimal political involvement and participation by blacks in the 
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‘white’ South African Union. It is against this backdrop that educational preparation 
would involve ‘proper’ and ‘adequate’ development of good citizenship among Girl 
Guides. To foster good citizenship, authorities emphasised religious and moral 
training. In Chapter 7, I will argue that the opening and extension of compulsory 
schooling to black pupils prior to the democratic election in 1994 was never intended 
solely to expedite the Dutch religious crusade and to serve the British economic 
interests, as the literature seems to suggest, but that it also represented a move to 
prevent the sort of education that aims to promote democratic citizenship in South 
Africa. The Girl Guide Movement’s notion of good citizenship was compatible with 
this attempt to subvert moves to a possible free, equal, non-racial, and democratic 
South Africa. By the same token, education for national citizenship aimed at 
encouraging service and unquestioning loyalty to the Republic of South Africa.  
 
One of the most remarkable features of citizenship education under apartheid in the 
Transvaal Education Department (T.E.D.) was the Youth Preparedness Programme 
(YPP), intended to assist white pupils in containing the threat posed by the national 
liberation struggle, and by external ideas deemed to fan or inspire the struggle. In 
fulfilling their pledge to serve the country, the Nationalist government embraced a 
‘patriotic’ view of citizenship education that sought to promote stability and 
normality in South Africa seen by some to originate outside the republic.26 The Youth 
Preparedness Programme covered the physical and moral aspects of citizenship. 
Physical preparedness was aimed at the acquisition of skills in the event of any crisis 
and included, inter alia, first aid, fire fighting, self-defence, marching, drilling, 
shooting, map reading, and field tactics. Moral preparedness was concerned with 
                                                 
26
 In the early 1970s, the Nationalist government believed that there was a Moscow-inspired total 
onslaught against white South Africans. It claimed that children needed to be physically and morally 
prepared for the hard times that lay ahead. In 1972, the Director of Education in the Transvaal 1969-
1975, A.L. Kotzee launched the Youth Preparedness Programme. Kotzee appealed to all headmasters 
present to launch and execute the YPP with vigour and enthusiasm. In Chapter 8, I will discuss the 
nationalists Christian National Education CNE) as an aspect of the Afrikaner nationalist ideology. 
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cultivating sound moral attitudes and rectitude in the youth of the country. However, 
the Nationalist policy based on forced obedience, if not unquestioning loyalty, to the 
state did not speak to its intended audience. 
 
Rabe’s (1986) study investigated the attitudes of a small non-random but fairly 
typical group of English speaking teachers and pupils towards the Youth 
Preparedness Programme. The author’s conclusion was that the YPP has been 
“attacked and criticised by both teachers and pupils and seen by them as a subject 
which has little or no relevance to life, and is therefore incapable of preparing them to 
adjust to and play a part in society” (Rabe, 1986, p. 61). Rabe’s findings point to an 
ideological tension produced by the apartheid policy’s conception of education for 
citizenship, among the nationalists and the liberals in South Africa. By contrast, the 
modified version of the prototypical concept of citizenship education was neither in 
favour of inferior nor of superior citizenship, but, rather, represented a vision of 
democratic education based on grassroots community participation. I now turn to a 
discussion of the anti-apartheid struggle and its notion of democratic citizenship. 
 
The struggle movement’s conception of citizenship education was based on 
participatory democracy. At the heart of the anti-apartheid struggle lies the idea of 
active, critical and inquiring individuals able to take part in the struggle for a 
democratic South Africa. From the anti-apartheid perspective, democratic citizenship 
meant a progressive pedagogy consonant with the needs and aspirations of all South 
Africans. In this context, a maximal concept of citizenship was endorsed because   
 
[It] encourages collective input and active participation by all, and stimulates 
critical thinking and analysis and allows students, parents, teachers and 
workers to be mobilised into appropriate organisational structures to 
participate actively in the initiation and management of people’s education in 
all its forms (Chisholm and Fuller, 1996 p. 701). 
 
This maximal concept of democratic citizenship strove to liberate and put students in 
command of their lives, rejecting the British Girl Guide system and the nationalist 
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Youth Preparedness Programme designed to control and produce a subservient, 
passive type of character. This notion of democratic education was both a political 
and an educational strategy based on mass participation, encouraged through 
“debates, discussions, invited speakers, plays, poetry readings, films and songs. 
Prescribed textbooks were critically dissected; the daily press was read politically” 
(Bundy, 1987, p. 320). From a Charter tradition perspective, this version of 
citizenship education enables pupils to understand the distinction between an 
education that aims to produce useful servants and one that aims at developing 
democratic citizens. In Chapter 5, I will argue that this anti-apartheid struggle and its 
concept of “People’s Education for People’s Power” that embodies the classical 
notion of people’s power is undermined in post-apartheid South African educational 
policy development. 
 
In sum, both the Girl Guide Movement and the Youth Preparedness Programme are 
incompatible with the maximal concept of democracy that reflects the model of 
democracy developed in the Charter tradition — envisioned in the anti-apartheid 
struggle movement (to be discussed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7) — and enshrined in the 
Constitution of South Africa (1996). The former conceptions of citizenship dispel any 
hope to educate for democratic citizenship and democracy, while the latter embodies 
a participatory, community approach that informs democratic citizenship. The current 
notion of common citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa is informed by racial 
and ethnic integration at all levels of society. However, the above analysis and 
discussion of citizenship education programmes point to the contested notions of 
citizenship in South Africa that have also affected post-apartheid citizenship 
education policy, as well as the conditions under which it has to be implemented.  
 
As a result, the policy lacks conceptual clarity, coherence and consistency, as 
indicated both in this and later chapters: 1) Chapter 5 will show that there is tension 
in the South African education policy and subsequent curriculum development policy 
between minimal and maximal conception of education for citizenship in relation to 
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democracy; 2) Chapter 6 will show that despite its intention to promote democratic 
Student Representative Councils (student-government), the policy document in the 
end regresses to features of the ‘prefect system’. (autocratic ‘boy-government’); and 
3) although the Bill of Responsibilities and the patriotically-tinged School Pledge are 
built on the classical concept of citizenship echoed in the Constitution of South 
Africa (1996), as Chapter 8 maintains, the documents are prescriptive and promote 
obedience, if not unquestioning loyalty, to the state. In the next section I will argue 
that, although the South African Constitution (1996) claims to promote common 
citizenship, its provision seeks to ‘transform’, and not yet, build a ‘democratic’ South 
African society.  
 
4.5 The restoration of South African citizenship: transformative or 
democratic? 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that the classical notion of citizens’ rights 
reappears in the South African Constitution (1996). The concept of active citizenship 
envisioned in the 1996 Constitution also reflects the Charter tradition. Its beginning 
was marked by the passage of the 1986 Restoration of South African Citizenship Act 
(73) enacted to provide for the granting of South African citizenship to certain 
citizens of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei with effect from 1 January 
1994. The restoration period is important in the history of South African citizenship 
for three reasons: 1) it acknowledges that the segregationists’ experiment to divide 
South African society was ill-advised, at best well-intentioned but poorly conceived 
(at worst, it was surely deeply immoral); 2) it recognised that the conflicting notions 
of social membership are not compatible with a united, free and democratic South 
Africa; and 3) therefore, subscribing to a notion of equal citizenship builds social 
cohesion by strengthening and consolidating South Africa’s democracy —which is 
also a common good goal.  
 
A significant piece of legislation towards common South African citizenship was the 
Restoration and Extension of South African Citizenship Act (196) of 1993. The Act 
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was driven by the need to provide an administrative structure for the participation of 
TBVC citizens in the April 27 1994 elections and it embodied a notion of common 
citizenship. On September 14 1991, anti-apartheid organisations, the National Party 
government and Bantustan governments formed a multiracial council, later called the 
Transitional Executive Council (TEC). The TEC served as a temporary executive 
authority before the first non-racial and democratic election in the country’s history 
on 27 April 1994. The interim constitution — The Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa (1993)
27
 
 
provided that: 
 
There shall be a [common] South African citizenship. … Every person who is 
a South African citizen shall … be entitled to enjoy all rights, privileges and 
benefits of South African citizenship, and shall be subject to all duties, 
obligations and responsibilities of South African citizenship (Republic of 
South Africa, 1993, p. 8; addition mine). 
 
In terms of formal citizenship, South Africa has moved over time from a segregation-
apartheid
28
 concept of citizenship (underplaying the role of the individual and 
stressing loyalty and obedience) through an ethnic concept of citizenship (which 
conceded to blacks ‘separate-but-equal’ civic, political and social rights) to common 
citizenship (the restoration and extension of South African Citizenship to those 
previously excluded on the basis of race, culture and language). In September 1992, 
the ANC and the NP agreed to a democratically elected five-year interim Government  
 
 
                                                 
27
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1993) was ratified on 22 December 1993 and 
implemented on 27 April 1994. It provided a framework for a coalition government, and the 
subsequent Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) was drafted by the Constitutional 
Assembly. Importantly, the current Constitution had to comply with the principles embodied in the 
1993 Constitution, including equal citizenship. 
 
28
 South Africa’s political system during the first half of the twentieth century was labelled 
‘segregation’ and after 1948 it was labelled apartheid. Though by definition apartheid is segregationist, 
nevertheless I will use the terms to refer to the first and second halves of the 20
th
 century. 
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of National Unity.
29
 Despite the Government of National Unity’s (GNU) endeavour 
to create a common South African citizenship, the separate citizenship regimes of the 
former independent homelands continued to operate in each of the formerly 
independent black national states up to 1995. It took the 1995 South African 
Citizenship Act (88) to formally repeal various pieces of homelands citizenship 
education and to create a unified citizenship regime. This was an important 
development towards eradicating apartheid and homeland citizenship policies. In 
support of the above Act was the South African Constitution (108) of 1996, which 
emphasised common citizenship. As this section will show, “policy-making had a 
double task: to dismantle the past and to put in place foundations for the future” 
(Christie, 2008, p. 128). In contrast to a citizenship that was marked by segregation 
and apartheid, the final Constitution (1996) has reconstituted national citizenship in 
South Africa in terms of a norm of equality, that is, all South Africans are equally 
subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. 
 
The South African Constitution (1996) is widely admired internationally. In certain 
respects, the preamble acknowledges the suffering brought by periods of segregation, 
apartheid and homeland citizenship — and rightfully so. It declares its intention to 
heal the historical divisions of the past and establish a democratic society whose 
citizens will be protected by law and enjoy the benefits of equal citizenship in a post-
apartheid dispensation. Although the Freedom Charter’s concept of citizenship that 
fed the Constitution of South Africa’s (1996) common citizenship is acknowledged 
and commended, in reality there is manifest here a tendency to undermine democratic 
education. In other words, though the 1996 Constitution’s provision of a common 
citizenship is admirable — but as an educational project it is flawed. In Chapter 5, I 
will argue that educational policy developments during the period of ‘consensus 
                                                 
29
 In September 1992, the ANC and the NP agreed to a democratically elected five-year interim 
Government of National Unity. The democratic government that came to power in South Africa in 
1994 was the product of a negotiated settlement between the anti-apartheid opposition and the 
apartheid state. The GNU brought together former adversaries (ANC and NP) to run the affairs of the 
state on behalf of all South Africans. The principles of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(1996) formed the basis of the new government.  
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seeking’ exhibits a trend towards ‘retreat’,  specifically the centering and narrowing 
of the educational policy agenda of the anti-apartheid struggle that supports a 
prototypical, maximal conception of education for citizenship in South African 
schools. For example, the education policies are geared towards addressing the 
historical challenges confronting citizenship — like the hierarchical and exclusive 
bestowal of citizenship created and enforced through a number of segregation-
apartheid policies structured along racial classification and ethnic grouping — on the 
one hand, and promotes South Africa’s democracy, on the other.  
 
There is arguably a tension between ‘transformative’ and ‘substantive’ conceptions of 
citizenship and of citizenship education. Enslin (2003) captures this ‘space of tension’ 
well, when she claims that  
 
South Africa’s emergent conception of citizenship has to be understood in the 
context of the negotiated transition to democracy that was marked by the 
election of 1994, as well as the period of struggle against apartheid that 
preceded it … This still recent transition and the radical break with the past 
that it is supposed to represent means that South Africans do not yet have a 
settled conception of citizenship to draw on. … Thus citizenship education too 
is still in a formative stage (Enslin, 2003, p. 73).  
 
The quotation above shows that the effects of the past that bear on the understanding 
of South African citizenship still linger. For example, in ‘Education Change and 
Transformation in South Africa: A Review 1994-2001’ (2001), the government 
argued that during this period, educational reform had been driven by the need “to 
overcome the devastation of apartheid, and provide a system of education that builds 
democracy, human dignity, equality and social justice” (p. 1). Now, the focus shifts to 
a new national system that seeks to redress past injustices in educational provision 
and advance the democratic transformation of society. The transformation of society, 
it is hoped, will translate to a common South African citizenship. There are two 
points worth noting about the policy’s conceptual incoherence. First, the 1996 
Constitution raises questions about citizenship as a practice that can be promoted in 
South African schools. Second, what is emerging in post-apartheid South Africa is a 
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concept of citizenship comprising complex and contradictory elements that provide 
both continuity and discontinuity with what preceded the 1994 historic democratic 
elections. The Constitution’s (1996) ‘transformative’ agenda has set the tone for both 
post-apartheid citizenship education policy documents. 
 
Currently, there can be little doubt that there have been changes, as far as dismantling 
apartheid structures and creating a unified education system are concerned. But these 
changes are not entirely reassuring. In his analysis of the achievements and prospects 
for South Africa’s new democracy, Mattes (2002) argues that “South Africans’ 
support for democracy is lukewarm and has not grown in any substantial way” (p. 
29). This lack of ‘political culture’, as the next chapter will show, contrasts with the 
country’s commitment to developing a culture of active, democratic citizenship 
encapsulated in the Freedom Charter. This indication does not bode well to those who 
embrace a modified version of Athenian citizenship as a foundation for citizenship 
education in post-apartheid South African schools. Mattes (2002), indicates that 
South Africans need to shift the focus to (substantive rather than transformative) 
problems of citizenship, representation and participation, thus building a grassroots 
culture of citizenship: 
 
This requires renewed emphasis on civic education by schools and civil 
society organisations, in order to teach citizens the intrinsic value of 
democracy and equip them with the resources necessary to participate more 
fully in the political processes (Mattes, 2002, p. 34).   
 
What this means is that the narrative of South African citizenship that was 
fragmented along racial and ethnic lines demands a radical, not merely an affirmative 
(moderate) transformation of a citizenry. In other words, a maximal conception of 
citizenship, as I argued in the previous chapter, does not view children as citizens-in-
waiting who need to be inducted into their future role. This deficit model of the youth 
is characteristically applied in education and particularly in the construction of 
citizenship education in South African schools. A closely related challenge is to 
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prepare an active citizenry and widen the envisaged participatory democracy by 
giving effect to the democratic vision of school policy in post-apartheid South Africa. 
There is an evident failure on the part of the government to address the growing 
apathy about democracy in South Africa, which is arguably the result of its (the 
government’s) moderate politics of compromise tampering with the radical ideas of 
the anti-apartheid movement, rooted in the Freedom Charter tradition. In other words, 
it does not speak to its intended audience, whose rights and responsibilities include 
the obligations to play an active part in citizenship in the near future, that is to say, 
public participation in central, provincial and local government. Education for 
citizenship and democracy, in a maximal sense, is better achieved by drawing on the 
Freedom Charter’s rich tradition, one that is likely to prepare young people to play an 
active part in this formative stage of South African citizenship.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The concept of South African citizenship has undergone a transition from colonialism 
via apartheid to democracy. The Bantustan or reserve system in the segregation 
period provided the basis for the later separate freedoms, or self-determination of 
traditional communities, giving the impression of a western-style democracy. The 
rejection of the volk’s ‘ethnic nationalism’ gave rise to the emergence of a popular 
notion of democratic citizenship associated with the Charter tradition in the 1950s. 
Schooling, in general, prepared the white child for (unquestioning) domination and 
the black child for (equally unquestioning) subordination. In post-apartheid 
citizenship education policy, with the restoration of equal citizenship and the 
establishment of a non-racial democracy, one might have thought that the idea of 
citizenship education, explicitly built on the tradition of democratic participation, 
would be seen as vital in order to bring together those previously divided. In theory, 
the Constitution (1996) embraces an updated version of the Athenian prototype of 
democracy, and its notion of citizenship. In practice, however, South Africa’s 
emergent, post-1994 conception of citizenship tends toward a ‘transformed’ citizen 
able to overcome the apartheid divide, i.e. race and ethnicity-based contested notions 
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of citizenship in South Africa, without committing to the provision of the tools 
necessary for such transformation (both internal/personal and external/political), in 
pursuit of a modified version of the prototypical concept of democratic citizenship 
envisioned in the Freedom Charter. The next chapter looks at the tension in post-
apartheid South African educational policy, and subsequent curriculum 
developments, between minimal and maximal conceptions of education for 
citizenship with regard to democracy. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1994: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 
 
 
It is time to declare that a new era has dawned […T]he Ministry of Education 
opens not just a new chapter but an entirely new volume in the country’s 
educational development. The efforts of all South Africans will be needed to 
reconstruct and develop the national education and training system so that it is 
able to … build our democratic nation. The ministry invites the goodwill and 
active participation of all parents, teachers and other educators, students, 
community leaders; religious bodies, NGOs, academic institutions, workers, 
business, the media, and development agencies, in bringing about the 
transformation we all seek (Department of Education, 1995, pp. 19-20).   
 
5.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I argued that there is a tension in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (1996) between ‘transformative’ and ‘substantive’ concepts 
of citizenship and, by implication, of citizenship education. This chapter builds on the 
discussion of the South African concept of citizenship education in post-1994. The 
quotation from the White Paper on Education and Training (1995) at the beginning of 
this chapter reflects a conception of popular participation, which appeals to the 
collective strength of the community with respect to policy formulation and 
curriculum development. Using recent educational policy and curriculum 
developments as a focal point, I critically analyse approaches adopted in promoting 
education for citizenship and democracy in South African schools. South African 
policy needs to be analysed within the context of the negotiated transition from 
apartheid to democracy and as vacillating between minimal and maximal 
interpretations of citizenship. The chapter maintains that policy on citizenship 
education has become more minimal and less participatory than that envisioned in the 
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anti-apartheid struggle and enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa (1996). 
Against this background, I argue that South African education policy’s conception of 
education for citizenship does not guide the practice in terms accessible to the 
school’s democratic community, this is to say parents, teachers and students, non-
teaching staff, the principal and co-opted members. In other words, post-apartheid 
citizenship education policy does not speak to its intended democratic audience. This 
chapter emphasises the need for a maximalist approach to citizenship education and 
for more scope for participatory, community democracy in schools. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 claims that the participatory 
vision of citizenship education developed in the anti-apartheid movement was diluted 
during the interregnum, a negotiation period in South Africa. Section 2 provides an 
analytical framework for interpreting the minimalist approach to citizenship 
education policy in post-apartheid South Africa. Section 3 shows that South African 
educational policy development after the transition reflects a minimalist conception 
of citizenship, and of citizenship education. It is impossible to understand recent 
educational policy and curriculum developments in South Africa without considering 
the anti-apartheid struggle and its concept of “People’s Education for People’s 
Power” that embodies the Athenian notion of participatory democracy.  
 
5.2 People’s Education for People’s Power:  a prototypical Athenian view   
As a starting point, I would like to begin by elaborating on the anti-apartheid struggle, 
and its concept of “People’s Education for People’s Power” in the 1980s. The 
National Education Co-ordinating Committee, an affiliate of the United Democratic 
Front, was established in Johannesburg in December 1985. As Chapter 6 will show, 
the early 1980s was a period when school students were associated with a perceived 
tradition of violence, destruction and ungovernability in South Africa. The prevalent 
‘immediatism’, that is, the belief that the revolutionary victory was imminent, among 
the school student population was expressed in the slogan ‘Liberation Now, 
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Education Later’ in 1985. By the end of the year, students were making calls for 1986 
to be ‘The Year of No Schooling’. The consequence was a growing rift between the 
older generation (parents, teachers, academics, community leaders, religious bodies 
and so forth) on the one side, and students on the other. In an attempt to break the 
grip of ‘immediatism’, a historic national education conference was convened in 
Johannesburg in December 1985. The National Education Co-ordinating Committee 
was launched at this conference. It was this turn of events that saved the student 
movement from destroying itself and gave them a practical political perspective. 
 
The NECC adopted the slogan “People’s Education for People’s Power” to express 
the strategic objective for the future of the educational struggle. The slogan outlined 
the concern with democratisation of the education system, particularly in schools, as 
follows: “the real struggle is to replace an undemocratic, coercive, ineffective and 
irrelevant education system with a democratic, participatory and relative alternative” 
(cited in Van den Heever, 1987, p. 4; emphasis mine: Van den Heever probably 
meant ‘relevant’). At the centre of this strategic goal was a strong commitment to the 
prototypical, maximal concept of participatory democracy, where mass democratic 
movement including parents, teachers and other educators, students, community 
leaders, religious bodies, NGOs, academic institutions, workers, business, the media, 
and development agencies worked vigorously and energetically to generate an 
alternative both within and, if necessary, outside the existing paradigm.  
 
The NECC called for the establishment of ‘progressive’ Parent-Teacher-Student 
Associations to build on educational relationships based on democracy. The National 
Education Consultative Conference noted:  
 
That statutory parents’ committees [School Management Council or 
Governing Council] at schools are the agents of the state and carry out the  
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work of the oppressive apartheid education system throughout South Africa.
30
 
The conference resolved that: 
a) progressive parent-teacher-student structures be formed at all schools 
so that: 
(i) parents, teachers and students can come to understand each 
other’s [education] demands and problems. 
(ii) interaction can take place between different schools to 
develop the education struggle to higher levels (National 
Education Consultative Conference, 1986, pp. 60-61, 
addition mine). 
 
The NECC regarded parent-teacher-student structures as democratic mediums that 
could effect transformation as far as democratic participation and representation was 
concerned in South African schools. The anti-apartheid movement’s concept of 
democracy emphasised popular participation and greater involvement of parents, 
teachers and students in school affairs. From the NECC perspective, to confront the 
oppressive apartheid education system, parents, teachers and students needed to 
participate in the mass-based gathering of school governing bodies.  
 
A pamphlet issued in August 1995 in greater Cape Town stated that:  
 
It is important that we build strong student, youth and community 
organisations because a well-organised community can never be defeated. It is 
important that we form student-teacher-parent bodies so that we can stand 
united in this time of intense repression. Some schools have already taken 
such steps (Bundy, 1987, p, 319).  
                                                 
30
 Historically, the notion of school governing bodies has oscillated between the ‘tyranny’ of school 
boards and school committees, ‘democratic’ Parent-Teacher-Student Associations and ‘official’ School 
Governing Bodies (SGBs) in South Africa. The Cape School Board Act of 1905 instituted school 
boards-committees later extended to the rest of the South African colonies. The objective of the Act 
was to grant white parents a measure of control and management of education. After the formation of 
the South African Union in 1910, school boards-committees were established in ‘white’ schools 
throughout the country. On the contrary, there were never official school governing bodies of Africans 
under missionary education at the time. It was the Bantu Education Act (47) of 1953 that introduced 
the school boards and school committees in black schools. The school boards-committees were 
established along ethnic or tribal lines, and were fundamentally incompatible with democratic 
precepts. The school boards and committees were perceived by the anti-apartheid movement as organs 
of the oppressive system. The Education and Training Act (90) of 1979 abolished the school boards-
committees and established the School Management Councils. The current institution of School 
Governance Bodies will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
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The anti-apartheid struggle’s vision of popular participation supports the claim made 
in Chapter 2 that the prototypical, maximal conceptions of democracy and 
participation are feasible, realistic and can, in fact, restore stability. In the previous 
chapter I also mentioned that the struggle’s concept of education for citizenship was 
also based on participatory democracy i.e. it encouraged collective input and active 
participation by all which allowed students, parents, teachers and workers to be 
mobilised into appropriate organisational structures to participate actively in the 
initiation and management of ‘People’s Education’ in all its forms (Chisholm and 
Fuller, 1996, p. 701). Furthermore, it stimulated critical thinking and analysis among 
learners because “prescribed textbooks were critically dissected; the daily press was 
read politically” (Bundy, 1987, p. 320). In brief, the anti-apartheid struggle’s concept 
of school democratic governance equipped young people to be active, critical and 
inquiring citizens in South Africa.   
 
From the NECC’s perspective, a post-apartheid South African education policy and 
subsequent curriculum development should aim to promote democracy and 
participatory forms of representation in schools. In other words, the NECC’s notion 
of a ‘school democratic community’, this is to say parents, educators, learners, may 
be interpreted as an expression of participatory democracy and representation in post-
apartheid South African schools. Despite the fact that the ‘People’s Education’ 
agenda of the 1980s did not constitute a coherent set of policies, it did provide a 
vision of a participatory, community based approach to education required to build a 
democratic South Africa. Regrettably, the concept of ‘People’s Education’ failed to 
re-surface in post-apartheid South African policy discourse.  
 
Following the unbanning of anti-apartheid political formations in 1990, the African 
National Congress and its ally, the South African Communist Party (SACP), 
embraced the Freedom Charter’s concept of democracy during the negotiations with 
the National Party government. The formal negotiations process which began in 1990 
with the first face-to-face meeting of the apartheid government and the ANC alliances 
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was significant, as this chapter will show, in 1) limiting the democratic power of the 
anti-apartheid movement; and 2) producing an ‘elite pact’ around the emerging policy 
framework and the establishment of educational priority. The political negotiations on 
education, which paralleled the policy process through the National Education 
Conference (NEC) — leading to the National Education and Training Forum (NETF) 
in 1993, then to the White Paper on Education and Training (1995) — were vitally 
important in bringing about a compromise that receded from the model of democracy 
and citizenship education developed in the anti-apartheid movement, with roots in the 
Freedom Charter tradition.
 
 
 
The National Education Conference was convened in March 1992 in Broederstroom 
by the Education Delegation31, in association with political and trade union 
organisations of the liberation movement. The purpose of the NEC was to identify a 
framework for the restructuring of the education system. One of the four objectives 
identified was, “the development of a mechanism for constructing a new education 
system and for dealing with education in the transition period” (Back to Learning: 
The National Education Conference, 2000, p. 6). While there were differences over 
the exact nature of the transformation the NEC attempted to define a policy agenda 
based on the principles of ‘People’s Education’. Arising from a set of basic values 
was a set of key principles determined as follows:  
 
Education and training policy and practice shall be governed by the principle 
of democracy, ensuring the active participation of various interest groups, in 
particular teachers, parents, workers and students; and education shall be 
based upon the principles of co-operation, critical thinking and civic 
responsibility, and shall equip individuals for participation in all aspects of 
society (Back To Learning: The National Education Conference, 2000, pp. 8-
9).  
                                                 
31
 The Education Delegation was formed by Nelson Mandela in 1991 to participate in direct 
negotiations with the state to address the crisis and challenges in black education. The delegation 
aimed to persuade the government, inter alia, to take responsibility for resolving the crisis, including 
removing racist education laws and structures and laying the groundwork for a single education 
system; meaningfully involve black communities in decision making; and suspending the unilateral 
restructuring of education within the apartheid framework. 
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The NEC’s vision of a post-apartheid South African education policy implicitly 
embraced the Athenian prototype of democracy and participation. For example, the 
NEC’s concept of democracy implied genuine engagement and robust debate on the 
future education policies that would foster active, critical and inquiring individuals 
capable of building, strengthening and consolidating South Africa’s democracy. The 
NEC’s concept of democracy that encouraged popular participation in the discourses 
of educational policy development was consistent with the global trends in liberal 
democracies that supported the claim that education for citizenship and democracy is 
not limited to the formal school curriculum, but also requires active community 
engagement, both of which I will argue to be essential parts of education for and in a 
democratic South African society. Importantly, the NEC managed to create unity 
across the political and ideological divide. 
 
Fears initially expressed by other anti-apartheid organisations, such as the Azanian 
People’s Organisation (Azapo), the Workers Organisation for Socialist Action 
(Wosa) and the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu), that the NEC was likely to 
be drawn into co-managing apartheid were allayed when conference delegates agreed 
on the need to campaign for a national education negotiating forum. The proposed 
forum was viewed as an attempt to bring together the government and the members 
of the NEC to: 1) halt the National Party government’s perceived unilateral 
restructuring of education; and 2) agree on an inclusive negotiated restructuring of 
education during the transition (Back to Learning: The National Education 
Conference, 2000, p. 42). The NEC endorsed the NECC and its slogan of “People’s 
Education for People’s Power” that resembled a prototypical Athenian democracy 
based on mass participation. The NEC’s vision of education and training policy 
shaped by popular/ mass participation was upheld in the White Paper on Education 
and Training’s (1995).  
 
Throughout 1992 and early 1993, however, the Nationalist Part government refused 
to accede to the demand for a negotiated forum and an end to unilateral restructuring. 
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For instance, their unilateral decisions during this period of impasse included, among 
others, the privatisation of public assets:  
 
Within the education sphere, the classification of most white schools as Model 
C schools
32
, which gives white parents a decisive say in admission criteria 
under the guise of self-determination or local community democracy, falls 
squarely within the logic of privatisation. What used to be under the control of 
central government will in future be under the control of local white elites 
(Back to Learning: The National Education Conference, 2000, p. 40). 
 
Contrary to the NEC’s call for the democratisation of the education system, the 
National Party’s discourse on educational decentralisation emphasised parental 
choice and consumer power, thus creating a tension between the ‘official’ parental 
view of school democratic governance on the one hand, and the anti-apartheid 
movement’s maximal concept of democracy and its notion of citizenship, on the 
other. As mentioned in Chapter 4, in apartheid South Africa, there were different 
languages of education policy debate, which were roughly labelled as ‘official’ (or 
top-down) and popular (bottom-up). I argued that the vertical policy approach dispels 
any hope to educate for democratic citizenship, while the latter embodies a 
participatory, community approach that informs effective citizenship education. At 
this point the anti-apartheid movement’s concept of education for citizenship with 
reference to democracy was diluted. According to Badat (1995), pressure on the 
government to accede to a negotiated forum came “only as a result of mass strikes by 
teachers […,] militant and violent demonstrations by students […,] coupled with 
demands for a negotiating forum” (p. 144). Eventually, the government agreed to the 
creation of a National Education and Training Forum launched on 7 August 1993. 
                                                 
32
 Until the end of 1990, white education was administered under the auspices of the Department of 
Education and Culture: House of Assembly. From the beginning of 1991, the National Party 
government made provision for the enrolment of black students in white state schools. In other words, 
white state schools would be able, under certain circumstances, to change their status to one of the 
three models: Model A, Model B and Model C. Model C were formerly full state schools that 
converted into state-aided schools. Such schools received a subsidy to cover 75% of their normal 
operating expenses. The rest of their funds had to be raised by the school’s parent-elected Governing 
Body through fees and donations. From April 1992, 96% of white state schools became Model C 
schools and their fixed property and equipment was given by the state to the Governing Body of each 
school (see Pampallis, 1993, pp. 21-29). 
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This forum provided a useful example of how the apartheid government and the anti-
apartheid opposition began to take part in negotiated education policy formulation.   
 
In contrast to the NEC that represented the anti-apartheid educational front, the NETF 
comprised representatives of the stakeholders in the education fraternity, ranging 
from the National Party government circles, business, the Bantustans, the training 
sector, universities, parent and church organisations, and NGOs. The mission of the 
NEFT was defined as follows: 
  
 To initiate, develop and participate in a process involving education and 
training stakeholders in order to arrive at and establish agreements on the 
resolution of crisis in education; the restructuring of education for a 
democratic South Africa; and the formulation of policy frameworks for the 
long term restructuring of the education and training system which are linked 
to the human, social and economic development needs of South Africa 
(quoted in Badat, 1995, p. 144). 
    
         Of concern to those who advocated the philosophy of ‘People’s Education’ was the 
NETF’s apparent shift from an oppositional discourse that drew upon local 
community support and participation base, to a pro-human capital position. In other 
words, high up on the NETF’s policy agenda was individualistic investment in human 
resources. Therefore, what the NETF reflected was the way in which public education 
was to take on characteristics of the private free market. As Chisholm and Fuller 
(1996) noted, the democratic movement that dominated the NEC “advanced an 
agenda for central and local transformation built on the foundations of people’s 
education... [T]he NETF came to be dominated by representatives whose history and 
allegiance did not lie in the democratic movement” (pp. 704-705). Compared to the 
NEC, the NETF, while framing its goals in terms of the principles of democracy, 
participation and openness, in fact, often reflected the interests of its broad non-
education stakeholder grouping, which favoured government as well as business. As 
a result, the concept of democracy based on the participatory vision of the NEC was 
superseded by the human, social and economic development needs of South Africa. 
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Of course, programmes of human resource development are crucial in addressing the 
major inequalities with respect to race, class and gender, but from a ‘People’s 
Education’ perspective this was not the only outcome intended by its negotiators.  
 
         Regrettably, the NETF signifies an education policy that moved from collective and 
transformational priorities, salient during the 1980s period of resistance, to a market 
and human capital orientation. According to Chisholm and Fuller (1996), “education 
budgets are now justified in human capital terms, depoliticised and less frequently 
linked to participatory aims” (p. 697). As the balance of power tilted towards the 
delegates of the Nationalist government, so too was the ‘People’s Education’ agenda 
reshaped. This served to critically weaken the content of the anti-apartheid 
movement’s broader education agenda led by the NECC and its slogan of “People’s 
Education for People’s Power”. Another setback pertains to the NECC which “began 
to articulate the necessity of moving beyond a purely oppositional politics towards a 
politics of transformation and reconstruction” (Badat, 1995, p. 151). To all intents 
and purposes, the participatory vision of citizenship education that was developed in 
the anti-apartheid struggle and exemplified in the NECC and NEC was watered down 
as a result of the enlarged elite pact that constituted the National Education Training 
Forum, a trade-off that all but abandoned the ideas formulated during the popular 
struggles.  
 
Referring to the United States of America, Boyte (2005) writes that technocratic 
politics shaped the institutions of learning in modern democratic societies. In South 
Africa, Chisholm and Fuller (1996) argue, earlier talk of ‘People’s Education’ and 
robust community participation is giving way to a technocratic discourse that “has 
relieved the Right and bewildered the Left” (p. 693). There seems to be a significant 
switch from the ‘People’s Education’ language that advocated a prototypical, 
maximal concept of democracy and its notion of citizenship education discussed in 
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Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. That the enlarged elite pact in the interregnum did not 
include popular participation is pointed out by Gibson (2001): 
 
The problem is that these expressions of [a modified version of the Athenian 
prototype of] direct democracy, however flawed and limited in their practice, 
were celebrated but not translated into a radical rethinking of liberation theory 
that mapped out paradigms of social and ethical practices for a post-apartheid 
society. This ideological pitfall was exploited by the ANC which was able to 
capture these narratives and celebrate the idea of “people’s power” while 
remaining the self appointed future negotiators (Gibson, 2001, p. 72, addition 
mine).  
 
For the advocates of the Athenian version of democracy, ‘People’s Education’ 
signifies the optimism of the masses and the pessimism of the elite in a post-apartheid 
South Africa. The ANC’s rein on ‘People’s Education’ represents an end to thinking 
democratically about South African educational policy development as rooted in the 
trajectory of resistance politics. In fact, it is deeply ironic that the ANC, which is 
committed to democracy and participatory forms of representation and the collective 
strength of the grassroots community, so to speak, diverted from a public, democratic 
debate about educational futures. On the contrary, a wide range of different interests 
were represented, invariably leading to the compromise of a once powerful notion 
such as “People’s Education for People’s Power”, which had the potential to provide 
the basis for citizenship education and democracy in post-apartheid South African 
schools. The next section provides an analytical framework for interpreting post-
apartheid South African education policy. 
 
5.3 South African education policy: a minimalist view of democracy    
The complexity of the South African policy process cannot be understood in terms of 
sequential steps. It involved reaching political agreements — ‘settlements’ — 
between the National Party that wielded political power, on the one hand, and the 
anti-apartheid opposition, in particular the ANC that had the majority support, on the 
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other. In other words, South Africa’s policy process involved negotiating among the 
competing interests and powers of social actors. It is against this background that 
South Africa’s negotiated political process offers two approaches to post-apartheid 
South African education policy: vertical (minimal) and horizontal (maximal).
33
 
According to Colebatch (2002), the vertical dimension covers the rational, top-down 
work of policy. Colebatch writes: 
 
The vertical dimension sees policy as rule: it is concerned with the 
transmission downwards of authorised decisions. The authorised decision-
makers [post-apartheid South African government] select courses of action 
which will maximise the values they hold, and transmit these to subordinate 
officials to implement. … This is a dimension which stresses instrumental 
action, rational choice and the force of legitimate authority. It is concerned 
about the ability or capacity of subordinate officials to give effect to these 
decisions (the implementation problem) and with ways of structuring the 
process of government so as to achieve this compliance (Colebatch, 2002, p. 
23, addition mine). 
 
Colebatch’s vertical approach to policy is reflected in the post-apartheid South 
African education policy that placed participatory democracy and active citizenship at 
its centre. As already indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the White Paper on 
Education and Training (1995) was concerned with the concept of popular 
participation, which denoted a broad range of participants (or ‘agents’, or ‘actors’) in 
policy processes in South Africa. However, the document was a statement of intent 
that eventually subdued the slogan “People’s Education for People’s Power”.  
 
The White Paper’s reference to democracy as a specialist business which should be 
conducted by the national Department of Education (DoE) experts is reminiscent of a 
minimal and conditional role for the demos, sketched in the discussion of Socrates, 
                                                 
33
 According to Colebatch (2002), the horizontal dimension of education policy covers the activities of 
a broad range of stakeholders, both inside government and in other outside organisations, who are 
participants of the policy process. An example is the National Education and Training Forum that 
consisted of the apartheid government and the anti-apartheid opposition who negotiated education 
policy formulation in South Africa. As indicated in the previous section of this chapter, when 
democratic government was formed in 1994 much of this ‘horizontal’ work, to use Colebatch’s model, 
was set aside.    
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Plato and Aristotle in Chapter 2. For example, its emphasis on experts to drive South 
Africa’s democratic governance project is alarming:  
 
Representative governance structures [such as Parent-Teacher-Student 
Structures and Student Representative Councils] ... do not exclude the 
importance of governments and institutions calling upon expert advice. … 
The parents, teachers, students, managers and other stakeholders who are 
seeking an equitable and democratic solution which will best serve the 
educational needs of all communities, need a lead from the national Ministry 
of Education which will encourage them in their efforts (Department of 
Education, 1995, pp. 22 and 68).  
 
As this, and the following, chapter will show, there is no knowledge barrier looming 
between parents, teachers, students, managers and other key actors that prevents 
anyone from participating actively in the discourses of educational policy 
development. From one perspective, the White Paper is about the ideal and vision of 
a representative participatory democracy in South African schools. From another 
perspective, it is about the practicalities of whether and how representative 
governance can be achieved in South African schools (the implementation problem). 
The document seems to suggest that ‘the people’ lack political knowledge and skills 
required to participate actively in representative democracy in South African schools. 
In short, the transition to what is supposed to be a ‘democratic education’ saw the 
masses who pushed the apartheid regime to negotiation, to use Fanon’s expression, 
“sent back to the caves” (1968, p. 183), thus reducing the spaces to elaborate on 
“People’s Education for People’s Power”, or any alternative education system. 
 
My argument in this chapter is that education for citizenship is imperative in 
promoting and consolidating democracy in South African schools. The South African 
Schools Act (SASA) has been hailed as a milestone in the discourse of educational 
decentralisation in contemporary South Africa. The Act took the representative mode 
of democracy to the level of the school, namely it paved the way for democratically 
elected and representative structures, officially known as School Governing Bodies 
(SGBs) and Representative Councils of Learners (RCLs). According to the new 
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school governing policy an SGB of an ordinary public school comprises: a) parents of 
learners at the school; b) educators at the school; c) learners in the eighth grade or 
higher in the school; d) non-teaching staff; e) the principal, in his or her official 
capacity; and f) co-opted members. 
 
I will analyse the current Representative Councils of Learners in the Chapter 6. For 
now, this part of the chapter shows that although the SASA claims to promote 
democracy and participation, its recommendations are ambiguous and flawed. In 
support of this claim it will be argued that  
●   the maximal element of the SASA is constituted by its idea of co-operative 
governance and partnership;  
●   the minimal element of the SASA is constituted by its provision of a minimal, 
merely conditional role for the School Governing Body members.  
 
The SASA upholds the anti-apartheid oppositional discourse of educational  
decentralisation which regards schools as ‘denizen-commune spaces’.
34
 These are 
public places that have the potential to marshal the collective and public exercise of 
power for the good of pupils, teachers, schools and society at large. What is 
distinctive about free spaces is that they assume a citizen-owned activity, where a 
school population becomes “co-learners and co-creators of learning experiences with 
students and with community members” (Boyte, 2005, p. 8). In other words, under 
                                                 
34
 The term refers to schools that encourage active, participatory, community-based citizenship 
education. The notion of ‘free public space’ is in line with the educational programme known as 
Tirisano — a Sotho word meaning ‘working together’. Tirisano was introduced by the former 
Minister of Education in South Africa, Kadar Asmal in 2002. The document perceive a school as a 
center of community life, as a public space where “there is a role … for religious bodies, business, 
cultural groups, sports clubs and civic associations, both to serve their own requirements and to 
contribute to the school’s learning programme both in and out of school hours” (Department of 
Education, 2000, p. 1). This concept of ‘citizen-commune spaces; is not peculiar to South Africa. In 
Chapter 3, I raised a number of issues that pertain to community participation and citizenship: 1) 
Barber’s (1984) strong democratic theory showed that participation and community are two features of 
citizenship, and citizenship education; 2) the Citizenship Advisory Group’s interpretation of the 
Athenian tradition sets out to enable pupils, parents, teachers, local communities and all those with an 
active interest in citizenship education to experience citizenship education beyond the school 
perimeters, thus reinvigorating the participative or maximal element in modern society; and 3) global 
trends in liberal democracies tend towards participatory, community-based citizenship. 
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the SASA schools are assumed to be public spaces that are life-enhancing for all 
citizens, children and adults alike. The SASA reflects the Athenian concept of 
democracy echoed in the National Education Co-ordinating Committee, this is to say 
the establishment of ‘progressive’ Parent-Teacher-Student Associations — as well as 
the NEC’s definition of a policy agenda based on the principles of democracy, co-
operation and civic responsibility. Unfortunately, there is some ambivalence in the 
Act. The document shifts from a concept of ‘People’s Education’ that centred on 
‘civic participation’ to official School Governing Bodies that reflect a minimalist 
conception of community participation and involvement in South African schools.    
 
To recall (from Chapter 2), central to theories of democracy is the stress on citizens’ 
participation in decisions affecting the life of their society. The purpose of the SGBs 
with regard to participatory democracy in school governance is stated by the SASA as 
follows:  
 
The governance of every public school is vested in its governing body. … A 
governing body stands in a position of trust towards the school. … The 
governing body of a public school must function in terms of a constitution 
which complies with minimum requirements determined by the Member of 
the Executive Council (MEC) (Department of Education, 1996, p. 14).     
 
According to the SASA, the Constitution of the SGBs cannot be called democracy 
because power is in the hands of the Member of the Executive Council, not the 
governing members. What this means is that a governing body has no control over 
but stands in a position of trust towards the school. In other words, a governing body 
is expected to act in good faith, to carry out all its duties and functions on behalf of a 
school, and to be accountable for its actions. On closer examination the SASA’s idea 
of co-operative governance and partnership falls well short of delivering the Athenian 
conceptions of democracy and participation.     
 
It seems clear that, although the SASA embraced a modified version of the Athenian 
prototype of democracy, the concept contains marked evidence of Colebatch’s 
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‘vertical’ elements. For example, a governing body may 
 
apply to the Head of Department in writing to be allocated any of the 
following functions … to maintain and improve the school’s property, and 
buildings and grounds occupied by the school, including school hostels, if 
applicable … to determine the extra-mural curriculum of the school and the 
choice of subject options in terms of provincial curriculum policy … to 
purchase of textbooks, educational materials or equipment of the school … to 
pay for services to the school (Department of Education, 1996, p. 16).  
 
It is evident that the SASA’s vision of participatory democracy is vague and 
unhelpful. The fact that participation is limited in school governance in South African 
schools, suggests that there is little direct democracy of the type defended by Budge 
(1993). In practice the SASA does not seem to support the anti-apartheid vision of 
participatory democracy and active citizenship. In doing so, education policy in South 
Africa after the transition recedes from the model of democratic citizenship 
developed in the anti-apartheid movement, with roots in the Freedom Charter 
tradition. The SASA also provides, at best, a minimal and conditional role for School 
Governing Body members.  
 
The SASA’s skepticism towards popular politics implicitly reflects the conclusions 
drawn by revisionist writers on democratic theory, summarised in Chapter 2 as 
follows: 1) the Athenian prototype picture of democratic man is hopelessly         
unrealistic; 2) because participation in decision-making requires judgement, skill and 
rational commitment, essentials that only the elites possess; 3) .the Athenian 
prototype of democracy does not recognise, indeed ignores, the importance   of 
leadership; and 4) against this backdrop, school democratic governance is a specialist 
business which should be conducted by the national Department of Education in 
South African schools. 
 
The SASA’s skepticism appears to be based on the belief that promoting a central 
participation and decision-making role for the ordinary citizens rests on empirically 
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unrealistic foundations, as Schumpeter (1950) says. In this way, a restricted notion of 
democratic participation as understood by the SASA militates against democratic 
school governance, a commitment to the sort of community participation articulated 
in the anti-apartheid movement. The NEC’s vision of education and training policy 
and practice governed by the principles of democracy and active participation are 
lost. The National Education Co-ordinating Committee’s ‘progressive’ parent-
teacher-student structures, took different forms as they moved from a populist 
political approach to education to the official structures that the new government 
favoured.  
 
Given that the SASA reflects a minimalist concept of democracy, the PTSA tradition 
seems to offer a glimpse of how parents, teachers and students can transform 
education by broadening participatory democracy for the benefit of the school and 
society at large. Neither the tradition of school-board committees nor the school 
governing bodies have much to contribute to the success of citizenship education and 
democratic practices in post-apartheid South African schools. This is arguably better 
achieved if SGBs are modelled on the PTSA vision. I contend that parents, teachers 
and students can articulate the practice of a substantial form of education for 
citizenship and democracy in schools. The anti-apartheid struggle and its concept of 
“People’s Education for People’s Power” had the potential to promote education for 
citizenship and teaching of democracy because it embraced the prototypical Athenian 
notion of mass participation. Let us turn our focus on citizenship education and 
curriculum development in post-apartheid schooling, with special attention to the 
minimal-maximal continuum.  
 
5.4 Citizenship education and curriculum development in South African 
schools  
I stated in Chapter 1 that in line with the pronouncements in the White Paper on 
Education and Training (1995) and the South African Schools Act (1996) was the 
development of Curriculum 2005 (1997) that declares its commitment to the 
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development of active, creative, critical types of citizens in a culturally diverse, 
democratic society. The ‘Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy’ (2001) 
provides a practical framework for instilling and nurturing democratic values of the 
Constitution in young South Africans. It was also mentioned that McLaughlin’s 
(1992) concept of citizenship, and education for citizenship, that is mapped in terms 
of a continuum of ‘minimal’ and ‘maximal’ interpretations, can be used to analyse 
and judge post-apartheid citizenship education policy. The White Paper on Education 
and Training (1995) and the South African Schools Act (1996) that both reflect a 
‘vertical’ concept of citizenship, and of citizenship education, have already been 
discussed in this chapter.   
 
Although the set of post-apartheid curriculum instruments has a maximal tone in 
places, they collectively reflect a minimalist notion of citizenship and of citizenship 
education, as this section illustrates. In support of this claim, it will be argued that 
post-apartheid citizenship education policy is not consistent with 
● an updated/modified version of the Athenian prototype of democracy, 
especially its democratic zeal for participation;  
●  McLaughlin’s (1992) maximalist concept of citizenship, and of citizenship 
education that encourages widespread political involvement and participation 
in schools; 
● global trends in liberal democracies that support the claim that learning 
democratic citizenship is not limited to the formal school curriculum, but also 
requires active community engagement; and  
● the model of democratic citizenship developed in the anti-apartheid 
movement, and its concept of “People’s Education for People’s Power” that 
embodies the classical notion of people’s power.  
 
This chapter emphasises the need for a maximal approach to citizenship education 
and democracy in South African schools In other words, South African curriculum 
developments that reflect these maximalist features of citizenship and of citizenship 
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education are likely to speak to the intended audience, i.e. school learners. By 
contrast, curriculum development in South Africa after the transition recedes from the 
active, participatory model of democratic citizenship explored in the last three 
chapters. In order to evaluate curriculum developments in post apartheid South 
Africa, I will focus firstly on the learning outcomes that explain the sort of citizen the 
Curriculum aims to produce, and secondly provide details as to what learners should 
know and be able to do at the end of formal teaching. 
 
Curriculum 2005 (1997) made provision for citizenship education through the Human 
and Social Sciences Learning Area, which comprised four components: History, 
Geography, Archaeology and Citizenship/Civics. History and Geography formed key 
elements but Archaeology and Citizenship/Civics were also integral to this Learning 
Area. The Citizenship or Civics education section on Participatory Citizenship 
intended to develop “active participatory citizens able to promote a democratic, 
equitable and just society” (Department of Education, 1997, p. 99). To realise its 
vision of an active participatory type of character, learners are expected to take an 
active part in democratic representative structures and in decision-making processes 
in the classroom, school or community based organisations. If this conception of the 
‘democratic’ learner is anything to go by, education for citizenship and teaching of 
democracy in South African schools has a good deal in common with the Athenian 
prototype. The curriculum implicitly affirms the democratic ideals of the Greek city-
state of Athens in several ways: 
●  It embraces a modified version of the Athenian prototype, especially its 
democratic zeal for participation. 
●  It suggests that participation of citizens in government develops an active 
character and contributes to the common welfare of society.  
●   It shows that participation does not stand in contrast to representative 
democracy — it is possible to combine the two into representative 
participatory democracy. 
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●  It proclaims that central to theories of participation and democratic theory is 
the stress on maximum participation in decision-making processes in a polity.   
● The educational aspect of participatory democracy relies on active engagement 
in many spheres of society, i.e. in schools, community, or public spaces.  
● Finally, it supports the claim that learning for democratic citizenship is not 
limited to the formal school curriculum, but also requires active community 
engagement. 
 
Curriculum 2005’s notion of participatory citizenship promotes student participation 
based on the prototypical version of Athenian democracy. Its commitment to active, 
participatory citizenship in South African schools is admirable. When South African 
schools are likened to a democracy, a popular assembly, to use Caragata’s words 
“citizenship reflects the idea that citizens act in the public sphere, they contribute to, 
and shape the discourses which, in turn and in part, structure our society” (1999, p. 
270). The language of Curriculum 2005 in this respect is compatible with a 
maximalist interpretation that requires more than an educational programme that 
develops critical understanding and a much more extensive range of disposition and 
virtues on the part of students. In other words, Curriculum 2005 is not just knowledge 
of citizenship and how to make themselves effective in public life; it also implies 
developing learners’ intellectual, moral and practical capacities as future adults. It 
would appear, then, that Curriculum 2005 reflects maximalist features of citizenship, 
and of citizenship education, thereby speaking also to South African school learners. 
 
Yet, it is impossible to read Curriculum 2005 in an unambiguously maximalist way, 
because education for citizenship and democracy is given a subsidiary status 
compared to History and Geography. Given the National Curriculum Statement’s 
undertaking to promote democratic participation and an active citizenry, one would 
expect citizenship education to be a key component of the curriculum. On the 
contrary, citizenship education has little or no status at all in post-apartheid South 
African schools. The conceptual incoherence of Curriculum 2005 is reflected by the 
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tension between the ideal and vision and the practicalities of what can be achieved 
under the circumstances. In other words, the document sets out ideals that it cannot 
necessarily achieve in practice. Furthermore, it reveals that the ‘taught’ and the 
‘caught’ notions of citizenship education are in conflict with one other. Curriculum 
2005 manifests the tensions and contradictions in the discourse of educational 
transformation that beset South Africa since the negotiation process in the 1990s.  
 
What follows is a brief summary of the central features of post-apartheid South 
African education policy discussed so far:  
• The White Paper on Education and Training (1995) reflects a conception of 
popular participation, which appeals to the collective strength of the 
community with respect to policy formulation and curriculum development on 
the one hand, and relies on the DoE expert knowledge to give advice on 
matters relating to democratic participation and representation in South 
African schools, on the other. 
• At the heart of the South African Schools Act (1996) lies the idea of 
democratic governance and partnership, but the Act fails to assign more than a 
minimal and conditional role to the School Governing Body members et al.  
• Curriculum 2005 (1997) embraces an updated/modified version of the 
Athenian prototype of democracy, and its notion of citizenship, but this 
prototypical, maximal concept is given a subsidiary status in South African 
schools.  
 
Like the White Paper (1995), the South African School’s Act (1996) and Curriculum 
2005, the Manifesto on Values (2001) is committed to active participatory 
citizenship, as envisioned in the Freedom Charter and echoed in the Constitution of 
South Africa (1996). The ‘Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy’ (2001) 
sets out to provide a practical framework for instilling and reinforcing democratic 
values of the Constitution in young South Africans. The idea of a document on 
values, education and democracy was born when the Ministry of Education was 
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working on a document dealing with religion in education in South African schools. 
The Ministry had no broader frame of reference to locate what is popularly known as 
‘Moral Regeneration Campaign’ in South Africa. In July 2000, the Working Group 
on Values in Education appointed by the Minister of Education Kader Asmal, tabled 
its first report entitled Values, Education and Democracy. The document was put 
forward for national debate on the appropriate values South Africans need to embrace 
in schools. Subsequently, a national conference dubbed the Saamtrek Conference 
produced the ‘Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy. In sum, the document 
is “a call to all citizens to espouse the spirit of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist 
South Africa (Department of Education, 2001, p. 3).   
 
The Manifesto is built on ten fundamental values of the Constitution of South Africa 
(1996) that include, among others, the political idea of democracy. The document’s 
concept of democracy endorses the educational value of participation. The authors 
write, “education is the key because it empowers us to exercise our democratic rights, 
and shape our destiny, by giving us the tools to participate in public life, to think 
critically, and to act responsibly” (Department of Education, 2001, p, 2). Theorists 
such as Rousseau (1968) and Mill (1975) have testified to and elucidated the 
educational value of democratic participation that the Manifesto on Values espoused. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Rousseau and Mill suggested that participation of citizens 
in government develops an active character and contributes to the common welfare of 
society. Similar to the contemporary British model of citizenship education, the 
Manifesto on Values’ maximal concept of democracy involves the socialisation of 
pupils who can “participate in society effectively as active, informed, critical and 
responsible citizens” (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998, p. 9).  
 
The Manifesto also outlines sixteen strategies for instilling democratic values in 
young South Africans. One such strategy consists in affirming a common South 
African citizenship. To recall (see Chapter 4), in South Africa, citizenship reflected 
two distinct formulations — to be a citizen (citizenship as a legal status) and to act as 
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a citizen (citizenship as a practice). In other words, to be a citizen means to enjoy the 
rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship. Citizens’ rights and responsibilities 
include the obligations to play an active part in citizenship; this is, public 
participation central, provincial and local government. The ‘Manifesto on Values’ 
support for equal citizenship that subjects learners to equal duties, obligations and 
responsibilities has been widely applauded and praised. 
 
Given this conception of the ‘democratic’ learner, education for citizenship and 
teaching of democracy in schools is compatible with the prototypical concepts of 
democracy and citizenship: 
• It supports Margetson’s (1978) verdict that echoes Rousseau (1968) and 
Mill’s (1975) claim that Athenian democracy, its enthusiasm for democratic 
participation and education of citizens are indivisible.  
• It treats citizens’ rights and responsibilities not as incompatible but, rather, as 
intimately and reciprocally linked.    
                                                                                                                                                                                          
On the other hand, there are a number of elements in the document which indicate a 
minimalist interpretation of citizenship education. To recall from Chapter 4: 
●  A post-apartheid South African citizenship and by implication citizenship 
education is torn between ‘transformative’ goals, on the one hand, and 
‘democratic’ goals, on the other. 
● Consequently, the democratic elements are tentatively expressed and 
outweighed by the general transformative orientation of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa (1996), thus rendering post-apartheid citizenship 
education policy instruments conceptually incoherent. 
●  South Africa does not have a settled concept of citizenship to draw on, and by 
implication education for citizenship and democracy too, is still at a formative 
stage. 
134 
 
●  There is a tension in the 1996 Constitution between ‘transformative’ and 
‘substantive’ concepts of citizenship and, by implication, of citizenship 
education. 
●  In theory, therefore, the Constitution embraces an updated version of the 
Athenian prototype of democracy, and its notion of citizenship. In practice, 
however, South Africa’s emergent conception of citizenship education post-
1994 is ‘transformative’, rather than ‘preservative’ of the Athenian concept of 
democratic citizenship. 
 
It is evident, then, that the ‘Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy’ does not 
encourage a maximalist interpretation of citizenship education. The document’s 
concept of citizenship education mirrors that of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa (1996), which vacillates between ‘transformative’ goals and 
‘democratic’ goals. Furthermore, education for citizenship and democracy is seen in 
localised terms, namely the school is not part of a larger community. Unfortunately, 
there is also a reinforcement of a minimalist interpretation of citizenship education 
contained in the original Curriculum 2005, and an emphasis on ‘good’ and ‘loyal’ 
citizenship that paints a picture of a school learner who, in the absence of explicit 
exhortation, is incapable of acting in a socially and morally responsible manner. In 
Chapter 8, I will discuss in greater detail the ‘Values, Education and Democracy: 
Report of the Working Group on Values in Education’ (2000) that introduced the 
original national School Pledge with a focus on the values and principles of the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights of 1996. 
 
In February 2000, the Ministry of Education commissioned a review of Curriculum 
2005, which was completed on 31 May 2000. The Revised National Curriculum 
Statement (RNCS) was not a new curriculum but a streamlining and strengthening of 
Curriculum 2005. It kept intact the principles, purposes and thrust of Curriculum 
2005 and affirmed its commitment to outcomes-based education. The RNCS planned 
to develop the full potential of each learner who is able to participate in society as a 
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critical and active citizen. The developmental outcomes envisaged learners who are 
also able to “participate as responsible citizens in the life of local, national and global 
communities” (Department of Education, 2002, p. 11). I mentioned in Chapter 3 that 
the Citizenship Advisory Group (1998) agreed that ‘effective education for 
citizenship’ consists of three strands, interrelated but also distinct, which combine to 
make up such an education, that is, social and moral responsibility, community 
involvement and political literacy. Among other positive elements that are stressed 
are these three elements of citizenship education.  
 
In terms of social and moral responsibility, it is expected of learners to demonstrate 
compassion by caring for people (and animals); and to discuss effects of gender 
stereotyping, sexism and abuse on personal and social relationships. On the 
community engagement side, the RNCS envisioned learners who were able to: 
“participate as responsible citizens in the life of local, national and global 
communities” (2002, p. 11). The political literacy strand calls on learners to ‘think 
globally, act locally’. In other words, South African learners are encouraged to form 
generative democratic relationships and know their rights and responsibilities, not 
only to their country, but also to the rest of the globe. The maximal features of the 
revised Curriculum 2005 are not without ambiguities. 
 
It seems clear that the RNCS embraces a modified version of the Athenian prototype 
of citizenship, namely to foster active, critical and inquiring individuals able to build, 
strengthen and consolidate South Africa’s democracy. Although the document 
promotes an active participatory citizenry, it does not pursue this notion with 
sufficient rigour and consistency. For example, Citizenship/Civics education is not 
only devalued, but removed from the Human and Social Sciences Learning Area. 
History and Geography continue to form key elements of the Human Social Sciences. 
Environmental education and human rights have replaced Archaeology and 
Citizenship/Civics as integral to the Human and Social Sciences Learning Area. The 
conspicuous removal of the Citizenship/Civics section from the document can be 
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interpreted in three ways: 1) it has become more minimal and less participatory than 
that envisioned in the anti-apartheid struggle and enshrined in the Constitution of 
South Africa (1996); 2) the expunging of Citizenship or Civics education from the 
Human and Social Sciences suggests that educating children for citizenship has no 
formal place in the curriculum; and 3) consequently, education for citizenship and 
democracy ends up in a rather restricted form, especially when compared to national 
goals. In other words, apart from the fact that there is little policy coherence across 
the five different official policy documents produced since 1994, education for 
citizenship appears to be given diminishing importance in post-apartheid South 
African education policy. Unfortunately, the minimalist conception of education for 
citizenship, as reflected in the original Curriculum 2005 documents, persists. 
 
In summary, although policy instruments since the transition to democracy are based 
largely on a minimal conception of citizenship, other aspects of the documents 
contain a maximalist reading or tone. The White Paper on Education and Training 
(1995) is concerned with the concept of popular participation, which denotes a broad 
range of participants (or ‘agents’/‘actors’) in policy processes in South Africa. At the 
heart of the South African Schools Act (1996) lies the idea of democratic governance 
and partnership. In line with the pronouncements in the White Paper on Education 
and Training (1995) and the South African Schools Act (1996) is the development of 
Curriculum 2005 (1997), which declares its commitment to active, creative, critical 
types of citizens in a culturally diverse, democratic society. The ‘Manifesto on 
Values, Education and Democracy’ (2001) provides a practical framework that instils 
and reinforces democratic values of the Constitution in young South Africans. There 
is a reinforcement of a minimalist interpretation of citizenship education contained in 
the original Curriculum 2005, and an equally minimalist emphasis on educating 
learners to a greater extent about rights, and less about the responsibilities of citizens 
in a democratic society, in the later, revised version.  
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Unfortunately, what is emerging in post-apartheid education policy South Africa is 
a concept of citizenship education comprising of complex and contradictory 
elements that provide both continuity and discontinuity with what preceded the 
historic 1994 democratic elections. In fact, policy development after the transition 
reflects a minimalist conception of citizenship and, by implication, of citizenship 
education. The maximal concept of democracy and education for citizenship in 
South African schools was relegated to subsidiary status in Curriculum 2005 
(1997), and obliterated altogether from the Human and Social Sciences Learning 
Area in the Revised National Curriculum Statement. It would appear, then, that 
South African education policy’s conception of education for citizenship does not 
guide the practice in terms accessible to the school’s democratic community, that is 
parents, teachers and students, non-teaching staff, the principal and co-opted 
members. Most importantly, it does not speak to its intended democratic audience 
in schools. In post-apartheid South Africa, opportunities to exercise and to learn 
democratic citizenship fell woefully short of active, participatory citizenship, as 
understood in the Greek city-state of Athens. It is not surprising that there is little 
policy coherence across all five different official policy documents produced since 
1994.  
5.5 Conclusion  
The chapter began by highlighting educational policy developments during the period 
of ‘consensus seeking’ that exhibit a trend towards ‘retreat’, namely the centering and 
narrowing of the educational policy agenda of ‘People’s Education’ that supports a 
prototypical, maximal conception of education for citizenship and democracy in 
South African schools. The post-apartheid South African education policy approach 
favoured by the government — a top down, vertical logic — tampered with the 
radical ideas of the anti-apartheid movement. Although the broader elements of 
‘People’s Education’ have evaporated, the conception of education for citizenship 
endorsed by the broader education policy, in particular policies of early transition 
since 1994, is a maximal interpretation. The discontinuities between the vision of the 
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anti-apartheid struggle of participatory democracy, on the one hand, and policy 
development after the transition on the other, can be attributed to a lack of conceptual 
clarity, coherence and consistency in post-apartheid South African educational policy. 
A more well-grounded approach, one that avoids the unsteadiness, disjointedness and 
complexity surrounding the education for democratic citizenship policy position, will 
focus not merely on the ‘content’ but also on broader issues in school policy 
involving students’ participation in learner representative councils. The next chapter 
focuses on the policy of Representative Councils of Learners that embodies in 
significant respects a roll-back of democratic participation and representation of 
students in school governance in South African schools. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
FROM ‘BOY-GOVERNMENT’ AND ‘STUDENT-GOVERNMENT’ TO  
REPRESENTATIVE COUNCILS OF LEARNERS: THE BEST  
OF BOTH WORLDS? 
 
Many schools have a tradition of Student Representative Councils which 
played a major role in the birth of the new South Africa. Other schools have a 
long school prefect tradition. … All these traditions needed to be brought 
together within the new context of consolidating democracy at school level. 
The best elements of these traditions had to be considered in order to see what 
was appropriate. This resulted in the SA Schools Act [1996] stipulating that 
[the Representative Councils for Learners] must be established in schools with 
learners in grade eight and higher (Department of Education, 1999, p. 11, 
addition mine). 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that the South African Schools Act (SASA) 
paved the way for democratically elected and representative structures, officially 
known as School Governing Bodies (SGBs) and Representative Councils of Learners 
(RCLs). In 1999 the national Department of Education issued Guides for the 
Representative Councils of Learners established in terms of the SASA of 1996. The 
Guides supplemented the Act’s declaration and commitment to representative 
governing bodies and democracy in South African schools. This chapter examines 
South African learners’ participation and representation in school governance as 
envisaged by the Guides. The chapter probes not only the Guides’ concept of 
students’ democratic participation and representation, but it also raises philosophical 
questions pertinent to the policy instrument: 1) Does its notion of student 
participation and representation embrace the Athenian prototype of democracy? In 
other words, does it reflect an active model of democracy in post-apartheid South 
African schools? 2) How does it envisage democratic citizenship education that is 
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enjoyed by a significant proportion of the South African learners? In other words, 
does it cover opportunities to learn democratic citizenship in schools and beyond? In 
the history of South African education there have been three contrasting attempts to 
incorporate learners in the authority structures of schools. These traditions are the 
‘prefect system’, Student Representative Councils and Representative Councils of 
Learners. The narratives informing these attempts are linked to Sithole’s (1998) four 
critical viewpoints of student participation and representation in school governance in 
South African schools for the past two centuries.
35
 I explore the claim that the 
Guides’ attempt to blend the ‘prefect’ and Student Representative Councils’ traditions 
to consolidate democracy at school level. By so doing, I argue that the Guides 
represent in significant respects retrieval of the less democratic student representation 
in South African schools, thus reinforcing post-apartheid citizenship education 
policy’s conceptual incoherence depicted in the two previous chapters.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 looks at the claims and features 
of three contrasting types of student representative organisations in South African 
schools. Section 2 points out that Student Representative Councils were born out of 
the rejection of the unpopular ‘prefect system’, and shows how education policy after 
1994 attempted to reconcile the ‘prefect’ and SRC traditions in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Section 3 provides a critical analysis of the Guides, and argues that despite its 
intentions to promote democratic student representation, a view of student 
representative structure that emerged first in the democratic Student Representative 
Councils developed in the anti-apartheid movement, school policy in the end 
regresses to features of the ‘prefect system’. The chapter concludes by defending the 
Student Representative Councils’ tradition on the basis of its emphasis on the 
educative potential of learner participation.  
                                                 
35
 Perceptions of the role of student participation and representation in democratic school governance, 
according to Sithole (1998), can be distinguished by the following contrasting stances: absurdity, 
abnormality, restriction and indispensability. Sithole’s first viewpoint epitomises the conception of the 
‘prefect system’, as far as school governance is concerned. The second and third features relate to the 
Guides’ approach to Representative Councils of Learners in post-apartheid South African schools. The 
last feature resembles Student Representative Councils’ history and tradition. 
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6.2 The British system of ‘boy-government’
36  
in South African schools 
The word ‘prefect’ (Latin, praefectus: a high-ranking military or civil official in the 
Roman Empire) can refer to any of a number of types of official. ‘Boy-government’, 
rule by the prefects, was a term that linked government and schooling in British 
society. Randall (1982) succinctly summed up the relation between government and 
schooling in Victorian times: “young people in schools were expected to emulate the 
White Anglo-Saxon Protestant gentlemen: the versatile, clean-cut, well-mannered, 
prudent man of affairs … respected, and influential —a pillar of society” (p. 2). In the 
context of schools a ‘prefect’ was a pupil who had been given authority to train his 
fellow students, to lead brave, courageous boys, moulded into conformity and loyalty 
towards the British Empire. By 1880 the ‘prefects’ in most English schools had 
attained enormous power and enjoyed a term of office that was for all practical 
purposes autocratic. This means prefects “ran house activities and helped legislate 
rules; they kept order, judged offences and often did the punishment themselves… 
They were, in short, an administration, a judiciary, and part of the legislature rolled 
into one” (Wilkinson, 1964, p. 30). The drawback of this ‘boy-government’ notion of 
education for citizenship in British schools is obvious. The prefect system promoted 
obedient citizens who were loyal to the British Empire. This concept viewed young 
people either as pliable recipients or as ‘problems’ rather than as competent citizens 
capable of meaningful participation. How did ‘boy-government’ or prefectorial 
government come to be established in South Africa?  
 
As I indicated in Chapter 3, the South African educational system owes much to 
British traditions. The British system of education was introduced to the Cape Colony 
soon after the British captured the Cape from the Dutch in 1806. In 1810, a large 
number of educators were imported but there were not enough of them to be sent to 
smaller towns and villages. To remedy this shortfall, it was decided to introduce the 
                                                 
36
 A term used by Randall (1982) in his analysis of private schools in South Africa via the British 
public school tradition. In this chapter I adhere to this usage on the understanding that one could also 
employ the term ‘girl-government’, to refer to ‘girl’ prefects.   
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‘monitor system’. The Cape Government agreed to this system of education in order 
to make up for the shortage of educators. Individual educators chose specific pupils 
(known later as ‘monitors’) for certain responsibilities, for instance hall monitor, 
sports monitor, library monitor and so forth. In other words, monitors served as 
agents of social control in Cape Government schools. With the disappearance of the 
original ‘monitor system’
37
 there arose a new system, which was indeed a type of 
‘boy-government’ or ‘prefect system’. By the middle of the 19th century the ‘prefect 
system’ was formalised and existed in virtually every South African public school. 
Individuals who were chosen to carry out tasks within this system were still known as 
monitors. As opposed to the monitors, prefects assumed a disciplinarian role, namely 
they became responsible for discipline outside the classroom, reporting either to a 
class teacher or the headmaster. This British concept of citizenship education was 
later extended and put into practice in the Boer republics. 
 
In his dissertation, ‘The Prefect System In The Transvaal: An Empirical Study’ 
(1963), Blumberg looks at the history of the prefect system in the Transvaal in the 
1960s. For the purpose of this chapter, I will confine myself to his comments on the 
nature, privileges, duties and powers of the prefectship. Blumberg’s study showed 
that choosing ‘prefects’ ranged from very autocratic to very democratic practices. For 
example, on one extreme, the principal and vice-principal chose the prefects; teachers 
and pupils had no say in the selection. In the opposite extreme, all the pupils in the 
school elected the prefects from the senior classes. Between these extremes, a 
combination of appointment (by the principal), nomination (by the teachers) and 
election (by older learners) of prefects took place in different schools. Owing to the 
concept of schooling aimed at producing obedient, if not loyal citizens, even a highly 
participatory, rotational prefect system became synonymous with autocratic styles of 
government in apartheid South African schools. This blend of autocratic-democratic 
                                                 
37
 Andrew Bell (1753-1832) and Joseph Lancaster (1778-1838) established the ‘monitor’ system as an 
agency of social control in British schools. In 1800 Joseph Lancaster, a Quaker, opened Borough Road 
School in London, using a monitorial system. Arnold, Rugby’s famous headmaster of the 1830s, is 
frequently credited with having perfected the system. 
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practices is not compatible with the object of Pitkin’s (1967) idea —which is 
substantive political representation, namely a democratic participatory representative 
body of learners — where prefects’ actions have substantive content, meaning the 
learners act through their ‘boy-government’ and are not merely passive recipients of 
its actions. I argued in Chapter 4 that the anti-apartheid struggle concept of 
democratic citizenship education strove to liberate and put students in command of 
their lives, rejecting the British Girl Guide system and the Nationalist Youth 
Preparedness Programme designed to control and to produce a subservient, passive 
type of character. In this regard, students’ democratic participation and representation 
is consistent with the prototypical, maximal concept of democratic citizenship that 
also reflects the democratic vision of the model of democracy developed in the 
Charter tradition and enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa (1996). What were 
the central justifications and features of the ‘prefect system’ in South African 
schools? 
  
Hosiosky’s dissertation, ‘Prefects In A Senior Secondary School In Eldorado Park- 
An Exercise In Democratic Leadership’ (1978), defined a prefect as a senior pupil 
elected by the teachers or principals and authorised to enforce discipline in the 
school. Similar to the Arnoldian understanding of the prefect system as an agency of 
social control, prefects were also expected to foster religious and moral principles, 
gentlemanly conduct and intellectual ability in South African schools. The principal 
functions mentioned in Blumberg’s study revealed a dual duty involving prefectship: 
supervisory and special capacity. A supervisory role included supervising pupils on 
the school premises before and after school, during intervals, while games were in 
progress, at the swimming bath, in the school pavilion, in the school hall before and 
after assemblies, in the bicycle shed, in the hostels, during study periods, during 
meals in the hostels. Special capacity varied from ‘library’ to ‘punishment’ 
prefectship.  
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Regrettably, prefectship was identified with harsh punishment and brutal discipline. 
Using evidence of public schools in the early 19th century British schools, Busher 
argued that:  
 
The most common minor punishment was the lines. The minimum      
punishment was five or ten lines copied out of the classical author. Apart 
from expulsion, flogging was the major punishment. For the severest cases 
split canes, thongs, or a tightly bound mass of the switches specially and 
freshly made up each day were used (Busher, 1988, p. 10).   
 
At Rugby, ‘prefects’ were virtually minor members of the staff with flogging and 
fagging powers. In South Africa, Blumberg wrote that both in English and Afrikaans 
schools, punishments by prefects included “the imposition of ‘lines’ ranging from 
twenty-five to a hundred, detention after school hours for a limited period, and small 
monetary fines, which were given to charity” (1988, p. 46). For example, a 
‘punishment prefect’ dealt with unruly behaviour and unconventional dress and so on. 
Against this background, especially in black schools, first under the Bantu Education 
Act (47) of 1953 and, later the Education and Training Act (90) of 1979, prefects 
were seen as agents of school authorities, which rested only on the power to accept 
bribes, to threaten, and punish. Again, prefects enforced discipline without students’ 
consent, thus exercising a substantial degree of power and control over them. As 
such, for decades prefectship endured as deplorable ‘boy-government’ structures that 
pursued a policy of autocratic rule in apartheid South African schools.  
 
Blumberg’s work also pointed out that prefects abused their authority by meting out 
harsh and sadistic punishments. In the mid 19
th
 century, ‘boy-government’ or the 
‘prefect system’ became virtually a universal phenomenon, often associated with 
cruelty and bullying. At Bishops in Cape Town, a head prefect of the late 1870s 
described the way in which juniors were abused by the seniors, who used  
 
their fags to such an extent that they failed to learn their lessons, and hid 
about to avoid being made fags. Sometimes the Seniors … ordered them to 
sing, and if they failed would thrash them; and sometimes they would send 
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them into the village to buy them liquor and tobacco (Randall, 1982, p. 64).  
 
As a result of prefects’ brutally enforced discipline, students’ attempts to defend the 
rights of their peers would result in increased bullying and bad behaviour by pupils. 
From Randall’s account, prefects could beat, and were often greatly feared, more so 
even than the masters. Student teachers in Blumberg’s study accused the prefects of 
bullying and exacting fines in the form of sweets —which the prefects ate. Those who 
disagreed with the ‘prefect system’, in Blumberg’s research, attested that prefects 
were responsible directly or indirectly for much of the bullying which took place in 
school, and that they were the cause of great unhappiness and resentment among the 
senior pupils who were not elected prefects. On the whole, ‘boy-government’ sparked 
complaints about abuse of power by prefects. This version of the ‘prefect system’ that 
South Africa inherited from England has not gone uncriticised. 
 
In South Africa, critics of the autocratic prefect system have expressed disapproval 
and called for the alteration and abolition of the entire system. The bone of contention 
was that the prefect system envisages a notion of student representative democracy 
that is not enjoyed by a significant proportion of South African learners. These were 
some of the reasons put forth: it caused resentment, disharmony and unhappiness 
among pupils who had not been chosen as prefects; and it turned hitherto well-
balanced individuals into conceited bullies. In January 2000 Hilton College, an 
independent school situated in the midlands of KwaZulu-Natal province, 
discontinued the ‘boy-government’ system (http://www.hiltoncollege.com, 07 
September 2005). For more than a century Hilton employed a traditional prefect 
system with authority and responsibility being vested in selected senior boys. The 
school saw the following weaknesses in the prefect system. Firstly, it was divisive 
and exclusive, enabling direct student participation by only a selection of students. 
Secondly, it failed to take into account the valuable contributions by less outspoken 
and less aggressive pupils. Thirdly, it disheartened and discouraged those learners 
who were not elected to ‘boy-government’. Lastly, it steadily reduced the space that 
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enabled students to have a direct experience of democracy as an integral part of their 
schooling. Thus, the ‘boy-government’s’ claim to democratic student representation 
did not reflect a participatory form of representative government, that is the ‘boy-
government’ was unable to educate the entire student population to take an active part 
in student affairs.     
 
Recognising the growing criticism of the ‘prefect system’, Redhill, an independent 
school in Morningside, Johannesburg, that portrays itself as immersing students in a 
rigorous liberal academic curriculum has also assumed a leading role in doing away 
with the traditional ‘prefect system’, in favour of a democratic executive system in 
which everyone participates. A school policy statement says that “no authoritarian 
prefect system, initiation or bullying is allowed in the school” (www.redhill.co.za, 07 
September 2005). Redhill’s democratic executive system is in stark contrast with the 
autocratic version of the English public schools and their South Africa counterparts in 
the Transvaal in the 1960s. The Redhill prefect system is compatible with 
Blumberg’s democratic practice in which the election of prefects is transparent and 
highly participatory. In this way, prefects in democratic locales, as compared to 
autocratic settings, are likely to assume a participatory form of representation, 
consistent with Pitkin’s participatory form of representation that guarantees maximal 
degree of electorates’ power and control over the representatives.  
 
Both the Hilton and Redhill studies provide a useful basis for the discussion below 
that 1) points out that Student Representative Councils were born out of the 
rejection of the unpopular ‘prefect system’; and 2) defends democratic Student 
Representative Councils on the grounds of their emphasis on the educative potential 
of learner participation. In short, a consideration of the Hilton and Redhill review of 
the prefect system supports this chapter’s claim that although the Guides purport to 
promote student representative democracy, their recommendations are ambiguous and 
ultimately flawed. In support of this claim, the last section of this chapter will show 
that: 1) the Guides attempt to balance the disparate, competing student representative 
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traditions, such as the prefect system and Student Representative Councils; 2) the 
Guides’ concept of student representative democracy provides both continuity and 
discontinuity with what preceded the 1994 historic democratic elections; 3) the 
Guides reflect a minimalist conception of citizenship, and of citizenship education; 
and 4) their commitment to democratic student representation does not ‘articulate the 
practice of a substantial form of education for citizenship’, thus undermining 
democratic participation and active citizenry in post-apartheid South African schools. 
 
In sum, the history of the ‘prefect system’, both under the British Empire and 
apartheid South Africa, yielded discontent and undemocratic practices like division 
and exclusion, excessive power and authority, harsh and sadistic punishment, cruelty 
and bullying. The official prefectorial system was also resented and rejected in Black 
schools in the 70s. School Student movement
38
 did not only reject the authoritarian 
‘prefect system’ but also emphasised democratic student representation in South 
African schools. 
 
6.3 A brief history of student struggle and the rejection of the prefect system  
The Student Representative Councils were born out of the rejection of the unpopular 
‘prefect system’ in South African schools. Hyslop (1999) has detailed how black 
school students
39
 resented the less democratic ‘prefect system’ at mission schools in 
the 1940s. The reasons vary, from the privileges prefects enjoyed to their inability to 
convey complaints of students to the authorities. The privileges prefects enjoyed in 
day schools included, inter alia tea with the teaching staff during the breaks and at 
                                                 
38
 The term ‘student movement’ refers to the sum total and intentions of students, individually, 
collectively and organisationally, directed towards change in the students’ own circumstances and for 
educational and wider social change (see Jacks, 1975, p. 13). 
 
39
 The concept ‘student’ had a political tag attached to it during the apartheid era. ‘Student’ activists 
were able to link educational demands to a broader national political struggle. In a democratic 
education system the concept ‘learner’ has an educational tone synonymous with schooling, not 
student politics. Though I use both concepts interchangeably, they must be understood in their 
historical context. 
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the end of each term, and exemption from uniform inspection. Additional privileges 
included being allowed ‘out’ more often than non-prefects; their own rooms; being 
allowed to go to bed later than non-prefects; wearing ordinary clothes instead of 
school uniform to town and being allocated special seats at school functions (see 
Blumberg, 1963, pp. 48-49). As a result of the privileges that prefects enjoyed, 
prefects were easily distinguished from the entire student population. At Lovedale 
mission school, established in the Cape Province in 1841, allegations of preferential 
treatment by the school management towards prefects led to the 1946 student riot. For 
these reasons, prefects were tagged in the imagination of student community as being 
organs of the oppressive system. 
 
By the early 1950s, the ‘prefect system’ had been under strain at Healdtown mission 
school, established in the Cape Province in 1857, for some time. As a result, 
Healdtown witnessed a stand-up strike in 1953. Students refused their meals and 
refused to be seated in the dining hall, in protest against the placing of a prefect at 
each dining hall table. In 1952 there was a mass resignation of prefects. They felt 
their position was being undermined by the unwillingness of the housemaster, Mr. 
Mncube to take action on disciplinary matters. Mncube resigned, but students 
accorded the prefects no legitimacy. In an anonymous letter to the authorities the 
Healdtown school students complained: 
 
The most important point which causes us to scribble this is because our 
representatives are not taking our complaints to you … these rules are not for 
all our students but for the juniors and seniors who have no say in your 
aristocratic form of government … what is the use of these prefects as being 
our rep[resentative]s, they should be called your tools (Hyslop, 1999, p. 15, 
addition mine).   
 
The rejection of the prefect system swung the pendulum against ‘boy-government’, 
even those democratically elected delegates and once respected student leaders that 
enabled students to gather around various issues, like inferior education, overcrowded 
classrooms, unhealthy study conditions and so on. Blumberg’s investigation captured 
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the unhappiness about the lack of representative participatory democracy expressed 
by students in Lovedale and Healdtown schools and also depicted the conditions that 
existed in South African schools in general. Among the list of complaints raised in 
missionary institutions were the following: 1) prefectship’s claim to promote student 
participation in essence was symbolic, in reality it was not bound up with the active, 
participatory concept of democracy, which embodies the Athenian notion of rule by 
‘the people’ or student population; 2) teachers exercised considerable power and 
favouritism, as a result of which sycophants were often appointed; and 3) parents, 
teachers and students expressed strong objection to the principal’s power of veto in 
electing prefects. With regard to prefect duties, a large number of former prefects 
failed to find such pseudo-participation stimulating or life-enhancing, since there was 
too much interference by all and sundry, parents, principal and teachers. Thirteen 
years after Blumberg’s inquiry, the Soweto Student Representative Council (SSRC) 
was established on 13
th
 June 1976 to give voice to the students’ feelings and opinions. 
 
In Hyslop’s view (1988), the key issue in explaining the origins of the Soweto 
Student Representative Council was the enforcement of Afrikaans as medium of 
instruction by conservative officials within the Bantu Education Department. By late 
1974 and into 1975, there were already indications of a new militancy among school 
students. In the Eastern Cape the South African Students Movement (SASM) was 
active. In 1975 at least two strikes occurred over educational grievances, one 
involving the occupation of a school. During the first months of 1975 tension over the 
issue of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction had arisen in Soweto and in April the 
first school came out on strike. The strike then spread fitfully through other eight-odd 
Soweto secondary and higher primary schools. On 13 June SASM convened a 
delegate meeting at Naledi High School which established the Soweto Student 
Representative Council. The SSRC called a demonstration for 16 June. Following the 
Soweto uprising in 1976, the SSRCs soon joined  parents, teachers and other 
educators, students, community leaders, religious bodies, workers and so forth in 
rejecting the ‘prefect system’ in South African schools. 
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The SSRC began to campaign for democratic and progressive student representative 
structures in South African schools. In the opinion of Hyslop (1988), the SSRC 
promoted the idea of democratic Student Representative Councils as a way of 
forming ‘student government’ and power. The SSRC signified a conceptual shift 
from autocratic ‘boy- government’ to a democratic ‘student-government’ that brought 
to the school governing bodies the thoughts and views of the learners. The SSRC was 
able to organise and mobilise learners around issues of common interest and was seen 
by many as a true and genuine body that represented their aspirations. Within four 
months of the SSRC’s establishment, students insisted on democratically elected 
representatives in South African schools starting with “the right to elect student 
representative councils … for the expression of student grievances” (Davenport, 
1991, p. 422). Most importantly, the SSRC’s definition of participation, as far as 
educating for a democratic society, was to give proper responsibility to students for, 
and control over, their lives. Starting with the broadening of the arenas of struggle 
against the ‘prefect system’, the fight to achieve democratic representation in school 
governance was connected to demands for the complete overhaul of the apartheid 
machinery. This tradition, recalling the Athenian version of democracy, provided the 
SSRC with a political model for students elsewhere in the country who set up their 
own representative structures in the form of Student Representative Councils.  
 
School student organisations like the Congress of South African Students 
(COSAS)
40
 and the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO)
41
 rallied and 
mobilised students to strive for a democratic student representation system. 
                                                 
40
 A school student organisation formed in 1979 that took a position founded on the Freedom Charter 
of 1955. On the educational front, COSAS’s programme of action sought to achieve dynamic, free and 
compulsory education for all. In Chapter 7, I will show that claiming the right to free and compulsory 
schooling and, by implication, to compulsory citizenship education is linked to the broader struggle for 
a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. 
 
41
 The Azanian Students Organisation was also formed in 1979 as a national organisation of black 
university students. AZASO identified its guiding principle to be the struggle towards setting up a 
democratic South Africa free of racist oppression and exploitation.  
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COSAS motto ‘Yes to SRC, No to Prefects’ served as an inspiration to the 
multitude of black school students. The students’ appeal for student democratic 
representation, echoed nationally, represented the broadening of the avenues of 
struggle by students. In an interview conducted with AZASO members around the 
struggle for student participation associated with school representative democracy, 
an AZASO activist said:  
Briefly, education struggle today has come to focus on the question of 
representation. Democratic student representation in the form of SRCs and 
COSAS and AZASO branches has been stifled by the racist education 
authorities. At school level, any form of student organisation and 
representation has been firmly crushed and as an alternative, prefect 
systems, etc, have been implemented. Students and scholars have neglected 
such representation from the top and today continue to strive for better and 
more grassroots representation (Interview with Azaso activists, 1984, p. 
74). 
 
Like the SSRC, COSAS and AZASO sought to promote the idea of democratic 
Student Representative Councils as a way of increasing student power and 
organisation in schools. There are two points worth noting about the anti-apartheid 
notion of student participation and representation in apartheid South African schools. 
First, the students’ interpretation of participatory forms of representation resembled a 
prototypical Athenian democracy based on mass participation. In other words, School 
Student movement characterised student participation and representation as structures 
in which the student population ruled: collective self-rule. Secondly, it showed that 
participation does not stand in contrast to representative democracy —it is possible to 
combine the two into representative participatory democracy in schools. The rejection 
of the ‘dummy’ SRCs was justified on the grounds that the education struggle aimed 
to replace an undemocratic, coercive, education system with democratic participatory 
structures like the SRCs. Therefore, it was argued, any attempts to impose 
undemocratic student representation would weaken student struggle in South African 
schools. So, in a sense, the education struggle continued to revolve around the 
demand for democratically elected SRCs, perceived as the only legitimate student 
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representative structures for a future South Africa. In short, the democratic Student 
Representative Councils’ participatory form of representation bears testimony to the 
relevance and, indeed, the compellingness of the classical theory in South African 
schools before 1994. 
 
The concept of ‘student-government’ was rooted in the trajectory of the resistance 
politics. The democratic Student Representative Councils pointed to the educative 
value that comes with active community engagement. The connection between the 
struggle for democratic representation and mass participation was well captured by a 
COSAS activist, who said: 
 
Students must be organised through democratically elected representative 
councils (SRCs) … ‘we are members of society before we are students’ – and 
thereby demonstrate that students can play a ‘progressive role in the broad 
democratic alliance’. Therefore, SRCs must relate the struggles in schools to 
the struggles in their communities (Wolpe, 1988, p. 206).  
 
This anti-apartheid activist speech is noteworthy in three senses: 1) it proclaims the 
value of individual autonomy and the appeal to the public good, as central features of 
the model of democracy developed in the anti-apartheid struggle; 2) it encourages 
more students to participate in collective self-government than the colonial British 
and the apartheid South African systems of ‘boy-government’ permits; and 3) it 
suggests that participation of students in democratic ‘student-government’ develops 
an active character and contributes to the common welfare of South African society. 
Drawing on Barber’s (1984) theory of a strong democracy, Chapter 3 maintained that 
the two terms participation and community are features of Athenian citizenship, and 
by implication citizenship education. I Chapter 3, I also showed how Edwards and 
Fogelman’s (1991) school study of representative democracy emphasised the 
educative potential of learners’ participation. It is evident that School Representative 
Councils are likely to foster active citizenship engagement, both at national and at 
local level of school.  
  
153 
 
The SRCs’ vision of school participation was reflective of the popular will and power 
envisioned and required in a post-apartheid South Africa in the mid 1980s. The 
SSRC, COSAS and AZASO also provided a political model for students elsewhere in 
the country who set up their own representative structures. Schools still within the 
Bantu Education system set up their own Student Representative Councils as an 
alternative to the ‘prefect system’. In some schools SRCs successfully replaced 
prefects; in other schools both traditions co-existed, and attempts to establish SRC 
structures in conservative schools were met with fierce resistance by school 
authorities. Where conservative authority held sway the co-existence of prefectship 
and ‘dummy’ Student Representative Councils were accepted unwillingly, but in 
most schools prefects were rejected as being lackeys of the principals.  
 
Where SRCs existed in these state institutions, they did so in defiance of the state, but 
without the ability to organise and mobilise as before. The SRCs regarded their 
representation in school governance as a crucial element in the complete overhauling 
and democratisation of the schooling system. Even though the government banned 
SRCs and later, in 1986, outlawed ‘People’s Education’, the student struggle for and 
recognition for democratic SRCs continued until the SASA (1996) paved the way for 
the RCLs. Student Representative Councils’ achievements included, inter alia, the 
upholding of the principle of democratic school governance and  the empowerment 
and education of the student population or citizenry; achievements that testified to the 
relevance and, indeed, the compellingness of the classical theory, that is broad 
‘active’ participation of citizens in South Africa, in general, and in schools, in 
particular. These achievements were considerable, and they indicate that a ‘prefect 
system’ that embraced what were arguably less than democratic methods, such as 
elitism and competitiveness, is far from constituting agency of educational change. 
The SRCs, on the other hand, underlined the need for more scope for participatory 
democracy and representation in schools. To what extent was this student government 
articulated and expressed in post-apartheid SRCs? 
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The South African Schools Act (1996) provided for a new uniform system for the 
organisation, governance and funding of schools. Starting with the Education White 
Paper 2: The Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools (1996), the idea of 
democratic authority in schools was clearly articulated:  
 
Other representative and deliberative structures within schools, such as 
student representative councils, parents’ associations, and staff meetings, are 
important for successful democratic practice and school management. They 
should support, but not substitute for, the governing body. An SRC in each 
school should be mandatory (Department of Education, 1996, p. 10).  
 
Up to this point, the populist language of student participation in democratic school 
governance continued to inform South African educational policy. That is, the 
Education White Paper 2’s notion of Student Representative Structures was 
interpreted as an expression of participatory democracy and representation, namely as 
being in the best interests of parents, teachers and pupils to have a school that is both 
well governed and well managed in a participatory manner. This implies that in 
democratic school governance relationships are based on equality, with no place for a 
merely minimal and conditional role for student participation. 
 
The SA Schools Bill was viewed as a historic piece of legislation that lays the basis 
for the democratic Representative Councils of Learners. The White Paper’s provision 
for the establishment of a Representative Council of Learners indicated “the 
realisation of the long struggle by students for representative SRCs’ […] All 
reference to the prefect system has been taken out of the Act” (Nzimande, 1996). The 
Bill was reflective of the history of student struggle, especially the abolishing of the 
prefect system in South African schools. At best, however, such efforts and struggles 
enjoyed only ephemeral success. The SA Schools Bill became an Act in 1996. Given 
the history of student struggle for a democratic representative system, it was hoped 
that the Schools Act would do away with autocratic prefectship in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Ironically, the Guides subsequently downplayed the SA Schools Bill’s 
acknowledgement of the SRC tradition. Instead, the Guides contradicted the SA 
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Schools Bill by recommending the merger of both the ‘prefect system’ and SRC 
traditions. Using this dual framework of representation, that is constituted by the 
prefect system and SRCs, I explore and clarify the conceptual schemes underlying the 
current Representative Councils for Learners. This I will do by using Sithole’s (1995) 
four critical viewpoints, or perspectives, on how South African education policy has 
perceived and articulated the participation of students in school governance for the 
past two centuries.  
 
6.4 Critical analysis of the Guides for Representative Councils of Learners 
Sithole’s four contending perspectives are not complementary, but, rather, 
contradictory —if not mutually exclusive.
42
 The perspectives on school student 
participation in representative governing bodies in South African schools are as 
follows: 
●  The idea that students should have a role in school governance is an absurdity 
of the first order. 
●  Students became involved in the struggle as part of that     abnormality.  
●  Students do have a role to play in school governance, but it should be 
circumscribed.  
●  Students are one of the most indispensable components of democratic school 
governance at secondary school. 
 
                                                 
42
 Sithole’s contending perspectives must be understood in context of South African history of 
education, i.e. a country whose education system has undergone different stages, such as colonialism, 
apartheid and democracy In the two previous chapters I mentioned that what is emerging in post-
apartheid education policy in South Africa is a concept of citizenship education comprising of complex 
and contradictory elements that provide both continuity and discontinuity with what preceded the 1994 
historic democratic elections. In short, there is a tension in post-apartheid South African educational 
policy and subsequent curriculum development between minimal and maximal conceptions of 
education for citizenship. Evidently, policy development after the transition, including the Guides for 
Representative Councils of Learners (1999), the proposed Bill of Responsibilities and the new national 
Schools Pledge (2008) reflect a minimalist conception of citizenship and, by implication, of citizenship 
education. I will examine the Bill and the Pledge in greater detail in Chapter 8.   
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Sithole’s four critical viewpoints can be mapped in accordance with Pitkin’s (1967) 
idea of a representative model of democracy. Outside the realm of substantive 
representation reside Sithole’s first three perspectives that see students’ role in school 
governance as absurd, abnormal and restricted, respectively. These set the outer limits 
of what Pitkin deems acceptable as representation in the substantive sense. Only the 
last view, that is indispensability of student participation, occupies the intermediate 
range. This view emphasises the significance of common deliberation and rational 
argument, where ordinary citizens are not content to leave matters to the expert. For 
the purpose of this chapter, Sithole’s typology provides a framework for analysing 
South Africa’s three contrasting student representative bodies or traditions. The 
‘prefect system’ regarded a prefect as a member of a superior elite of wisdom and 
reason. Similar to Sithole’s first three viewpoints, the prefect tradition leaves the 
realm of representation altogether, and we “end up with an expert taking care of the 
ignorant masses as a parent takes care of a child” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 419). In the 
intermediate range, one finds the SRCs’ tradition that treated both the representative 
and constituents as relatively equal in capacity and wisdom and information. At the 
other extreme, one also finds the RCLs who are perceived as ordinary, fallible 
representatives, with no special knowledge or abilities. Let us take a look at how 
Sithole’s viewpoints are reflected in the Guides document.    
 
The first viewpoint mentioned by Sithole dismisses the idea that students should have 
a role in school governance as an absurdity of the first order. There is ambivalence in 
the Guides interpretation of the Student Representative Councils’ role in the struggle 
for a democratic South Africa 
 
In practice we have found that learners quickly realise the significance of their 
role in an RCL once they understand the connections between the struggle for 
democracy in the past, and the present need to consolidate and broaden 
democracy as we strive to build our nation (Department of Education, 1999, 
p. 11).  
 
This perspective does not place significant weight on democratic and participatory 
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governance structures in education. The Guides seemed to have taken a leaf from this 
portrait of the apocalyptic view of the youth as described in Seekings (1993) and 
Hyslop’s (1988) work later in this chapter. Unsurprisingly, the authors of the 
document are preoccupied with stability and normality in South African schools, 
rather than with the educative potential of learner participation The Guides set out to 
promote and maintain discipline in schools. To ensure that order and discipline is 
maintained, the Guides call on the RCL to appoint a sub-committee responsible for 
discipline in public schools. Though the sub-committee cannot punish learners, it 
should nevertheless encourage them to commit to the code of conduct. For example, 
learners may sign a statement that they subscribe to the code, “it [the Representative 
Councils for Learners] must promote and maintain discipline among learners and 
promote the general welfare of the school. … It must promote orderliness and not 
disrupt the order in the school” (Department of Education, 1999, p. 13). The Guides’ 
emphasis on maintaining stability and normality supports the view that says: student 
struggle for representative participatory democracy must be understood as having 
taken place in the context that South Africa was at war — an abnormal situation. 
Sithole’s first viewpoint or feature endorsed the ‘prefect system’, as far as school 
governance is concerned. It comes as no surprise that elements such as competitive 
leadership, authority and discipline central to prefectorial government are reflected in 
the Guides.  
 
Explicit in the Guides is the ‘boy-government’s’ conscious technique of competitive 
elitism and authoritarianism. The Guides emphasise competition among learners to 
become representatives, rather than the involvement of all in a participatory 
democracy. The Guides define Representative Councils of Learners as:  
 
The most prestigious official structure of learners in the entire school […A] 
structure made up of learners elected by their fellow learners to represent 
them […T]he only body that represents every learner and in which every 
learner can participate (Department of Education, 1999, p. 11). 
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Electing a student leader to a hierarchical structure is seen as comparable to electing a 
professional politician to the office of president, premier or mayor. This race for 
leadership provides for competition for power and authority among learners in 
general. On the face of it, competition for power and prestige (as opposed to 
participatory democracy) runs the risk of silencing the less assertive and articulate 
learners. As a consequence of the exclusion of a large number of South African 
learners, in an ideal participatory system, competition for leadership would not be a 
defining characteristic. In Chapter 2, I challenged Schumpeter’s minimalist 
conception of democratic participation, where sovereignty was exercised by a subset 
of ‘the people’, usually on the basis of election. This chapter defends a modified 
version of the Athenian prototype that sought to challenge the Guides’ anti-popular-
participation argument, especially the alleged inability of Schumpeter’s electoral 
citizens to participate in political life. To reiterate the point I made also in Chapter 2, 
virtually all claims to expert knowledge, as opposed to substantial emphasis on 
participatory citizenry as a model of education for citizenship, are fallible. Theorists 
of the prototypical, maximal concept of democracy, such as Pericles (Thucydides, 
1972), Rousseau (1968) and Mill (1975) have shown that citizens’ active 
participation in a democracy is likely to be educational, namely to contribute 
significantly to the education of the entire people’s intellectual, moral and practical 
capacities. In short, the Guides’ hierarchical and exclusive body of citizenship is 
telling, in that it does not endorse a participatory form of representative democracy 
that is enjoyed by a significant proportion of the South African learners.   
 
In a democracy equable participation is likely to foster active, critical and inquiring 
citizens, appropriate in western democratic societies like South Africa. According to 
Budge (1993), there is no insurmountable knowledge barrier between leaders and 
electorates that cannot be addressed. In support of the theorists of a prototypical, 
maximal concept of democracy, this chapter has shown how the prefectorial system 
was resented and rejected, because prefects enjoyed privileges and powers and were 
easily distinguished from the rest of the student population in South African schools 
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in the 1970s. The Guides encourage an interest-based model of democracy. This 
model is implied by the emphasis on voting and competition for leadership. One 
might argue against this view that Representative Councils for Learners should not be 
seen as little national legislative bodies of representatives from different and hostile 
interests, but rather as deliberative assemblies or bodies of one community, with one 
primary interest, namely, the active participation of all. The stress on competitive 
struggle for the learners’ vote is likely to undermine ‘participation’, an essential 
component of representative democracy in post-apartheid South African schools. 
 
As stated earlier, the South African Schools Act stipulates that Representative 
Councils for Learners must be established in schools with learners in Grade 8 and 
higher (14-18 years of age). A Teacher Liaison Officer (TLO) is nominated or elected 
by the learners or educators of a particular school to help and guide the RCLs. The 
Guides clearly view both leaders and constituents as ordinary fallible people with no 
special knowledge or abilities. The learners are assumed to possess little wisdom and 
reason. Like Schumpeter’s (1950) democratic elitism, the Guides have a good deal to 
say about the RCL’s lack of rationality in political matters. The following provisions 
bear testimony to this claim: 
 
An MEC (Member of the Executive Council) may, by notice in the 
Provincial Gazette, set out how an RCL is to be established, how the 
members are to be elected and what the functions of the RCL are (p. 9)… 
The TLO must help to guide and organise the RCL. … The TLO must 
also develop a sense of leadership in the members of the RCL 
(Department of Education, 1999, p. 6). 
 
The Guides’ reference to MECs and TLOs as experts in school democratic 
representation is reminiscent of a minimal and conditional role for the demos, 
sketched in discussion of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Chapter 2. To recall (from 
Chapter 2), these theorists argued that mass political participation leads to worse 
results and picking the brains of the populace is harmful in a democratic polity. In the 
words of Ndlovu and Dieltiens (2004), the “impulse to … encourage [student 
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representation and] participation needs to be embarked on with caution … 
participatory democracy fails when too much is expected of participants, without 
sufficient guidance, support and even control from the centre” (p. 7). 
The Guides seem to suggest that the RCL’s picture of democratic man is hopelessly 
unrealistic, and therefore, the RCL’s need MECs or TLOs to tell them what to do. 
The Guides give the impression that  
● without MECs’ guidance, support and control, ‘student government’ is neither 
feasible nor desirable in post-apartheid South African schools;   
● student participation and representation in school governance requires 
judgement, skill and rational commitment, essential attributes that only the 
TLOs possess; 
● in the end, the post-apartheid South African education policy’s selection of 
citizenship education —a top down, vertical logic —dilutes the Student 
Representative tradition.  
 
The reduced sense of responsibility and lack of trust suggest that learners drop down 
to a lower level of mental performance as soon as they enter the school governance 
arena. The Guides share the revisionists’ overall claim that populist theories of 
democracy involve unnecessary and unrealistic assumptions about the political 
interest, knowledge and rationality of the average citizen, particularly young adults. 
The objection might be raised that learners are young, with an as yet insufficient 
developed sense of responsibility, to participate in political issues on equal terms with 
adults. Learners may indeed be less mature and so disqualified, for the time being, 
from citizenship, but they remain one of the most indispensable components in 
promoting and consolidating democracy in South African schools.  
 
The Guides’ selection of what form of education for citizenship is appropriate to 
consolidating democracy in South African schools is not about the nature of 
adulthood vis-à-vis childhood or adolescence. It is about the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa’s (1996) provision of every citizen’s rights and 
161 
 
responsibilities to play an active part in citizenship, namely public participation in 
central, provincial and local government. I contend that learners ought to have a say 
and share in collective decisions on matters affecting the life of the school —for 
example, the school uniform, school times, late arrivals, missing classes, sport, 
organization of school debates, field trips and so on. The Guides’ conception of 
democratic student representation does not articulate a notion of citizenship education 
that is appropriate for the South African context. The maximal conception of 
citizenship is likely to address comprehensively the Guides’ view of learners as 
citizens-in-waiting who need to be inducted into their future role. It is to the second 
and third features that relate to the Guides’ approach to Representative Council of 
Learners in post-apartheid South African schools that we now turn our focus. 
 
As it were, Sithole’s (1998) second viewpoint, which resembles but is distinct from 
the first, accepts that students played an important role in the liberation struggle in 
this country. However, it contends that this must be understood in the context of a 
South African struggle against the apartheid regime where students were embroiled in 
an abnormal situation. In Chapter 5, I mentioned that the early 1980s was a period 
when school students were associated with a perceived tradition of violence, 
destruction and ungovernability in South Africa. The consequence was a growing rift 
between the older generation (parents, teachers, academics, community leaders, 
religious bodies and so forth) on the one side, and students on the other. It would 
appear, then, that the Guides interpret this history of student struggle for democracy 
as threatening and inappropriate in post-apartheid South African schools. In terms of 
this view students should not be involved in school governance. It is against this 
background that the Guides, like the Bill of Responsibilities and the national School 
Pledge, as Chapter 8 will show, might be seen as dictating or demanding 
unquestioning obedience from learners in South African schools.   
 
The third viewpoint is premised on the notion that students do have a role to play in 
school governance, but that this should be circumscribed. This view reiterates the 
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Guides’ inability to envisage a form of representative democracy that is enjoyed by a 
significant proportion of South African pupils. The policy document supports this 
claim: 
The purpose of this Guide is to supply you (RCLs) with relevant information 
about your roles and to help you to develop the skills required to play your 
part in improving and stabilising your school. … An RCL also has to enable 
learners to contribute towards the improvement of the culture of learning, 
teaching and service in their school (Department of Education, 1999, pp. 6, 
11). 
 
Regrettably, the laudable emphasis on a culture of learning, teaching and service 
coincides with the erosion of the SRCs’ historical vision of democracy. However, the 
anti-apartheid struggle’s vision of democratic participation showed that a maximal 
concept of democracy or popular politics is feasible, realistic and can, in fact, restore 
stability in schools. Questions might be raised about the Guides’ acknowledgement of 
the “tradition of Student Representative Councils which played a major role in the 
birth of the new South Africa” (Department of Education, 1999, p. 11). I argue that 
the Guides do not seem to rekindle ‘the best elements’ of the SRCs’ history and 
tradition appropriate for South Africa’s democracy, as the document alleges. The 
‘best feature’ of the Student Representative Councils’ tradition was its emphasis on 
the educative potential of learner participation. 
 
The three main concerns I have with the Guides’ attempt to provide a ‘third way’ 
between the competing prefect system and SRCs’ traditions are that, first, this is an 
effort to balance disparate, competing student representative styles; and second, the 
Guides’ conception of democratic citizenship education provides both continuity and 
discontinuity with what preceded the 1994 historic democratic elections; and third, its 
commitment to democratic student representation consequently does not articulate the 
practice of a substantial form of student representative democracy in South African 
schools. Furthermore, the Guides’ interpretation of the vision of student participation, 
which emphasises the need for stability, presupposes a threat to civility and order in 
society. Supposedly, this threat is seen as coming from the youth, given that only, 
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“the best elements of the SRC tradition had to be considered in order to see what was 
appropriate” [for South African schools] (Department of Education, 1999, p. 11), and 
the Guides seek to counter the threat by emphasising a stabilising role for youth 
leaders.  
 
According to Seekings (1993), the apocalyptic stereotype of the youth is essentially 
hostile, identifying the youth with violence and destruction. As already mentioned in 
this chapter, the early 1980s was a period when school students were associated with 
a perceived tradition of violence, destruction and ungovernabilty in South Africa. To 
cite one example, students enforced consumer boycotts and stay-aways, often in a 
violent arbitrary fashion against alleged boycott breakers. The ‘immediatism’ among 
the school student population was expressed in the slogan ‘Liberation Now, 
Education Later’ in 1985. Students’ struggle against what they referred to as ‘gutter’ 
education threatened to shipwreck the entire student movement. According to Hyslop 
(1988), “lack of leadership and of formal structures, and weak or non-existent 
political education, laid the student movement open to exploitation by lumpen 
elements, and prey to a tendency to lash out blindly and violently at anyone who 
incurred suspicion” (p. 198) .  
 
This trend towards politically destructive violence took a number of forms. One was a 
sequence of attacks, often deadly, on individuals held responsible for the deaths of 
students. A second form of this lumpen violence was the ‘necklace phenomenon’, 
namely put and set alight a wheel tyre doused with petrol around the victims head. A 
third form of this lumpen politics was the vicious rivalry that erupted between the 
student supporters of the United Democratic Front and the National Forum (NF).
43
 In 
contrast, the model of democracy developed in the anti-apartheid struggle shows that 
popular politics can be realistic and ‘in fact’ restore stability, both inside and outside 
the school. This was evident by the NECC’s saved the School Student movement 
                                                 
43
 A non-Charterist umbrella organisation (i.e. one not guided by the Freedom Charter) formed by the 
Azanian People’s Organisation in 1983. 
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from self-inflicted danger and destruction, creating unity between students and 
communities and giving students political direction, as was evident between 1985 and 
1986. 
 
Seekings (1993) challenges the apocalyptic stereotype of SRCs and youth in general 
during the 1980s. According to him, this characterisation is an over-simplification. 
Reducing the youth to participants in violence ignores school students’ education and 
democratic achievements. For Sithole, (1998) creating a significant role for students 
in democratic school governance structures will lead to schools becoming “fertile 
ground for training and building future leaders” (p. 111). I am in agreement with 
Sithole’s consequentialist justification for creating these roles for students in 
democratic school governance. We have seen how students challenged the unpopular 
‘prefect system’ and conceptualised their own modes of democratic student 
representation. Students played a significant role in overthrowing apartheid by 
participating in political boycotts, rallies, meetings, marches and stay-aways.  
 
In terms of education, students took part in ‘People’s Education’ through debates, 
discussions, plays, poetry readings, films and songs. The Guides misinterpret this 
significant chapter of school student politics. Even though the SRCs’ educational and 
political struggle reflects the culture, as it existed at the time, the democratic 
education acquired is still relevant in promoting and consolidating South Africa’s 
young democracy. The student history of struggling for democracy seems to have 
fallen victim to a post-apartheid citizenship education policy that does not speak to its 
intended democratic audience, and —significantly —to the assumption that now that 
democracy is in place, there is no further reason for critical interrogation of the status 
quo.  
 
The Guides provide a minimal and conditional role for student representation. 
Theorists of participatory democracy, such as Rousseau (1968); Mill (1975); Budge 
(1993); and Benhabib (1996), have endorsed the idea of participation (though the 
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focus is on adult citizens) and provide substantial arguments for its educational value. 
The Guides document states the purpose of the Representative Council of Learners 
with regard to participatory democracy in school governance structures: “The council 
is to provide learners with an opportunity to participate in school governance and to 
participate in appropriate decision-making” (Department of Education, 1999, p. 11). 
On this point, the Guides’ vision is inexplicit and unhelpful. The Guides allow 
participation of learners in decision-making only in “appropriate” cases. Those 
appropriate cases are not spelled out. The fact that participation is limited suggests 
that there is little room for democratic student representation of the type promoted by 
the NECC and School Student movement of the 1980s. It is evident, then, that the 
Guides undermine SRCs’ participatory forms of representation, and that their 
favoured conception of education for citizenship is minimalist. This apparent 
opposition to large-scale participatory form of representation points to substantial 
similarities between the Guides and the revisionists’ assumptions about democracy.   
 
The fourth point of view identified by Sithole holds that students are one of the most 
indispensable components of democratic school governance at secondary school. 
Regarding this aspect, educational struggle has seen students confront the lack of 
direct, participatory forms of representation in school governance through the 
demand for democratically elected SRCs. Student Representative Councils became 
representatives of social change, and played a critical role in the general struggle for 
democracy and emancipatory education in South Africa, particularly in the struggle 
for educational transformation. Students’ educational demands involved the 
democratisation of school relations linked to a broader national political struggle. One 
of Bundy’s (1987) commentators recognised the students’ contribution: 
 
I mean there is no doubt about that, that the whole struggle in South Africa is 
dominated by the students. The students are in the forefront of the struggle 
[…T]he students organising and —you know - shaping the history of the 
country; and hence it is the students who forced apartheid to introduce so-
called reforms (Bundy, 1987, p. 318). 
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The SRCs were able to relate the struggles in schools to the anti-apartheid struggle in 
South Africa. This connection between the struggle for democratic representation and 
the struggle for national liberation was well captured by a COSAS activist, who said 
“we are members of society before we are students’ —and thereby [Student 
Representative Councils must]… demonstrate that students can play a ‘progressive 
role in the broad democratic alliance” (Wolpe, 1988, p. 206). The general 
involvement of students in national politics, and particularly in protest against 
apartheid education was linked to every sector of society: women, academics, 
workers, civics, professionals, political groupings and so on. The present analysis 
supports Sithole’s fourth perspective, which argues that students are one of the most 
indispensable components of democratic school governance at secondary schools. If 
the lack of conceptual clarity, coherence and consistency in post-apartheid South 
African educational policy is anything to go by, there is little chance for the SRCs’ 
view to triumph. There has been a significant shift from the populist language that 
advocated classical progressive education based on political and educational 
strategies towards an emphasis on education without political connotations.  
 
The SRCs’ history as student government and power is reduced in the Guides to 
instruments for liaison and communication in schools. The authoritarian and less 
democratic rule once challenged by the SRCs and the NECC appears to have found 
its way into the Guides. School students are discouraged from challenging and 
questioning the prerogatives of the principals and educators and the Departments of 
Education:  
 
An RCL must support or contribute to the sound management of the school 
authorities and must normally act in accordance with the school authorities. 
… An RCL must remember that the relationship between educators and their 
employers (the provincial Department of Education) is governed by Labour 
Law and that they have no direct influence on labour processes and matters. 
… It [the Representative Councils for Learners] must liaise and communicate 
with the learners, professional school management team (SMT) and the SGB 
at the school (Department of Education, 1999, pp. 12-13, addition mine). 
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There is no longer a mass democratic movement that brought together a number of 
students, political and organisational strands. The School Student movement’s vision 
of mass participatory democracy and equality concerned with democratisation of 
control over schooling at local, regional and national level is obliterated by the state. 
Though the Guides lean on a minimal view of education for citizenship, there are 
other aspects of the Guides that do give encouragement to a maximal reading. Among 
other positive elements that are stressed in the document are learners’ voice and 
representation in the SGBs (p. 12). An RCL fosters participation and democratises 
school activities (p. 13). However, the Guides do not indicate how this would be 
done. After every meeting an RCL gives feedback to the learners. If an idea is turned 
down, and RCL must explain why approval was not granted (14). Differences of 
opinion are accepted among learners (15). Democratic decisions and constant 
consultation is to be sought all the time (Department of Education, 1999, p, 16).  
 
However, it is impossible to read the Guides in an unambiguously maximalist way 
because, as shown earlier, its recommendations are ambiguous and, indeed, flawed. 
The Guides claim to promote student participatory form of representation is not 
clearly articulated. Although the document has a maximalist tone in places, at the 
very least it fails to provide guidance at the very points where it is most required. As 
a result, education policy in South Africa after the transition recedes from the model 
of democratic citizenship education developed in the anti-apartheid movement, with 
roots in the Freedom Charter tradition. Given this analysis the possible direction for 
the Guides is that it will join the scrap-heap of moderate South African education 
policy and curriculum development’s attempt to move towards participatory, 
community-based education for citizenship. In short, the Guides do not encourage 
learners to promote and deepen democracy in South African schools.  
 
The break with the SRCs’ concept of democratic student representation in schools has 
been diluted in the Guides for Representative Councils of Learners. For example, 
Members of the Executive Councils have vested powers to determine the powers and 
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functions of governing bodies. The MECs may grant or refuse additional powers to 
governing bodies. Evidence of this shift can be seen, firstly, in the way earlier 
concepts of students’ mass participatory democracy gave way to legalisation and 
officialisation of student representatives in South African schools. Secondly, the 
Student Representative Councils’ organisational unity, vision of democracy and 
political awareness has been transmuted into a concern with reconciliation between 
the prefect and SRCs tradition. Thirdly, technocrats like the TLO representatives have 
assumed the role of experts taking care of the ignorant student populace in South 
African schools. The Student Representative Councils’ struggle had the effect of 
empowering and educating the student population; technocratic discourse is likely to 
have the effect of disempowering them. As stated in Chapter 5, the educational and 
political strategy of ‘People’s Education’ is giving way to a technocratic politics or 
discourse.  
 
I have examined three ways in which, over the past two centuries, the concept of 
student representation has been used in order to analyse student democratic 
participation and representation in post-apartheid South African schools. The concept 
has oscillated between autocratic ‘boy-government’ and democratic ‘student-
government’ interpretations in South African educational history. Of note in the 
present conjuncture is the ‘official’ attempt to merge both ‘boy-government’ and 
‘student-government’ systems, an aim that is likely to overshadow the latter tradition 
of mass-based democracy. Neither the tradition of prefectship nor the RCLs have 
much to contribute to the development of citizenship education in South Africa. This 
is arguably better achieved if we rediscover the SRCs’ rich traditional voice and give 
learners once again the power to speak. It is by participating at the local institutions 
like schools that the individual ‘learns’ democracy. The SRCs constituted the 
potential to educate for citizenship in a democratic society, because through 
participation in it students found a ‘free space’ that produced active, informed and 
critical citizenry convinced that they can influence government in their quest to 
achieve an equitable, democratic and participatory schooling system.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
Although the Guides claim to consolidate democracy in South African schools, their 
recommendations, to combine prefectorial government and Student Representative 
Councils into RCLs, leave the RCLs with dominant elements of the ‘prefect system’. 
Many black school students viewed the elite prefect system as part of the overall 
apartheid education system. Within the national educational struggle orbit, 
prefectship was resented and rejected in predominately black schools. Alternatively, 
black students found space in democratic SRCs for self-definition, for organising, and 
participating in a microcosm of democratic self-governance. The Guides selection of 
democratic citizenship education, namely its attempt to provide a ‘third way’ between 
the competing prefect system and SRCs’ traditions has also to be understood in the 
context of a negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy, a compromise that 
ultimately led to the Government of National Unity in 1994. Its commitment to 
democratic student representation does not articulate the practice of a substantial form 
of student representative democracy. It does not envisage citizenship education that is 
enjoyed by a significant proportion of the South African learners. Unfortunately, what 
seems to characterise the Guides is a lack of an adequate concept of democratic 
participation and representation, a maximal concept that is necessary in order to 
promote, deepen and consolidate democracy in South African schools. I cannot 
imagine better structures to promote and consolidate education for citizenship and 
teaching of democracy in South African schools than the democratically elected and 
representative school councils. We need to select citizenship education programmes 
carefully. The choices we make have consequences for the kind of democratic South 
African society we ultimately help to create. The next chapter is concerned with 
fundamental philosophical questions such as the aim, justification and defence of 
compulsory schooling and compulsory citizenship education in post-apartheid 
education policy for South African schools.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
COMPULSORY SCHOOLING AND OBLIGATORY CITIZENSHIP 
EDUCATION
44
 IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Every politically controlled educational system will inculcate the doctrine of 
state supremacy sooner or later, whether as the divine right of kings, or the 
‘will of the people’ in a ‘democracy’. Once that doctrine has been accepted, it 
becomes an almost superhuman task to break the stranglehold of the political 
power over the life of the citizen. It has had his body, property, and mind in 
its clutches from infancy. An octopus would sooner release its prey (Paterson, 
[1943], 1972, quoted in Davie, 2005, p. 33). 
  
7.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter pointed out how the British schooling system aimed at 
producing courageous and loyal boys, devoted to the British imperial power. The idea 
of compulsory schooling in South Africa was inherited from the British tradition. In 
South Africa, colonial settlers encouraged compulsory Christian education and 
compulsory manual work to push black students into positions of servility and to turn 
them into efficient and compliant workers. Under the National Party government, the 
nationalists trained white children for an ‘uncritical’ and ‘supportive’ role under the 
status quo while assigning to them a superior form of citizenship. At the same time, 
the period of struggle prior to 1994 developed a vision of a free, compulsory 
education system pertinent to the creation of a democratic state based on the will of 
the South African people. The idea of compulsory schooling based on a democratic 
vision of the anti-apartheid struggle presupposes a particular conception of schooling, 
                                                 
44
 Schooling (institutional or formal school education) is often taken as synonymous with education 
per se (a process of enculturation). It is frequently forgotten that schooling and education are not 
identical concepts, and that what goes on inside the school is not necessarily always education. It may 
initially appear paradoxical that a learner should be forced to receive education which s/he is entitled 
to. For the purpose of this chapter, it will be assumed that individuals have the right to education, a 
claim that arguably cannot be compelled, while what is to be enforced is schooling. In other words, 
education occurs as a result of compulsory primary and secondary schooling. 
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namely one that is appropriate for a free, non-racial and democratic South African 
society. It is this struggle for a free, compulsory and uniform system of education that 
sought to break the stranglehold of the National Party’s political power over the lives 
of the oppressed black South African population. The purpose of this chapter is to 
defend compulsion, arguing that within the framework of the Athenian concept of 
democracy, and its emphasis on the educative potential of learner participation, state 
regulated compulsory schooling can be justified as an essential component of the 
curriculum in post-apartheid South African schools.  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1 notes that the concept of 
compulsory schooling is a recent phenomenon inherited from the western education 
tradition. Section 2 shows that claiming the right to free and compulsory schooling 
and, by implication, of compulsory citizenship education is linked to the Freedom 
Charter and reflected in the Constitution of South Africa (1996). Section 3 points to 
the global policies that reflect the prototypical concept of democracy, with regard to 
state regulated compulsory citizenship education. Section 4 argues that within the 
theoretical framework of the Athenian version of democratic citizenship, compulsory 
schooling and compulsory citizenship education can be justified on the grounds that 
they develop active, self-helping type of character and promote social cohesion — 
which is the common good in a democratic South African society. Given the 
specificities of this background, it will be argued that compulsory citizenship 
education has special significance in post-apartheid South African schools.  
 
7.2 The origins of a formal compulsory schooling in South Africa 
The Dutch missionaries introduced an official practice of compulsory attendance in 
South Africa. I used the term ‘official’ because before the arrival of the Dutch and 
British settlers there were no formal schools as we know them today. According to 
Christie (1988), in pre-colonial African societies education was part of daily life. 
African children learned by experience from doing tasks. For example:  
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The boys learned how to distinguish useful grasses and dangerous weeds, how 
to stalk wild game, and how to stalk sheep and goats. … All children were 
taught tribal history by oral tradition and were also helped to acquire the 
sacred cultural mores and attitudes as well as the modes of behaviour which 
were valued by their society. While the mothers prepared the evening meal 
after a long working day, the grandmother kept the children awake by telling 
fireside stories and by asking them to find answers to riddles and puzzles 
(Kajubi, 1974, p. 80). 
 
This is one of the seven “cardinal goals of African traditional education identified by 
Fafunwa (1974)”, according to Adeyemi and Adeyinka (2003), to “develop a sense of 
belonging and to participate actively in family and community affairs” (p. 429). The 
question is, however, whether this goal can be transported into post-traditional social 
contexts. In Chapter 2, I mentioned, following Enslin and Horsthemke, that Adeyemi 
and Adeyinka’s (2003) principles of African traditional education “are either not 
particularly or uniquely African or do not constitute obvious ‘sound’ foundations” 
(Enslin and Horsthemke, 2004, p. 554). In agreement with Enslin and Horsthemke 
(2004), I maintained that the basic principles of democratic citizenship education are 
neither western nor (South) African, but apply to any society. In addition, Adeyemi 
and Adeyinka identified two weaknesses of African traditional education. First, pre-
colonial ‘People’s Education’ exclusively focused on the clan or tribe. A second 
concern is (perhaps inevitable) the problem of indoctrination, i.e. educating learners 
by means of instilling fear and punishment. In short, the simple biggest drawback of 
African traditional education in the pre-colonial era is obvious. It produced obedient 
and submissive learners loyal to the African traditional authorities or elders. 
 
Importantly, the concept of compulsory schooling formulated in Dutch religious  
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circles and English industrial cities
45
 was to shape the South African schooling 
system until the turn of the 19th century. In 1652 the Dutch settlers arrived at the 
Cape. The settler government (1652 to 1806) brought with them a tradition of 
religious education under the direct control of the Dutch Reformed Church, through 
bodies such as the Consistory, the Scholarch, and the Bible-and-School Commission. 
Much the same as in Holland, religious education in the Cape had ‘compulsory’ 
features to it:  
 
The religious and civil affairs were very closely connected. …   Attendance of 
the Burgers
46
 at the Sunday services was compulsory on pain of forfeiture of 
six days’ wine ration for the first offence, one month’s pay for the second, and 
the penalty of working in chains for a year for the third offence (Malherbe, 
1925, p. 31). 
 
The Dutch concept of compulsory religious education was declared by the 
commandership of Jan van Riebeek (Governor of the Cape) in 1652 and 1659. In 
contrast, unlike in Britain where compulsory schooling was used to instil self-
discipline and social control in the urban youth, the Dutch authorities by law had 
power and authority to enforce compulsory attendance at Sunday service as a sign of 
humbleness and obedience to God. In the eyes of the Dutch, compulsory Sunday 
services and the use of compulsion were generally necessary to get the Burgers to 
respect official proclamation and attain moral excellence as expected by the church. 
                                                 
45
 During the late 1700s and early 1800s, Europe witnessed the beginning of industry and the growth 
of factories. According to Stephens (1998), by the 1850s, crime, endemic poverty and social unrest 
appeared to be spiralling, especially in urban areas, spawning fear of social disintegration. Given the 
social unrest that developed as a result of urbanisation and industrialisation, compulsory schooling was 
considered to resolve the urban crisis, a similar pattern which developed in South Africa in the 1940s 
and 1950s. In Chapter 6, I mentioned that British schools produced brave, courageous boys, moulded 
into conformity and loyalty towards the British Empire. Mack (1938) gave a vivid description of what 
the British Empire needed then: “manly, well-adjusted, honourable boys moulded into unthinking 
conformity and imbued with passionate idealising loyalty towards authority, whether school or nation” 
(p. 125). In sum, British compulsory schooling served a dual purpose: First, as a tool for ‘taming’ or 
‘civilising’ learners, educating them to the disciplines of industrial and urban society; and second it 
promoted obedient citizens who were loyal to the British Empire. 
 
46
 The ancestors of the present day Afrikaners, these free citizens of the Boer republic occupied the top 
rungs of the social hierarchy with Khoikhoi and slaves at the bottom. 
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The Dutch colonists’ conception of themselves as civilised Christians enabled them 
to accept compulsory religious education as the ‘natural order of things’. This 
coercive power of the Dutch Reformed Church translated into a substantial denial of 
Burghers’ — civil rights of citizenship. In other words, instead of civic liberties 
invoked to limit interference by Dutch authorities, individual rights were interpreted 
to include the obligations to obey the law and behave in a morally acceptable way.  
 
The first formal school for the Dutch East Indian Company’s slaves was opened in 
the Cape on 17 April 1658. In 1652 a colonial decree made school attendance 
compulsory for all slave children under the age of 12 and twice weekly attendance for 
older slave children. Van Riebeeck put into words the aim of compulsion in slaves’ 
schools when he wrote in his diary: “to stimulate the slaves to attention while at 
school and to induce them to learn the Christian prayers” (Horrell, 1970, p. 3). For 
example, slaves were promised each a glass of brandy and two inches of tobacco, for 
finishing their education tasks. According to Molteno (1991), the student-slaves 
resisted colonial Christian compulsory schooling that prepared them for subordinate 
positions, by flight and hiding in caves. Resistance to the Dutch and British colonial 
form of compulsory schooling will receive attention at the end of this section.  
Slaves’ co-operation was hard to secure and they continued to reject imposed 
compulsory schooling under the British authority. 
 
In 1815 the British took over the Cape from the Dutch, and black schools became 
places of religious instruction, as well as of manual industry. Under British rule, some 
35, 745 slaves were freed at the Cape and equal rights were extended to the Khoi and 
other persons of colour. According to Horrell (1970), schooling became important in 
that ‘free’ slaves “became vagrants, squatting on government or private land, while 
numbers went to the outskirts or beyond the frontiers of the colony ... the need for 
more schools to instil discipline became acute” (p. 11). In the same way that the 
British Empire attempted to quell social unrest in the 1850s, compulsory schooling 
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was to be used to subdue the vagabonds, educating them in the disciplines of 
industry. In 1855 Sir George Grey, Governor of the Cape, said to Parliament: 
 
If we leave the natives beyond our border ignorant barbarians, they will 
remain a race of troublesome marauders. We should try to make them part of 
ourselves, with a common faith and common interests, useful servants, 
consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue. Therefore, I propose that 
we make unremitting efforts to raise the natives in Christianity and 
civilisation, by establishing among them missions concerned with industrial 
schools (Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p. 205).  
 
This utterance gives us an idea of what the British colonialists hoped to achieve by 
schooling the children of the indigenous people. In a nutshell, the British colonial 
government saw ‘compulsory’ schooling as a device to ‘domesticate’ the natives, to 
instruct them in the Christian religion, and to train them to meet the economic needs 
of the British Empire. Grey’s ‘civilised educational policy’ (1855 to 1863) with its 
segregation and supremacist ideologies reflects the Dutch and British missionaries’ 
belief in the value of hard work. As claimed by Hunt (1974), Grey’s policy intended 
to produce “a docile and efficient labour force which would accept European 
religious and political authority and social superiority” (p. 6). This shared emphasis 
on ‘teaching to work’ by all and sundry, the close connections between missionaries, 
merchants and manufacturers was wrapped up in a whole set of white colonists’ 
attitudes and values. In the words of John Philip, people schooled in the settlers’ 
religion “will be more productive, there will be an increase in consumption of British 
manufactures, taxes will be paid and farmers will have no cause to complain of a lack 
of labour” (quoted in Majeke, 1952, p. 66).  
 
Van den Berg (1987), for example, though writing about the South African history of 
education, noted that  
 
[T]he history of South Africa[n] [education policy] since the middle of the 
17
th
 century is the history of the consolidation of the dominance of the 
European colonists and their ancestors over the broad mass of the South 
African people … the role of [compulsory] schooling in this process is so 
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clearly visible from the official pronouncements of the rulers and the 
enactments … of the authorities over the centuries … the message is the same: 
[compulsory] schooling is there to serve the perceived wishes, hopes, interests 
and fears of those who rule the country, and to serve the creation and 
maintenance of a particular economic order  (Van den Berg, 1987 p. 4, 
addition mine).  
 
Van den Berg claims that European colonists set up formal schools to convert the 
original inhabitants from heathendom to the doctrines of Christian faith, but also in 
their being trained in the disciplines of industry. Or put differently, the establishment 
of compulsory schooling was intended to domesticate the black South African 
population in order to expedite the Dutch religious crusade, and to serve the British 
economic interests. In brief, compulsory schooling was established to promote Dutch 
religious instruction and the British industrial needs and values. On the whole, the 
British colonial version of compulsory schooling was to set the scheme for a South 
African education system differentiated along the lines of colour.  
 
The notion of uniting South Africa’s white states took hold after the British 
confirmed the independence of the Boer republics. Starting with the Orange Free 
State and Transvaal proclaimed in 1854 and 1859 respectively, let us take a look at 
how statutory compulsory schooling developed in the former province. According to 
Malherbe (1925), in the Volksraad (‘People’s Council’, a legislative body) Session of 
30 May 1893, the following views were expressed:  
 
Children belong not only to the parents but also to the State, and it is the duty 
of the State to provide the education when the parents cannot or will not 
provide it themselves. … A father who cannot give his child an education 
must be assisted, and he who does not want to do so must be compelled. … 
Compulsory Education does not detract from the freedom of the citizen at all. 
… The Volksraad must make Education compulsory in order to protect the 
State itself (Malherbe, 1925, pp. 373-374).   
 
The Orange Free State’s view of compulsory schooling points to some significant 
developments: 1) it places compulsory schooling almost entirely in the hands of the 
state; 2) where applicable, a parent is to be compelled to guarantee a child’s right to 
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education and 3) compulsion is justified on the basis that it promotes individual 
freedoms in the medium — to long-term. From a policy development perspective, the 
Volksraad Session signified a shift from the colonists’ emphasis on compulsory 
Christian education and manual labour towards an education aimed at fostering free 
individuals able to manage the affairs of the Boer republic. In Chapter 4 I mentioned 
that the Afrikaners struggled to free ‘white’ South Africa in general and the Boer 
republics in particular, from all the confines of the colonial past. The Volksraad 
Session provides insight to the contradictory conceptions of citizenship education 
programmes both in colonial and apartheid South Africa in ensuing years. In other 
words, the right to education of white children is emphasised, ruling out non-citizens 
of the Boer republics. The Orange Free State province compulsory schooling was 
given a statutory status by the Cape School Boards Act of 1905.47 
 
Similar to the Boer republics, the British colonies (Cape Colony and Natal) also made 
strides in providing compulsory schooling for European children. In the Cape the 
Education Commission of 1909 recommended to the federation of South Africa’s 
white states to support those children whose parents were unable to pay for fees. This 
view aided the Volksraad Session’s proposal that provinces should assist parents to 
provide compulsory schooling envisioned and required in the Boer republics. To 
ensure the full application of the provincial education policies, aids to enforcement 
became important elements of the white system of primary and secondary schooling. 
These measures included, among other things:  
 
                                                 
47
 Two factors underlay the Cape School Board Act of 1905. The first was the institution of a more 
equitable system of local finance by means of taxing powers; the second was the voluntary 
introduction of compulsory education in provincial schools so as to enable governing authorities to 
deal with the large numbers of white children not yet at school. The Act made white schooling free and 
compulsory for all primary school children between the ages of 7 and 15 within a radius of three miles 
from the nearest school. In the Orange Free State province, the Hertzog School Act of 1908 
institutionalised racial separation in education further, by placing white children on a fundamentally 
different footing from that of non-European children. In addition to the existing School Board Act, the 
Smuts Education Act of 1907 also made primary schools free and compulsory between the ages of 7 
and 14 in the Transvaal province. 
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Regulations in all four provinces making education compulsory, their scope 
being steadily extended to higher ages and grades; the provision of free 
education and such prerequisites as free clothing, text-books and 
supplementary meals, the establishment of hostel facilities in central towns for 
children from remoter rural areas or from poor families; the injection of large 
sums of money into the educational system, not only for increased salaries to 
teachers, but for the building of schools, and school infrastructures, such as 
libraries, sporting facilities and transport systems; and the rapid expansion of 
facilities for teacher training (Shingler, 1974, p. 60). 
 
In a way, a centralised state education policy put the search for a free, compulsory 
schooling that sought to educate for white South African citizenship well on course. 
For the first time in the history of South Africa, because of government’s support 
initiatives schooling became free and compulsory for white children. The word ‘free’ 
focuses attention on the difficulties of enforcing and implementing compulsory 
schooling. These can range over geographic, economic, social and educational 
factors. With regard to aids to enforcement, the South African government was 
committed to: 1) help white children who had great distances to cover to get to 
school, and address issues of hunger and disability; 2) deal with the shortage of 
school buildings and shortage of teachers; and 3) address lack of parental guidance, 
homelessness, joblessness, and inability to pay for uniforms, let alone daily 
sustenance. At this point, the notion of a free, compulsory schooling articulated by 
the Boer republics and the British colonies firmly established itself in South African 
education discourse.  
 
Thus far, I have been concerned with the influence of the Dutch and British 
colonialists’ notion of compulsory schooling in South Africa. At this point, a 
description of British, Dutch and South African education policies points to certain 
common characteristics. Firstly, a concept of compulsory schooling originated as a 
response to a much needed literacy during the Industrial Revolution and rapid  
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urbanisation in Britain and South Africa
48
, respectively. Secondly, while the colonial 
British concept of compulsory schooling served a dual purpose: First, as a tool for 
‘taming’ or ‘civilising’ learners, educating them to the disciplines of industrial and  
urban society
49
; and second, promoting obedient citizens who were loyal to the 
Empire, in South Africa the idea was first introduced as a way to encourage (Dutch) 
religious instruction. Thirdly, at the same time in the colonial Britain and the 
dominion South Africa compulsory schooling served to further widen class 
distinctions, in the latter a segregationist and supremacist ideology also characterised 
black education in mission schools. A formal compulsory education developed fairly 
early in South Africa. Although compulsory schooling remained limited in scope, 
provincial authorities’ support (namely aids to towards enforcement) gave impetus to 
its later realisation under the Union of South Africa. The path towards realising a 
free, compulsory, non-racial democratic schooling in South Africa had to steer 
through many decades of imposition of Christian civilisation, racial segregation and 
education for menial labour. The attention of this chapter now turns to the resistance 
to colonial-apartheid education policies, and the demand for a free, compulsory 
schooling that aims to prepare people for democratic participation in all spheres of 
South African society. 
 
                                                 
48
 South Africa experienced rapid urbanisation and the expansion of secondary industrialisation in the 
1940s and 1950s. Similar to the crime, endemic poverty and social unrest in British urban areas in the 
1850s; the slaves emancipation that paved the way for vagrancy and squatting on government (1830s); 
and 3) the discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) that gave rise poor white’ and working class, 
South Africa once more was to resort to schooling for solutions. 
 
49
 It was reported to the Interdepartmental Committee on Native Education of 1935-1936 that juvenile 
delinquency among Africans had assumed alarming proportions, especially in the urban areas. It was 
argued that if African youth of school age could be compelled to attend school, “they would be 
usefully occupied during part of the day, and so acquire habits of orderliness and industry and hence 
become amenable to discipline” (Behr and Macmillan, 1971, p. 395). In his 1946-1947 presidential 
address to the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Edgar Brookes called for 
compulsory education as a “preventative against delinquency and crime” (quoted in Hyslop, 1999 p. 
3). By the end of the Smuts government’s tenure of office in 1948, such ideas had penetrated the 
thinking of significant sections of government and administration. The Secretary for Social Welfare on 
top of that, aired the view that compulsory education could overcome the ‘skollie’ (juvenile 
delinquent) problem. The 1952 Van Schalkwijk Committee, furthermore, warned that the “absence of 
compulsory education in towns results in greater freedom from supervision of non-European 
juveniles” (Hyslop, 1999, p. 4). 
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7.3 Compulsory schooling and citizenship: resistance and struggle 
The resistance to colonial compulsory schooling has a long history, beginning with 
the slaves’ rejection of the Dutch Christian education system. Early opposition to 
compulsion, understood as interference with individual freedoms and socio-economic 
systems, in colonial schools took three forms: First, the student-slaves’ response was 
flight and to hide in caves; second, the Khoi hunters, San herders and Bantu-speaking 
agriculturalists and herders often refused to send their children to school; or third at 
times they sent their children only for long enough to obtain specific benefits like 
clothes and food. After the promulgation of the Cape 1905 School Board Act, a plea 
for a free, compulsory schooling for black people swept across the four provinces. In 
1909, the African People’s Organisation (APO) urged, through the columns of its 
official organ that  
 
[f]urther attention [be] paid to, and fuller provision [be] made for, the 
education of the coloured children of the (Cape) colony … justice demands it. 
The coloured ratepayers bear their share of the burden of government, and are 
justly entitled to fuller facilities for education; and we are convinced that the 
only solution of the education problem will be found in making primary 
education free, secular, and compulsory for coloureds as for whites (quoted in 
Molteno, 1991, p. 86). 
 
A concept of a free, compulsory schooling as understood by the organisation was to 
be extended to a South African society as a whole, that is, Europeans, Coloureds, 
Africans and Indians. The organisation sought integration in the state-controlled 
schooling system for whites as a means of extricating blacks in general, and 
Coloureds in particular, from the non-citizenship status conferred on them. 
Regrettably, the Union government remained deaf to the Cape Coloureds’ appeal to a 
free and compulsory schooling. The African People’s Organisation’s notion of a free, 
non-racial compulsory schooling was echoed in the Freedom Charter — as well as the 
anti-apartheid movement, both with roots in the Athenian prototype, as the next 
section will show.  
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To the advocates of the prototypical Athenian democracy and, its notion of 
citizenship, the use of compulsion is necessary only if the school in which it takes 
place is both educative — ‘improves’ the citizens and manages to ‘conduct’ its 
educational function in a participatory way. However, “to the critics of compulsory 
schooling it is precisely this coercive intrusion into the life and mind of the individual 
that represents the most damnable feature of compulsory schooling” (Chamberlin, 
1989, p. 91). Davie (2005) must have the Dutch and British mission schools in 
colonial South Africa in mind when she writes: 
 
Compulsory schooling is incompatible with a humane society, and primitive 
in its reliance on coercion and force. The pursuit of knowledge and 
understanding requires, above all, an environment that is free of such ancient 
and discredited instruments (Davie, 2005, p. xviii).  
 
There are two points worth noting about the Chamberlin and Davie quotations. First, 
the authors affirm Holt’s (1973) claim that schools have a dual purpose, “the prime, 
legitimate humane mission or function of the schools — to promote the growth of the 
children in them and the custodial or jail function and indoctrination — the power to 
cause children mental and physical pain, to threaten, frighten, and humiliate them, 
and to destroy their lives” (p. 264). In other words, schools have always been located 
in two extreme and diametrically opposed positions: as liberating acceptable practices 
on the one hand, and as tools of oppression, on the other. In support of the former, 
Davie proclaims the value of the educative mission of compulsory schooling, namely, 
to ‘improve’ the citizens and build a humane society. This section of the chapter will 
show that the anti-apartheid struggle for a free and compulsory schooling — the 
educative mission of the schools that is linked to the Freedom Charter — is neither 
coercive nor repressive.  
 
One of the earliest and most influential formulations of the anti-apartheid struggle’s 
demand for a free, compulsory schooling that aims to promote democratic citizenship 
in South Africa is contained in the Freedom Charter, adopted at The Congress of the 
People in 1995 (see Chapter 4). The Charter famously declared that “The doors of 
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learning and culture shall be opened ... education shall be free, compulsory, universal 
and equal for all children” (The Freedom Charter, 1955). This is a very brief but 
significant statement, considering that the Freedom Charter, as I mentioned in 
Chapter 4, makes reference to ‘the will of the people’ that is strongly reminiscent of 
the prototype of democracy sketched by Pericles (Thucydides, 1972). Second, the 
document affirms the basic assumptions, that is, collective self-rule, equality and 
freedom. In other words, this prototypical, maximal concept of democratic citizenship 
education is incompatible firstly with the Dutch and British colonialists central 
features of compulsory schooling, that placed emphasis on ‘taming’ or ‘civilising’ not 
only the Dutch, British, but also South African learners; and secondly the 
introduction of free, compulsory schooling for children whose parents were of 
European descent in the federation of South Africa’s white states, an educational 
incentive intended to encourage white citizenship, not inclusive of Coloured, Indian 
and African groups. The Charter shows that education for citizenship and democracy 
based on ‘the will of the people’ is likely to bring prosperity and secure individual 
liberties. As stated in Chapter 4, the Freedom Charter continued to be a guiding 
document to both young and old in the anti-apartheid movement in later years.  
 
The mood began to take focus when student organisations like the SSRC, COSAS, 
AZASO and others started calling for free and compulsory schooling for all South 
African children. The school student organisations like COSAS, AZASO and the 
National Union of South African Students (NUSAS)50 launched the Education 
Charter Campaign (ECC) in 1984. The ECC affirmed the right to free and 
compulsory schooling set out in the Freedom Charter, when it called for a 
 
Campaign for an Education Charter that will embody the short-term, medium-
term and long-term demands for a non-racial, free and compulsory education 
                                                 
50
 The National Union of South African Students was formed in 1924 to unite all white university 
students. In 1936 Afrikaans speaking white students left NUSAS. In 1967, disillusionment with (white 
led, multi-racial) NUSAS’s inability to reflect specific concerns of African students, South African 
Student Organisation (SASO) was formed in 1968. Even so, the NUSAS continued to have links with 
the black university student organisation AZASO. 
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for all in a united and democratic South Africa based on the will of the people 
(The National Co-ordinating Committee, Education Charter Campaign, 1986). 
 
Interestingly, the struggle for a non-racial, free and compulsory education based on 
‘the will of the people’ bears the language inherited from the Charter tradition. The 
link between free and compulsory schooling and the anti-apartheid struggle for 
democracy is also telling. The objectives of the Charter Campaign were inter alia: to 
reach out to and consult all students in all corners of the country together with their 
communities and to receive contributions from them so that the document arises out 
of the principle of democracy; and to create a document around which students can 
organise and rally in striving for a democratic and relevant system of education for all 
(see Christie, 1988, p. 251). In a nutshell, the ECC was part of the anti-apartheid 
struggle, and reflected its concept of “People’s Education for People’s Power” 
embodying the Athenian notion of people’s power. 
 
The demand for a free, compulsory education based on the prototypical Athenian 
democracy was aptly captured by Sisulu in his address to the first conference of the 
NECC in Durban in 1986: 
 
The NECC has opened the way for people’s power to be developed in our 
struggle for a free, democratic, compulsory and non-racial education. The 
crisis committees have brought all sectors of the community together in the 
pursuit of this noble goal. … The demand for free, democratic people’s 
education, we have said, is part of, indeed inextricably tied, to the struggle for 
a free, democratic, people’s South Africa (Sisulu, 1986, pp. 107-111).   
 
Hartshorne (1986) described the NECC’s struggle for free, democratic ‘People’s 
Education’ in South Africa as follows: “In the wider context of the NECC movement, 
People’s Education can be regarded as the working out of the educational 
consequences of the Freedom Charter… an expression of the will of the people” 
(quoted in Van den Heever, 1987, p. 2). There are three points worth noting about the 
NECC’s struggle for free, compulsory education in apartheid South Africa. First, in 
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contrast to the Dutch missionaries, British colonialists and the Union of South 
Africa’s concept of compulsion, the NECC’s vision of state regulated compulsory 
education resembles democracy based on mass participation. Secondly, compulsion 
as a ‘noble goal’ is tied to the struggle for equality, freedom and democracy for all the 
people of South Africa. Thirdly, it also shows that compulsion can be bound up with 
the ‘will of the people’ in a democratic society. I do not embrace a pre-colonial 
concept of ‘People’s Education’, the Dutch missionaries and British colonial notions 
of compulsory citizenship education, but rather, a prototypical, maximal concept of 
democratic citizenship sought to promote not only individual autonomy, but also to 
build a free, equal and democratic South African society. 
 
Soon after the advent of democracy in 1994, the Government of National Unity also 
introduced compulsory school attendance for all South African pupils. The anti-
apartheid vision was given legal status in the new South African Constitution of 
1996, which declared that  
 
…everyone shall have the right: a) to basic education, including adult 
education; and b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable 
measures, must make progressively available and accessible (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, p, 14). 
 
There can be little doubt that the Freedom Charter endorsed a modified version of the 
Athenian prototype, one that was envisioned in the anti-apartheid struggle and echoed 
in the Constitution of South Africa (1996). In the context of this chapter a question 
might arise, why the anti-apartheid vision of a free, democratic, compulsory and non-
racial education in post-apartheid South Africa was so hard to put into practice? In 
Chapter 4, I showed that in principle the Constitution embraces an updated version of 
the Athenian prototype of democracy, and its notion of citizenship. On the other 
hand, in pursuit of democratic participation and active citizenry, there are a number of 
elements in the document which indicate a minimalist interpretation of citizenship 
education. To recall from Chapter 4:                                                                                                                              
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● A post-apartheid South African citizenship and by implication citizenship 
education is torn between ‘transformative’ goals on the one hand and 
‘democratic’ goals, on the other; consequently 
● the democratic elements are tentatively expressed and outweighed by the 
general transformative orientation of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (1996), thus rendering sets of post-apartheid citizenship education 
policy instruments conceptually incoherent; 
● South Africa does not have a settled concept of citizenship to draw on, and by 
implication education for democratic citizenship too is still in a formative 
stage;  
 ● as such there is a tension in the 1996 Constitution between ‘transformative’ 
and ‘substantive’ conceptions of citizenship, and by implication, of 
citizenship education; therefore 
●  in theory, the Constitution embraces an updated version of the Athenian 
prototype of democracy, and its notion of citizenship. In practice, South 
Africa’s emergent conception of citizenship education in post-1994 is 
‘transformative’ rather than ‘preservative’ of the Athenian concept of 
democratic citizenship. 
 
Against this background, Chapter 5 maintained that the discontinuity between the 
anti-apartheid struggle vision of participatory democracy and active citizenship, on 
the one hand, and policy development after the transition, on the other, can be 
attributed to a lack of conceptual clarity, coherence and consistency in post-apartheid 
South African educational policy. Furthermore, Chapter 6 argued that state policy 
documents undermine democratic participation and active citizenry. In fact, policy 
development after the transition reflects a minimalist conception of citizenship and, 
by implication, of citizenship education. In the next section, I examine the United 
Nations instruments that support the Athenian prototype of compulsory schooling, 
and compulsory citizenship education as part of the educational entitlement of all 
children in modern-day societies. 
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7.4 Universal primary education and state regulated compulsory citizenship 
education 
The United Nations global policies on education espouse a modified version of the 
Athenian prototype of citizenship applicable in any given democratic national 
context. As I discussed in Chapter 3, citizenship as a ‘social contract’ between the 
state and the individual is closely related to the notion of rights. Furthermore, the 
concept of compulsion is also understood in relation to state regulated compulsory 
schooling, an entitlement that is central to the idea of democratic citizenship. Article 
26 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) claimed that 
“everyone has a right to education” followed by the prescription that “elementary 
education shall be compulsory” setting a universal standard (United Nations, 1948). 
From a global (i.e. extra-national) perspective, the provision of compulsory schooling 
stems from the recognition that schools have a key role to play in educating learners 
for democratic citizenship. Citizenship grounded on rights and democratic principles, 
as pointed out in the UN global policies, will be considered below. In part, the 
principle of universal compulsory schooling promises to give impetus to education 
for citizenship and democracy at national school level. In other words, schooling, 
compulsion and citizenship have become indivisible and mutually reinforcing parts of 
democratic education policies worldwide.  
 
According to Christie (2008), various theories view the role of schooling as part of a 
pattern which needs to be maintained, or modified, or broken altogether (p. 15). To 
many advocates of Athenian democracy and its notion of citizenship, the use of 
compulsion is necessary because it improves the quality of life both for individuals 
and societies as a whole. In contrast to this view, Marxist theories see compulsory 
schooling as a reproductive tool that is schools have become part of structural 
inequalities, both in well-established and those in transition to democracy, including 
South Africa. A strong response, proposed by Holt (1974) is that “aside from being 
boring, the school is almost always ugly, cold, and inhuman” (p. 40). Some of the 
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school-critics, like Goodman (1971); Illich (1974) and Lister (1974) have even gone 
as far as comparing schools to prisons: 
 
The headmaster is the prison governor; teachers are warders; the prisoners are 
the pupils, in the obvious instance, but the teachers are prisoners too. … The 
school as a hospital tends to individual and social problems. Pupils have to 
attend by law. … The deprivations of school include being deprived of the 
company of human beings other than members of the pupil’s peer group 
(Lister, 1974, pp. 85-86).   
 
Some critics have suggested an end to compulsory schooling, “Since I became 
convinced of the case for … deschooling, I now recognise that this was a dangerous 
reformism which detracts from the necessary struggle for the abolition of compulsory 
schooling” (Botford, 1993, p. 4). For Davie (2005), universal compulsion has to go; it 
cannot be reformed (p. 113). Even though internationally compulsory schooling 
remains a contested educational topic, its support and enforcement is considered by 
many as the most elementary sign of human progress with regard to individual and 
social dimensions of citizenship rights.  
 
In Chapter 3 I mentioned that Marshall’s (1950) classic definition of citizenship 
includes the social element, implying the state’s obligation to guarantee the right to 
education to its national citizens. In this regard, social rights include the 
unconditional right to universal primary education. In this fashion, nation states are 
encouraged by the global community to pursue active participatory citizenship as a 
goal for their learners. By upholding pupils’ entitlement or the right to education, a 
nation state should prepare its youth for taking part in the political, economic, social 
and cultural responsibilities of adult society:   
 
The education of children has a direct bearing on citizenship, and, when the 
State guarantees that all children shall be educated, it has the requirements and 
the nature of citizenship definitely in mind. It is trying to stimulate the growth 
of citizens in the making. The right to education is a genuine social right of 
citizenship, because the aim of education during childhood is to shape the 
future adult (Marshall, 1950, p. 172). 
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In the context of globalisation, Osler and Starkey (2005) argue that civil and political 
rights and social, economic and cultural rights are interdependent. To elaborate, 
citizenship is defined in terms of practice, namely “as an awareness of oneself as an 
individual living in relationship with others, participating freely in society and 
combining with others for political, social, cultural or economic purposes” (2005, p. 
14). I am arguing then — as global trends in liberal democracies reveal — that 
“education for human rights and democracy in the last analysis means the 
empowerment of each individual to participate with an active sense of responsibility 
in all aspects of … life” (Spencer, 2006, p. 28). This is to say, a democratic society 
prepares its youth through the formal and informal processes of socialisation that 
make up its educational system. In this regard, the adage “think globally, act locally”, 
is certainly pertinent to modern-day societies, including post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
The state aims to create a nation of able, informed and empowered citizens who 
understand that optimal personal fulfilment is likely to be achieved by active 
involvement in their society. In this respect, facilitation of the development of the 
child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential 
requires the enforcement of compulsory schooling. In South Africa 1) state-regulated 
schooling that was compulsory only for whites was a direct contravention of the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights; and 2) consequently, the country 
became the battleground for the struggle for citizens’ rights and human rights during 
the latter half of the 20th century. Unsurprisingly, the notion of state schooling 
remains crucial in universally recognised and accepted guidelines for establishing 
education for citizenship in schools. The UNDHR and its subsequent global 
commitments, in the form of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1989), Education for All (2000) and the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (2001), will be discussed in detail shortly. These are models of 
education for citizenship that are grounded in human rights principles, and I use them 
as significant global education policies and practices that resemble a democracy 
based on mass participation.  
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The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is an 
international agreement that came into being in 1989 — although the drafting process 
began ten years earlier, in response to a formal proposal by Poland. The UNCRC has 
been ratified by 192 states, an important indicator of its global acceptance. 
Effectively, the UNCRC has put children’s rights on national and international policy 
agendas. The document is of special relevance to children’s rights, together with 
compulsory citizenship education. For instance, in article 28 signatories to the 
Convention pledged to provide, as well as enforce, free and compulsory schooling for 
all children in their respective countries:  
 
a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
b) .… and take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free 
education and offering financial assistance in case of need (United 
Nations, 1989, pp. 190-191). 
 
The UNCRC is groundbreaking in many ways: firstly, it points to the lack of progress 
in the implementation of universal elementary education since the 19th century when 
the idea established itself; secondly, it affirms the right to free, compulsory schooling 
of all children of the world regardless of race, class or ethnicity; and thirdly most 
importantly, states’ parties are duty-bound to ensure that the enforcement is aided by 
free books, feeding schemes, transport or boarding, and family allowance and so 
forth. By implication, entitlement to free, compulsory schooling for all is likely to 
enhance pupils’ ability to contribute to the progress of their respective nations. In the 
case of South Africa, schools are expected by the CRC to heed the imperative of 
education for participation in democratic governance. The most progressive part of 
the UNCRC is found among the articles addressing participation rights (Articles 12-
16). As it were, the UNCRC “participation rights recognise children as meaning 
makers and acknowledge their citizenship” (Verhellen, 2006, p. 35). For example, 
article 15 states: “no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights … 
which are necessary in a democratic society” (United Nations, 1989, p. 186). On this 
point, the right to education remains a cornerstone of a global social order, a 
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prerequisite for the overall, active, participatory citizenship in democratic countries 
like South Africa.  
 
The UNCRC’s notion of compulsory citizenship education is backed by article 29 
that demands that states’ parties agree to “the development of the child’s personality, 
talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential” (1989, p. 191). 
Embodied in the concept of education for citizenship is the principle that, as actors in 
political space, children are citizens. This means that adult-centric construct “that 
defined children as not yet knowing, not yet competent, and not yet being” is being 
questioned (Verhellen, 2006, p. 35) Children are neither seen as consumers of 
citizenship education nor excluded from citizenship, on the basis of their being 
portrayed as threatening or apathetic. Against this backdrop, Chapter 6 defended the 
Student Representative Councils’ tradition on the grounds of its emphasis on the 
educative potential of learner participation. It would appear, then, that education for 
citizenship is, therefore, the education of citizens, not the education of citizens-in-
waiting.  
 
According to Osler and Starkey (2005), ‘through recognising children as citizens and 
engaging with student voices, educators, policy-makers and researchers can increase 
their understanding of learning and teaching processes and of what constitutes a 
successful learning community’ (p. 39). Given that participation rights in schools 
provide an opportunity for education, children are able to exercise their right to 
citizenship education. Hence, children’s rights to education, “as covered in the CRC, 
have been categorised as the three Ps: those of protection, provision (services, 
material benefits) and participation” (Osler and Starkey, 2005, p. 43). In support of 
the UNCRC, the Education for All (EFA) movement was launched at the World 
Conference on Education for All in 1990, when representatives of the international 
community agreed to universalise primary education and massively reduce illiteracy 
by the end of the decade.  
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Much the same as the CRC, the Education for All movement is a global commitment 
to provide quality basic education for all children of the globe. There are six EFA 
goals directly linked to youth and adults, but just one of them provides a succinct 
summary: “universal access to and completion of primary education by year 2000” 
(United Nations, 2000, p. 2). As a global movement, EFA is likely to bring popular 
organisations ranging from parents’ bodies, teachers unions and student formations-, 
behind this noble idea of achieving universal elementary education worldwide. Its 
achievement of universal participation in education requires a push for more inclusive 
and meaningful forms of direct and participatory democracy at local, national and 
international levels. In this context, the right to education becomes critical in the 
struggle for citizenship. If the EFA global commitment is anything to go by, 
education for citizenship and teaching of democracy in schools is consistent with a 
modified version of the Athenian prototype of democracy. In support of the Athenian 
prototype, Mill (1975) argued that it is only within a context of popular participatory 
institutions or large-scale society that one sees an active type of character being 
fostered. In South Africa, the anti-apartheid struggle and its concept of “People’s 
Education for People’s Power” were both a political and an educational strategy 
based on mass participation. The Student Representative Councils tradition 
emphasised the educative potential of learner participation. The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) are drawn from the actions and targets contained in the 
Millennium Declaration that was adopted by 189 nations and signed by 147 heads of 
state and governments during the UN Millenium Summit in September 2000.  
 
MDG 2 seeks to achieve universal primary education by 2015, by ensuring that 
“children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of 
primary schooling” (United Nations, 2001). The UNDHR and its subsequent global 
commitments in the form of Education for All, the United Nations’ MDG arguably 
takes us a step closer to the realisation of every child’s right to compulsory 
citizenship education by 2015. The present, global policies will enable every child to 
form generative relationships and to know his/her rights and responsibilities, two 
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critical components that constitute citizenship. Compulsory schooling is likely to give 
them the chance later on to become active participating citizens able to contribute in 
the development of their nation states. Current state regulated compulsory schooling 
involves a conception of education as a means of effecting positive changes and 
promoting development in their own countries. While schooling in the history of 
South Africa has until recently been neither democratic nor compulsory for all, there 
is a need for some form of compulsion that is compatible with liberal democracies 
that favour a maximal conception of democracy and citizenship. Compulsion as the 
anti-apartheid struggle discussion indicated does not rely, to use Davie (2005) words, 
on coercion and force. On the contrary, this infringement of rights (if it is that) is 
compatible with the prototypical concept of democracy and citizenship at school 
level.  
 
7.5 Compulsory, participatory citizenship education: rights — not coercion  
In Chapter 3, I mentioned that the British government’s decision to introduce 
compulsory citizenship education in schools as a matter of national policy (in May 
1999) speaks directly to the argument that state compulsory schooling, and 
compulsory citizenship education, can be justified as an essential component of the 
curriculum in South African schools. In England, the Advisory Group’s report 
recommended that citizenship education be a statutory entitlement in the national 
curriculum at secondary level for students at Key Stage 3 (11-14 years of age) and 
Key Stage 4 (14-16 years of age).  This view of compulsory citizenship education 
based on democratic participation and active citizenry was expressed in the Crick 
Report when its authors wrote: 
 
We unanimously advise the Secretary of State that citizenship and the 
teaching of democracy, construed in a broad sense that we will define, is so 
important both for schools to ensure that it is part of the entitlement of all 
pupils… It can no longer sensibly be left as uncoordinated local initiatives 
which vary greatly in number, content and method. This is an inadequate basis 
for animating the idea of a common citizenship with democratic values 
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(Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998, p. 7).   
 
The Group emphasised both universal compulsory education and a broad conception 
of citizenship and citizenship education when it made “a case for citizenship 
education being a vital and distinct statutory part of the curriculum, an entitlement for 
all pupils in its own right” (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998, p. 13).  In 
its final report, it argued “citizenship education to be a statutory entitlement in the 
curriculum and [that] all schools should be required to show they are fulfilling the 
obligation that this places upon them” (p. 22). The Group believed that citizenship 
education is important and distinct enough to warrant a separate specification within 
the national framework (p. 18). In May 1999, the British government decided that 
citizenship education must indeed be compulsory and that the curriculum should 
address issues as democracy, community, society and citizenship.  
 
In the light of the British experience, this chapter asserts that compulsion is not 
necessarily coercion. Contrary to the critics of compulsory schooling, compulsory 
citizenship education is not necessarily indoctrination or teaching by duress. It is the 
state’s responsibility to formally introduce citizenship education as a statutory 
entitlement in South Africa. By introducing citizenship education formally into 
schools as a matter of national policy, we rediscover the original Curriculum 2005 
that made provision for citizenship education through the Human and Social Sciences 
Learning Area, which comprised four components: History, Geography, Archaeology 
and Citizenship/Civics. I also mentioned in Chapter 5 that Curriculum 2005 affirmed 
the democratic ideals of the Greek city-state of Athens. I contend that post-apartheid 
South Africa needs a revised approach to citizenship and citizenship education. This 
appeal for state regulated ‘compulsory’ entitlement for citizenship education, I will 
argue, is consistent with the Freedom Charter, the anti-apartheid struggle and its 
concept of “People’s Education for People’s Power”; as well as global policies that 
reflect a prototypical concept of democracy based on mass participation. 
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This section reiterates that within the theoretical framework of the Athenian version 
of democratic citizenship, compulsion in post-apartheid South Africa schools can also 
be justified on the grounds that: 1) it promotes individual autonomy, a citizen’s 
ability and inclination to act for him-/herself; 2) it builds social cohesion–the political 
goal or common good in post-apartheid South Africa, and 3) unlike the state 
compulsory schooling that relies on coercion and force, the Athenian version of 
citizenship education guarantees South African learners the freedom to opt out of 
‘official’ school democracy projects. 
 
I argue that in post-apartheid South Africa, these are three necessary, and seemingly 
paradoxical, reasons with different purposes and different teaching approaches. The 
initial process of pursuing individual freedoms, I maintain, is concerned with 
fostering an active type of citizenry, whereas the second process of social cohesion 
involves initiating learners into the body of received ideas and practices appropriate 
for the South African context in which they are educated. The last process, the right 
to opt out of the ‘official’ compulsory citizenship education, assumes that a learner is 
or will be capable of making decisions with regard to participation in programmes 
and/or projects in the area of education for democratic citizenship. Significantly, this 
form of education that compels pupils’ attendance in pursuit of citizenship is in 
keeping with: firstly an updated/modified version of the Athenian prototype of 
democracy, especially its democratic zeal for participation; secondly McLaughlin’s 
(1992) maximalist conception of citizenship, and of citizenship education; thirdly the 
model of democratic citizenship developed envisioned in the Freedom Charter and 
reflected in the anti-apartheid movement; and fourthly global policies that support the 
Athenian prototype of compulsory schooling, and compulsory citizenship education 
as the duty of nation states or governments. 
 
To emphasise the points made in Chapter 2, a major function of participation in the 
theory of democracy is an educative one. It was Pericles (Thucydides, 1972) who 
proclaimed the value of individual autonomy, a central feature of democratic theory. 
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Pateman (1970) alerted us to the interrelationship between popular participatory 
institutions and their educative potential of citizen participation. Mill (1975) argued 
that participation of citizens in government develops an active character. 
Furthermore, Benhabib (1996) and Cohen (1989) claimed that deliberative 
democratic procedures impart information, promote good reason, and generally 
heighten moral, social and political awareness of individual citizens. If one follows 
these claims, one is likely to embrace a theory of democracy as an enterprising goal, 
that is, the education of the entire learners’ intellectual, moral and practical capacities. 
In the context of the individual right to education, compulsion is likely to be 
acceptable, provided participation in the life of the school offers a chance for the 
development of active, participatory learners in South African schools. What this 
means, clearly, is that any defence of compulsory schooling that intends to ‘improve’ 
the citizens requires that schools are managed in a participatory and democratic way.  
 
In South Africa, the anti-apartheid struggle concept of democratic citizenship strove 
to liberate and put students in command of their lives, rejecting the British colonial 
Girl Guide system and the nationalist Youth Preparedness Programme designed to 
control and produce a subservient, passive type of character. In addition, the anti-
apartheid struggle and its concept of “People’s Education for People’s Power” 
prepared learners for “total human liberation; one which helped them to be creative, 
to develop critical minds” (cited in Nkomo, 1990, p. 300). It follows that government 
public schools are to be judged by their effects on pupils, whether they ‘improve’ 
them, and/or by their efficiency help build a democratic South African society. The 
right to education justifies some compulsory schooling, although it is tempting in a 
society like South Africa, with its activist tradition of political struggle, to treat 
individual freedom as part of a more liberatory approach to citizenship education in 
our schools. In a democratic South Africa, compulsion that violates the right to 
autonomy is inconsistent with theories of participatory democracy, such as Mill 
(1975), Budge (1993), and Benhabib’s (1996), that have argued for a notion of 
citizenship which can imbue in citizens the virtue of practising a rational, consensus-
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oriented deliberative discourse in a free, unconstrained and reflexive way. As free and 
equal citizens, pupils’ sense of collective obligation to uphold individual rights is 
likely to enhance South Africa’s fledgling conception of citizenship and citizenship 
education.  
 
Advocates of maximal conception of education for citizenship are likely to force 
pupils to be free, to use Rousseau’s (1968) paradox, as a way of preventing them 
from missing out on education for citizenship and democracy which they are entitled 
to. A pre-political or personal contract between persons specifies the terms upon 
which they are prepared to enter society or submit to political authority:  
 
… in order that the social pact shall not be an empty formula, it is tacitly 
implied in that commitment — which alone can give force to all others — that 
whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the 
whole body, which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free; 
for this is the necessary condition which, by giving each citizen to the nation, 
secures him against all personal dependence, it is the condition which shapes 
both the design and the working of the political machine, and which alone 
bestows justice on civil contracts — without it, such contracts would be 
absurd, tyrannical and liable to grossest abuse (Rousseau, 1968, p. 64).   
 
Rousseau’s social contract theory is based on the ideal society, comprising two 
mutually reciprocal strands, namely the pre-political or personal and the political 
strand. The personal element binds or favours all citizens equally, rather than the 
rulers’ orders targeting at particular individuals or groups. On the education front, 
Rousseau’s citizens are to be trained ‘to will nothing contrary to the will’ postulated 
by a democratic society. A democratic South Africa will place a premium on 
obligatory schooling to bring pupils to the spirit of citizenship and the teaching of 
democracy. This is essential for the wellbeing and preservation of a democratic 
system of government. On the present line of argument, I reiterate Pericles’s 
(Thucydides, 1972) praise of the Athenian prototype of democracy, as comprising 
two reciprocal dimensions, namely the personal (autonomy) and the public (political) 
dimension. In post-apartheid South Africa, a right to citizenship education aims to 
197 
 
prepare the youth for active participation in civil and political responsibilities of adult 
society. In contrast to the colonial-apartheid education system, compulsion based on 
participatory concept of democracy is not binding to the mind and body of the child.  
 
In ‘Educating for active citizenship’ (2000), Kreibig cautions against making the 
assumption that all students want to engage as active citizens, as well as against 
raising too high expectations of participation. In the words of Kreibig, “I would hope 
that the way we teach and promote civic and citizenship education allows students the 
freedom to opt out of substantive participation with dignity … treating citizens 
disdainfully builds resentment and alienation; further it is exclusive” (p. 99). Two 
issues bear on the question of student participation: interest and opportunity. Since 
children can and do have interests, it is generally held that their vital interests or 
needs be taken into account. The South African government cannot avoid passing on 
ideas to their children, but it is possible to teach them to treat ideas critically, and 
compulsion may be the only way to ensure that all children have the opportunity to 
do this. Therefore, education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools 
must come to terms with, and attempt to strike a balance between, the individual and 
the political dimensions of citizenship rights. Any degree of compulsory citizenship 
education made available to students who are uninterested will improve their ability 
to engage with government and politics, should they choose to do so later.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the pursuit of individuals’ rights does not stand in 
contrast to the quest for the common good: the promotion and consolidation of 
democracy in South African schools. Therefore, a maximal conception of compulsory 
schooling and compulsory citizenship education entails recognition of the learner’s 
right to optional education, at least in so far as it does not stifle the development of 
active, participatory citizenry and being guided, in case of conflicting claims, by a 
sense of duty to the public good. When ‘catching’ citizenship, to quote Rathbone 
(1971), “each child is his own agent — a self-reliant, independent, self-actualizing 
individual who is capable, on his own, of learning” (p. 104). At the very least, we 
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should attempt to bring compulsion within the confines of participatory democracy in 
order to foster public-spirited citizens responsive to the wellbeing of the public. These 
layers justify compulsory schooling as a means to an end which, in view of the 
individual’s rights, must be pursued. If educators, policy-makers and researchers are 
seriously committed to extending ‘compulsory’ citizenship education, then the 
Athenian concepts of democratic participation and active citizenry yield a notion of 
education for citizenship that arguably should underpin post-apartheid education 
policy in South Africa. In this way, education for citizenship and teaching for 
democracy in schools become a way of life and not merely a substrand or a subject in 
the school curriculum. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In South Africa, the concept of compulsory schooling was established to promote 
Dutch religious instruction and British industrial needs and values. The difficulty of 
enforcing and implementing the Dutch and British colonial compulsory schooling 
directed at taming, as opposed to liberating, its citizens is bound to be resisted and 
rejected by the populace. It took educational pressure combined with political 
struggle, to achieve compulsory attendance, which was not freely available to all 
young South African citizens. A number of education policies by the United Nations 
world body indicate that the right to education, often associated with compulsory 
attendance, and the notion of citizenship education are not in conflict with one other. 
A state-regulated compulsion that embraces a modified version of the Athenian 
prototype of citizenship education is neither exclusive nor repressive, but promotes 
enthusiastic individuals who bring their particular will into harmony with the general 
will. Even so, interference with the life and mind of the individual outside the realm 
of the Athenian prototype of democracy and its notion of citizenship cannot be 
justified, as it underpins a revised post-apartheid citizenship education policy in 
South Africa. The next chapter looks at the recent proposals for compulsory 
citizenship education in South African schools. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
 
THE FUTURE OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
SCHOOLS 
 
 
The right to citizenship expects that each of us will be good and loyal South 
African citizens. This means that were are responsible for: obeying the laws of 
our country, ensuring that others do so as well, and contributing in every 
possible way to making South Africa a great country. … I accept the call of 
this Bill of Responsibilities
51
, and commit to taking my rightful place as an 
active, responsible citizen of South Africa. By assuming these responsibilities 
I will contribute to building the kind of society which will make me proud to 
be a South African (Department of Education, 2008, pp. 4-5).   
 
8.1 Introduction       
In Chapter 4 I showed how the concept of South African citizenship has undergone a 
transition from colonialism via apartheid to democracy. I did so by examining three 
contradictory conceptions of citizenship education programmes in South Africa: the 
British colonialists’ Girl Guide Movement, the National Party’s Youth Preparedness 
and Veld Schools Programmes and the democratic citizenship education of the 
‘People’ Education’ movement. I argued that the first two conceptions of citizenship 
set out to train both black and white children to be obedient and loyal citizens of the 
Union of South Africa and Republic of South Africa, respectively. This chapter 
maintains that although the Bill claims to promote an ‘active, responsible citizen’, in 
the final analysis it sets out to foster inactive, obedient and passive South African 
learners. The Bill is not to be confused with the new national Schools Pledge (2008) 
                                                 
51
 In February 2008, the national Department of Education (DoE) introduced the Bill of 
Responsibilities as part of the national curriculum. The aim of the bill is to teach youngsters to be 
‘good’ and ‘loyal’ South African citizens. 
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that has been proposed for daily recitation at assemblies and memorisation in 
classrooms. Similar to the 2000 Pledge, the new vow is intended to nurture 
‘patriotism’, or loyalty to the Republic of South Africa. The purpose of this chapter is 
two-fold: 1) it shows that the proposed compulsory citizenship education programmes 
recede from the model of democratic citizenship developed in the anti-apartheid 
movement rooted in the Freedom Charter tradition; 2) it maintains that their concept 
of compulsory citizenship education is in conflict with individual autonomy, a central 
feature of democratic theory — namely it is unlikely to promote active, critical and 
inquiring individuals able to build, strengthen and consolidate democracy in South 
African schools. In post-apartheid South Africa, the promotion of social honour in the 
absence of a national dialogue and robust debate on government policies which 
should “articulate the practice of a substantial form of education for citizenship” 
(McLaughlin, 1992, p. 245) is not consistent with deliberative democracy as a variant 
of the Athenian version of democracy.  
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 gives a brief background on the 
proposed Bill of Responsibilities and the new national Schools Pledge. Section 2 
shows that the language of the Bill of Responsibilities is prescriptive and dictatorial.
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Section 3 maintains that the patriotic School Pledge enforces obedience, if not blind 
loyalty, to the state. Section 4 argues that the Bill of Responsibilities and the School 
Pledge do not offer possible strategies for getting from where we are to where we 
ought to be. Section 5 concludes that these citizenship education initiatives do not 
embrace cosmopolitan ideals, namely they place allegiance to South Africa ahead of 
universal humanity. Currently, there is a tension in post-apartheid South African 
educational policy and subsequent curriculum development between minimal and 
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 In the introduction to this thesis I mentioned that the term ‘dictatorial’ is synonymous with the rise 
of totalitarian states based on mass participation — namely with the collusion of the masses. The 
spectre of totalitarianism explains the concern with stability in a democratic polity, including South 
Africa. This chapter will argue that the Bill appears to echo the apocalyptic stereotype of the youth 
who are dangerous, irresponsible, uncaring, reckless and ungovernable, a conception criticised already 
by Seekings (1993). Unsurprisingly, the authors of the document are preoccupied with stability and 
‘normality’ in South African schools. I contend that the Bill of Responsibilities might be seen as 
demanding and indeed dictating unquestioning obedience from learners in South African schools.   
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maximal conceptions of education for citizenship. The Bill of Responsibilities and the 
School Pledge reinforce, rather than improve on, existing state policy instruments that 
undermine democratic participation and active citizenry. 
 
8.2 The origin of the Bill of Responsibilities and the national Schools Pledge  
The previous chapters have raised a number of common issues that pertain to 
democratic participation and active citizenry in pre-and post-apartheid South Africa. 
The argument can be summed up briefly as follows:   
●  Participatory democracy, as understood in the Athenian city-state, namely as 
both an idea and a practice, is relevant in South African schools. 
●  The notion of citizenship that also emanated from the Greek city-state of 
Athens is regarded by the maximal theorists as the most fitting model for a 
successful citizenship education in schools, which offers a noteworthy 
prospect for a revised post-apartheid citizenship education policy in South 
Africa. 
●  This prototypical, maximal concept of democratic citizenship was reflected in 
the anti-apartheid struggle, echoed in the Freedom Charter as well as in the 
Constitution of South Africa (1996).  
 
It was against this background that the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(1996) declared that:   
 
There is a common South African citizenship. … All citizens [including 
learners, both in public and independent South African schools] are — equally 
entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and equally 
subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship (Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, p. 3, addition mine). 
 
In terms of section 184 (2) of the Constitution (1996), the South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC) has a mandate to investigate and report on the 
observance of human rights, including the right to education (for citizenship). 
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Following a number of publicised incidents of violence in schools, the Commission 
decided to convene public hearings on school-based violence. The SAHRC ‘Report 
of the Public Hearing on School-based Violence’ (2006) has found that “bullying, 
gender-based violence, accidental violence, discrimination and violence, sexual 
assault or harassment, physical violence and psychological violence” (p. v) interfere 
with learners’ Constitutional right to education. In short, the SAHRC identified 
citizens’ rights and responsibilities as a key area that needed attention.   
 
The SAHRC’s report (2006) recommended that schools, through their curriculum, be 
entrusted with promoting rights and responsibilities of citizenship in South African 
schools: 
A rights-based life skills programme should be nationally implemented within 
the existing DoE curriculum that includes peace education, citizenship 
education, anti-bullying, human rights education, anger management, conflict 
resolution and mediation. … Life skills training should have an emphasis on 
child rights and responsibilities that go with them and positive values (South 
African Human Rights Commission, 2006, p. 37).    
 
The Bill of Responsibilities has come to be considered part of Life Orientation, one 
of the compulsory subjects of the national curriculum. The Bill was mainly the work 
of the National Religious Leaders’ Forum (NRLF)
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, which began drafting it in June 
2007. Speaking on behalf of the NRLF, Chief Rabbi Warren Goldstein said the idea 
behind the Bill was “to nurture a culture of giving, care, compassion, duty and 
responsibility in our youths” (The Teacher: ‘From rights to responsibilities’. 2008, p. 
4). As a result, a joint initiative between the NRLF and the DoE introduced the Bill of 
Responsibilities in South African schools with a focus on the 1996 Constitution and 
Bill of Rights. In short, the DoE hopes to convey to the youth that they have a 
                                                 
53
 In 1997 the then-President of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, called upon the 
religious communities to have their leaders constitute a national forum in which all would work 
together towards changing the moral climate of the South African society. This forum became known 
as the National Religious Leaders’ Forum. It consists of and is represented by the majority of faiths 
and religions practised in South Africa. The NRLF Executive consists of a seven-person group of high 
profile religious leaders who encourage, among others, the promotion of moral education in South 
African schools and the wider society (see Just, 16 May 2008). 
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responsibility to respect the right to equality, human dignity, life, family or parental 
care, education, work, freedom and security of the person, property, freedom of 
religion, belief and opinion, a safe environment, citizenship and freedom of 
expression. What is interesting for the purpose of this chapter is the inclusion of 
‘right to citizenship’, and by implication education for citizenship. The assumption 
from the DoE is that through its curriculum, the Bill will ensure that there is common 
understanding of the rights and obligations of citizenship in South African schools. In 
the second section of this chapter, I will argue that the prescriptive and dictatorial 
nature of the Bill (which is supposed to act as a supplement to the 1996 Constitution 
and Bill of Rights) undermines its attempt to educate for citizenship in South African 
schools. I now turn to the genesis of the national Schools Pledge.  
 
The national Schools Pledge is not a new phenomenon in South Africa. The idea of 
the School Pledge was introduced by the Working Group on Values in Education 
(2000)54 as a starting point for a national debate on “the appropriate values South 
Africa ought to embrace in its primary and secondary educational institutions” 
(Department of Education, 2000, p. 1). In other words, the 2000 pledge was supposed 
to be part of a wide ranging national debate that should pronounce on the appropriate 
practice of education for citizenship and democracy in South African schools. The 
proposed pledge did not see the light of day for the following reasons: 1) the 
prevailing opinion was that it enforced unquestioning obedience and loyalty to the 
Republic of South Africa; and 2) it was not considered a priority by the national 
Department of Education. The matter of a new national School Pledge was first raised 
                                                 
54
 In Chapter 5, I hinted at two essential documents that conceptualise values in education for a post-
apartheid South Africa – the ‘Values, Education and Democracy: Report of the Working Group on 
Values in Education’ (Department of Education, 2000) and the ‘Manifesto on Values, Education and 
Democracy’ (Department of Education, 2001). The Manifesto sought “to distil the good things of 
South Africa’s past and give them definition, for the education of future generations of South Africa” 
(Asmal, Foreword, p. 2). Equally, the working group stated that “the definition it gives to values today 
is an avenue to imagining the future character of the South African people” (James, Executive 
Summary, p. 1). Against this backdrop, the working group proposed the promotion of social honour, 
the value which South African school children should regard as desirable. At the heart of teaching 
honour in schools was a pledge of allegiance at weekly school assemblies with a focus on the values 
and principles of the Constitution and Bill of Rights of 1996. 
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by former President Thabo Mbeki in his state of the nation address in February 2008. 
Mbeki said that the government “should develop an oath that will be recited by all 
learners in their morning school assemblies” (State of the Nation Address, 08 
February 2008). Of note is that the idea of a School Pledge is no longer part of a 
national debate, but rather a significant policy statement. Similar to what undergirded 
the 2000 version, the national DoE seeks to require all schoolchildren to recite the 
pledge of allegiance to the Constitution and the Republic of South Africa. This 
chapter holds that the proposed national School Pledge is not consistent with 
individual autonomy, a central feature of democratic theory. I will show that the 
pledge is premised on educating the youth for an ‘uncritical’ and ‘passive’ role in 
South Africa’s democracy.  
 
Of note in the present conjuncture is that South African education policy and 
curriculum development is taken over by religious leaders and the state instead of 
being used to open up national dialogue and debate on the nature and practices of 
learners’ duties and responsibilities in a democratic society. I argued in Chapter 5 that 
in a democracy a wide ranging debate and greater involvement should guide policy 
formulation and curriculum development. The Bill of Responsibilities and the 
national Schools Pledge add to the narrowing of the educational policy agenda of 
‘People’s Education’ that supported a prototypical, maximal conception of education 
for citizenship in South African schools. In the process, the Bill and the Pledge 
undermine the promise of democratic participation that is rooted in the anti-apartheid 
tradition. The DoE only invited public input regarding the content, but not the aim of 
the pledge. In fact, there was no debate (and certainly no evidence of a general 
agreement) about whether the proposed documents constitute part of appropriate 
policies to educate for citizenship and democracy in South African schools.  
 
Instead, members of the public had one month to comment, though the Bill was 
already distributed to schools in February of the same year. Similarly, although the 
School Pledge was announced in February 2008, it had already been published, and 
205 
 
the public was given a month to give input. In general, the Ministry of Education did 
not allow South Africans sufficient time and space for consultation. This form of 
purported participation, which has been referred to by Arnstein’s (1969) as exhibiting 
a ‘degree of tokenism’, is not genuine participation. In their current form the Bill of 
Responsibilities and the School Pledge are not likely to be endorsed by a significant 
proportion of the South African public, particularly learners. In the course of this 
chapter, I will argue that to make the Bill and the new Pledge compelling instruments 
of citizenship will require a national debate that is not confined to religious and 
political leaders alone. It is the ramifications of the maximal concept of democracy, 
with regard to education for citizenship that is likely to get South African learners 
from where they are to where they ought to be. I now turn to a discussion on the Bill 
as part of the state regulated compulsory entitlement to compulsory citizenship 
education for all South African learners in secondary schools. 
 
8.3 The Bill of Responsibilities and democratic citizenship education    
In Chapter 6, I discussed how the ‘Guides for Representative Councils of Learners’ 
(1999) perceived South African learners as essentially hostile, identifying them with 
violence and destruction. The Bill, similarly, embodies the apocalyptic stereotype 
(see Hyslop, 1988 and Seekings, 1993) of a youth who are dangerous, irresponsible, 
uncaring, reckless and ungovernable. To wit, the Bill’s emphasis on socially and 
morally responsible behaviour towards one another is manifest in the following: 
●  Not to endanger the lives of others by carrying dangerous weapons or by 
acting recklessly or disobeying our rules and laws (p. 2) …  
●  To live a healthy life, by exercising, eating correctly by not smoking, abusing 
alcohol, or taking drugs, or indulging in irresponsible behaviour that may 
result in my being infected or infecting others with communicable diseases 
such as HIV and AIDS (p. 2) … 
●  To be kind, compassionate and sensitive to every human being, including 
greeting them warmly and speaking to them courteously (p. 2) … 
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●    Not to hurt, bully, or intimidate others, or allow others to do so (p. 3) … 
●   To adhere to the rules and the Code of Conduct (Department of Education, 
2008, p. 2). 
 
The Bill needs to be commended for striving to instil a sense of rights and 
responsibilities that flow from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(1996). Most laudable is its attempt to address, treat and prevent all forms of violence 
in South African schools. As the Bill tries to make its mark, however, the 
fundamental difficulties in making schools functional that have been with us since the 
transition in 1994, are arguably yet to be alleviated. Similar to the Guides, the authors 
of the Bill are preoccupied with stability and normality in South African schools. By 
promoting order and discipline, the Bill hopes to develop ‘national character’, which 
the DoE regards as desirable. Unfortunately, the emphasis on students’ discipline and 
order is likely to undermine learners’ active engagement with the values considered 
‘core’ by the DoE. If Constitutional values are merely imposed on learners, there is 
the danger of insufficiently engaging, indeed of circumventing, learners’ intellectual 
abilities and critical faculties that must surely constitute the cornerstone of South 
Africa’s democracy.  
 
Explicit in the Bill is the DoE’s endorsement of compulsion to bring the South 
African learners to respect official pronouncements and to develop moral excellence, 
as expected by the state. It follows that the Bill of Responsibilities is inclined to 
demand, if not dictate, unquestioning obedience from learners in South African 
schools. In the last section of this chapter a distinction is made between compulsory 
citizenship education that develops active, self-helping type of character and 
promotes democratic citizenship, on the one hand, and the proposed compulsory 
citizenship education initiatives that undermine democratic citizenship in South 
African schools, on the other. I mentioned earlier in this chapter that the term 
‘dictatorial’ is synonymous with the rise of totalitarian states based on mass 
participation —  that is with the collusion of the masses.  
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A review of literature on violence in urban schools in South Africa (Independent 
Projects Trust, 1990) talks of a culture of violence existing in South African schools 
— a systematic cycle of violence that had its origin in the apartheid years when 
authoritarian institutions stressed obedience, conformity and passivity. A white 
educationist in Christie’s (1988) research expressed his opinion about 
authoritarianism in apartheid South African schools: 
 
In my opinion, African schools, around Johannesburg anyway, are more 
rigidly authoritarian.  … Some African schools are known for their strict 
headmasters, who enforce rules by corporal punishment and even expulsion. 
Children in these schools are strictly disciplined — even regimented (Christie, 
1988, p. 133).          
 
According to Christie, the authority structures in apartheid South African schools 
taught learners that they were expected to be obedient, to conform to the rules — and 
that they would learn what happened if they did abide. In white schools, as discussed 
in Chapter 4, we saw the influence of the apartheid South African Defence Force 
(SADF) in the Youth Preparedness Programme. Kotze’s speech (1972) brought to 
light the ‘physical dangers’ facing white schools: 
  
You have already seen the sirens which are to sound the warning when the 
bombs start falling. Would you know what to do with your pupils if this 
should happen during school-time? Would you know how to extinguish fires, 
how to save people from under the ruins and how to nurse them? (cited in 
Christie, 1988, p. 167).  
 
Kotze’s speech is significant for two reasons: Firstly, it demonstrates the extent of the 
National Party’s authoritarianism in white South African schools; and Secondly, it 
indicates how government control influences the authoritarian hierarchical structures 
to teach a whole range of attitudes, values and assumptions that presumably prepare 
pupils for the wider society. In Chapter 6, I examined the autocratic ‘boy-
government’ and undemocratic School Representative Councils as part of school 
authority structures. I also showed how the ‘prefect system’, both in the British 
colonial era and apartheid South Africa, yielded discontent and undemocratic 
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practices like division and exclusion, excessive power and authority, harsh and 
sadistic punishment, cruelty and bullying. It would appear, then, that the Bill of 
Responsibilities needs to be seen in the context of a colonial-apartheid social system 
as a whole — and its authoritarian schooling system that spans across two centuries. 
 
The language of the Bill is both prescriptive and dictatorial, as exemplified by the 
following responsibilities placed on school children: 
 
The right to citizenship expects that each of us will be good and loyal South 
African citizens. This means that we are responsible for: obeying the laws of 
our country, ensuring that others do so as well, and contributing in every 
possible way to making South Africa a great country. … I accept the call of 
this Bill of Responsibilities, and commit to taking my rightful place as an 
active, responsible citizen of South Africa. By assuming these responsibilities 
I will contribute to building the kind of society which will make me proud to 
be a South African (Department of Education, 2008, pp. 4-5).    
 
Just like Schumpeter’s apathetic and passive citizens, the Bill assumes that school 
learners have a reduced knowledge and understanding of their rights and duties as 
South African citizens. In addition, the Bill’s concept of ‘good’ and ‘loyal’ 
citizenship paints the picture of a school learner who, in the absence of explicit 
exhortation, is incapable of acting in a socially and morally responsible manner. The 
language of ‘obedience’ is highly revealing given that the words ‘good’ and ‘loyal’ 
are not defined or elaborated upon. Furthermore, learners are urged to accept and 
commit themselves to what is, in effect, an impoverished sense of citizenship. On the 
whole, the language of ‘expectation’, ‘acceptance’ and ‘commitment’ manifest in 
these prescriptions is not appropriate for a democratic South Africa. The Bill does not 
embrace a maximal concept of citizenship, that is, of active, critical and inquiring 
citizens who are able to take part in the democratisation of South Africa. The Bill is 
likely to make schools the instruments of slavish obedience to the state and the 
wishes of religious leaders. There is also a noticeable move, to use Dieltiens’s (2005) 
words, away “from … developing autonomous citizens [learners] who are able to 
freely express themselves” (p. 189).   
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In his article, ‘Schools are bad places for kids’, Holt (1974) asks whether schools “are 
trying to raise sheep — timid, docile, easily driven or led — or free men?” (p. 43). 
With regard to South Africa, too, my take is that the Bill is intended to make learners 
“a flock of sheep innocently nibbling the grass side by side” (Mill, 1975, p. 345). If 
what the DoE desires is sheep, namely docile and unquestioning dependents, the Bill 
as part of a compulsory curriculum subject would be the appropriate way of preparing 
South African learners for citizenship. If the South African democratic state yearns 
for active, critical citizens, however, then the Bill’s recommendations are flawed and 
ambiguous, as I will show below. A good citizen is not only an informed individual, 
but a critical and independent subject with an open and inquiring mind. In other 
words, at the heart of state citizenship programmes lies the promotion of individual 
autonomy, the development of intellectual, moral and practical capacities of citizens. 
By contrast, the Bill’s conception of ‘good’ and ‘loyal’ citizenship is likely to 
develop learners who can engage actively with values which the DoE has proclaimed 
to be an unquenchable aspiration in South African schools. The Bill runs roughshod 
over the idea of democratic citizenship developed in the anti-apartheid movement, 
with roots in the Freedom Charter tradition. The state stranglehold over its learners 
has no place in post-apartheid South African schools. Education for democratic 
citizenship is incompatible with such a dictatorial tone.  
 
The Bill’s concept of citizenship is presented as if it were unproblematic. Yet, there 
clearly is a tension in the Bill between minimal and maximal conceptions of 
education for citizenship. On the one hand, the Bill aims to prepare learners for 
‘good’ and ‘loyal’ citizenship while, on the other, it hopes to promote active, 
responsible citizens in schools (this is the core of its ambiguity). Given the Bill’s 
essentially undemocratic make-up, the notion of active, responsible citizenship gives 
rise to ambiguities and tensions inherent in the post-apartheid citizenship education 
policy. I mentioned, earlier in this chapter, that the term ‘dictatorial’ is indicative of 
authoritarian institutions that stressed obedience, conformity and passivity in 
apartheid South African schools. As a result, the Bill’s minimalist view of citizenship 
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in South African schools reflects substantial doubts and reservations with regard to 
the School Student Movement’s concept of participatory democracy based on mass 
participation: learners are being seen by the authors of the Bill as posing a threat to 
the culture of learning and teaching in South African schools. On the whole, the Bill 
echoes both the colonialists’ prefect system and Nationalists’ Youth Preparedness 
Programme that are incompatible with the maximal concept of democracy that 
reflects the model of democracy developed in the Charter tradition — envisioned in 
the anti-apartheid struggle movement — enshrined in the Constitution of South 
Africa (1996). I noted in Chapter 6 and 4 that neither the tradition of prefectship nor 
the YPP have much to contribute to the development of citizenship education in 
South African schools.  
 
The Bill seems to replicate three possible viewpoints identified by Sithole (1998) that 
students’ participation in democratic projects that enhance citizenship education in 
schools is absurd, abnormal, and therefore should be circumscribed. It does so 
against the background of the assumption that students should passively receive 
instructions and behave themselves in accordance with the Constitutional values that 
South African society deems vital for a new order. By seducing or worse, coercing 
children to be ‘good’ and ‘loyal’, the Bill undermines the defence of compulsory 
schooling, and compulsory citizenship education in South African schools, based on 
democratic participation and active citizenry, mounted in the previous chapter. First, 
the Bill is incompatible with individual autonomy, a citizen’s ability and will to act 
for himself or herself. Second, it is not appropriate in terms of building, strengthening 
and consolidating South Africa’s democracy. As the next section will illustrate, the 
School Pledge reinforces the Bill’s prescriptive and dictatorial tone by seeking to 
promote ‘passive’ rather than ‘active’ critical learners in South African schools.  
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8.4 The national Schools Pledge and democratic citizenship education    
The Working Group on Values in Education identified ‘nurturing the new patriotism’ 
as one of the sixteen key strategies for instilling the values of the Constitution in 
South African schools. As mentioned earlier, the group made the argument for a 
School Pledge, writing “We believe that the ritual of declaring a pledge of allegiance 
or vow at weekly school assemblies will serve as a reminder of the fundamental 
values to which South Africans in a democracy aspire” (Department of Education, 
2000). The 2000 version of the School Pledge reads:   
 
I promise to be loyal to my country, South Africa, and to do my best to 
promote its welfare and the well-being of all of its citizens. I promise to 
respect all of my fellow citizens and all of our various traditions. Let us work 
for peace, friendship and reconciliation and heal the scars left by past 
conflicts, and let us build a common destiny together (Department of 
Education, 2000). 
 
Similar to the Bill, the School Pledge’s concept of ‘good’ and ‘loyal’ citizenship 
paints a picture of a school learner who, in the absence of explicit exhortation, is 
incapable of acting in a socially and morally responsible manner. From the old Pledge 
also stem the values of peace, friendship and reconciliation that the DoE regarded as 
necessary in building a common South African citizenship. Alongside the vow of 
allegiance, the group recommended that the national anthem be taught and sung at 
schools. In a democratic society, imposed uniformity (daily recitation and singing) 
does not encourage young people to be informed and critical citizens. This concept of 
learning is susceptible to unthinking compliance, if not uncritical patriotism. In the 
first section of this chapter I stated that the 2000 School Pledge did not make it from 
paper to practical reality partly because it sought to enforce obedience to the state. 
Perhaps not unsurprisingly, the 2000 Pledge was resented and rejected in many 
quarters. 
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Given the history of student struggle against autocratic ‘boy-government’, one might 
have thought that enforced obedience would be seen as undesirable in a democratic 
South Africa. The 2008 version reads:  
 
We, the youth of South Africa, recognising the injustices of our past, honour 
those who suffered and sacrificed for justice and freedom. We will respect and 
protect the dignity of each person and stand up for justice. We sincerely 
declare that we shall uphold the rights and values of our Constitution and 
promise to act in accordance with the duties and responsibilities that flow 
from these rights. !ke e: / xarra // ke [written in the language of the /Xam San 
people, which literally means, diverse people unite] Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika 
[God bless Africa] (Department of Education, 2008, addition mine).   
 
The School Pledge is noble and inspirational in that firstly, it calls on the youth to 
acknowledge the injustices of the past; and secondly, honour the heroes and heroines 
who endured suffering and sacrifice for justice, democracy and citizens’ rights in 
South Africa. Against this background, the words of the Pledge are meant to evoke 
national pride and promote nation-building and common South African citizenship. 
In terms of citizenship, it might be said that the document is crafted with the aim of 
producing informed and thoughtful South African citizens. Unfortunately, the 
concept of education for citizenship informing the Pledge is based on an assumption 
of the state’s supreme wisdom as ‘political’ parent of all South African citizens.   
 
The new School Pledge echoes Plato’s (1994) theory of the family state that places 
educational authority exclusively in the hands of a centralised state. According to 
Plato, the state uses its political authority to educate the young to desire not only what 
is good for themselves, but for their society — to pursue the good of all people. In 
The Republic (1994), Plato writes that it is one of the state’s chief responsibilities to 
inculcate in learners loyalty to the values of the state, and indeed these very values, so 
that children “hear only morally sound stories, which will help them gain the 
appropriate social attitudes, such as respect for their parents, the desire for political 
unity”, and so on (p. 70).  In the case of South Africa, the DoE at the direct request of 
President Thabo Mbeki as head of state has proclaimed social honour as a public 
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value to be absorbed and lived, by young South African citizens. The state as the 
‘political’ parent of all its citizens hopes to educate young people for good 
citizenship, to what Mbeki calls “the new patriotism” (Department of Education, 
2001, p. 15). When the state School Pledge works explicitly with the values enshrined 
in the Constitution it speaks to learners of their duty to obey, and claims also its right 
to rule them. The School Pledge creates the conditions under which its children are 
bound to honour and obey the state. The state claims its right to rule South African 
learners. This parental imagery and its idea of education for citizenship are open to a 
number of objections. It would seem that we have not learned from the past, 
particularly the dangers of legislating a value system and turning it into an ideology.  
 
The most notable objection is that school children will have to recite and memorise 
the pledge. It would appear, then, that the mere recitation of the pledge’s words 
undermines a central tenet of the prototypical view of citizenship and citizenship 
education, that is, the value of individual freedom. Although he does not write about 
the South African pledge, obviously the School Pledge infringement with individual 
autonomy is succinctly summed by Gatto (1993) when he writes: 
 
Our system of government school destroys both mind and character. It 
prevents the formation of the most precious resource of all — a self. To have 
a self you can trust it must be singular, it must be bold, it must be brave, 
resourceful, strong, self-reliant, unfettered. Does anyone … think government 
schools teach such things? (cited in Davie, 2005, p. 18).  
 
In Chapter 7, I mentioned that the pursuit of individual freedom does not stand in 
contrast to the quest for the common good, that is, building, strengthening and 
consolidating South Africa’s democracy. Gatto’s quotation alerts us to a system of 
government that lacks a wholistic approach to educate its democratic citizens. In 
South Africa, as elsewhere, a government’s wholistic approach would include an 
education for citizenship that seeks to develop active characters who contribute to the 
common welfare of society. The well-rounded South African citizen of the future is 
not merely a historically aware learner, but an active, informed and critical individual. 
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On the contrary, the pledge is likely to lead to unreflective socialisation through the 
teaching of social honour in South African schools. 
 
A more damaging outcome would be the reinforcement of an unquestioning and 
uncritical attitude to the values that guide South African social interaction. Similar to 
the Youth Preparedness Programme, South African learners would be socialised into 
unthinking compliance, if not unreflective patriotism. The national School Pledge is a 
ritual that elevates a notion of patriotism that is not open to critical inquiry in South 
African schools. This is especially pertinent in a situation like the recent one where 
‘patriotism’ in South Africa gave rise to rampant xenophobia and brutality towards 
foreigners. In the process individual autonomy is sacrificed in favour of group 
observance and uncritical obedience. I contend that the values which South Africans 
in general and school students in particular, have desired for generations — freedom, 
independence and critical thinking — are not consistent with children repeating lines 
in an habitual manner. This conception of learning endorses rote compliance to the 
detriment of a free, independent and critical society towards which South African 
people aspire.  
 
Gutmann’s (1987) critique of Plato’s family state provides a tool to evaluate the draft 
pledge for schools in South Africa. According to Gutmann, a concept that locates 
educational authority squarely with the state has its particular problem: the most 
obvious one being the difficulty to determine the best Constitution for any society 
and the correct concept of the common good of any person. Let us take a look at how 
Gutmann’s view is reflected in the South African state’s value-based documents. The 
opening lines of the Constitution (1996) and School Pledge’s wording — in particular 
the first two lines — read, respectively:  
 
We the people of South Africa, believe that South Africa belongs to all who 
live in it, united in our diversity (Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 1). We 
the youth of South Africa, recognising the injustices of our past, honour those 
who suffered and sacrificed for justice and freedom. We will respect and 
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protect the dignity of each person and stand up for justice (Department of 
Education, 2008, p. 6).  
 
These two quotations point to the vision of a common South African citizenship, of a 
nation united in diversity and working to build a just society. The School Pledge 
serves as a reminder of the core values towards which South Africans in a 
Constitutional democracy aspire. Importantly, the Constitution and the School Pledge 
support the claim made in Chapter 4 that South Africa’s developing conception of 
citizenship is still very much in the making. In this context, the state’s attempt to 
determine, among other things, how “the Constitution is to be taught, as part of the 
curriculum, and brought to life in the classroom, as well as applied practically in 
programmes” (Department of Education, 2000, p. 1), presents challenges for the way 
future South African citizens will be educated. Clearly, the constituents of a common 
South African citizenship and what constitutes the (sole) good life are yet to be 
discovered. Unless we can establish what determines a common South African 
citizenship, we shall lack a substantial argument to compel school children to swear 
rote allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the School 
Pledge. An argument based solely on nurturing the new patriotism or affirming our 
common citizenship is not only inadequate but dangerous, because patriotism, 
historically, has been linked to the diminution of intellectual abilities and critical 
faculties of learners in schools, as well as the rise of violent xenophobia. 
 
The National Religious Forum and the then-President Thabo Mbeki have sought to 
convince the rest of the South African public that they have discovered the values to 
guide social interaction in schools. It is generally held that the Bill of Responsibilities 
and the patriotic School Pledge provide practical frameworks for instilling and 
reinforcing values that will lead South Africa into its desired future. The message 
from the Bill and the Pledge is the same: 1) there is a need to enforce citizenship 
education programmes that inculcate obedience and loyalty to the Republic of South 
Africa; and 2) these coercive state controlled Constitutional value systems are to be 
given expression in South African schools. As opposed to citizenship itself informing 
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values, the Bill and the Pledge stipulate a common South African citizenship that is 
defined by values. It would appear, however, that a joint venture between the 
National Religious Forum and the government would contravene the spirit of 
‘People’s Education’ and its vision that resembled a prototypical Athenian democracy 
based on mass participation. 
 
Firstly, the religious leaders seem to assume that teaching values in schools does not 
require a process of democratic participation in order to ‘articulate the practice of a 
substantial form of education for citizenship’ in South African schools. Secondly, the 
government is equally wrong in deciding that the best way of inculcating fundamental 
values that underlie our Constitutional democracy is through the daily recitation of a 
patriotic pledge. In this way, the documents are unlikely to be able to forge “the 
citizenship of tomorrow, the common destiny of the South Africa to be” (Department 
of Education, 2001). In the main, the Bill of Responsibilities and the School Pledge’s 
undemocratic nature is incompatible with a maximal interpretation of education for 
citizenship and democracy. Most disturbing is the coercive intrusion of the doctrine 
of state supremacy, to use Paterson’s phrase (cited in Davie, 2005, p. 33), into the 
lives and minds of burgeoning South African citizens, as quoted in Chapter 7. Both 
documents constitute a set back to the South African citizenship educational policy 
development to date. Nonetheless, the Bill of Responsibilities and the School Pledge 
are useful in attempting to probe deeper into a vexed question like, who should share 
the authority to influence the way future citizens are educated?  
 
8.5 The Bill of Responsibilities and the Schools Pledge: dialogue and debate 
In Chapter 2, I argued that education for citizenship is likely to be effective in a 
democracy, where ‘the people’ are encouraged to participate actively in the 
discourses of educational policy development. This prototypical, maximal concept of 
democracy implies genuine engagement and robust debate on government policies 
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with regard to citizenship education in schools. In South Africa, participatory 
democracy with roots in the Charter tradition was a value that was once cherished:  
● The NECC slogan “People’s Education for People’s Power” (1985) 
encouraged collective input and active participation by students, teachers, 
parents and the community in the initiation and management of people’s 
education in all its forms. 
● The National Education Conference (1992) developed a vision of post-
apartheid education policy that was governed by the principle of 
democracy: active participation of various interest groups, in particular 
teachers, parents, workers and students.  
●  The White Paper on Education and Training (1995) was concerned with 
the concept of popular participation, where active participation of all 
parents, teachers and other educators, students, community leaders, 
religious bodies, NGOs, academic institutions, workers, business, the 
media, and development agencies was needed to reconstruct and develop 
the national education and training system so that it was able to build a 
democratic society.   
● Finally, the ‘Values, Education and Democracy: Report of the Working 
Group on Values in Education’ (2000) was a starting point in what ought 
to become a national debate on the appropriate values and mores South 
Africa ought to embrace for its primary and high schools. 
 
These are strategic objectives and practical policies that span across different periods: 
the anti-apartheid struggle, the transition and post-apartheid South Africa. The anti-
apartheid struggle vision of national debate, and of agreement (at least as far as 
possible) about education policy in post-apartheid South Africa, though upheld in 
early policy documents, has diminished in importance. The Bill of Responsibilities 
and the School Pledge do not represent the collective input of the South African 
people that has been arrived at by general consensus [this may have worked in 
traditional African communities — but it hardly constitutes a principle worth 
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pursuing in a modern democracy]. In this section, I point to the importance of a 
general agreement about public virtues and the common good, and about how 
citizenship and education for citizenship themselves are to be understood.      
 
If Gutmann’s (1987) criticism of the family state theory is correct, then the national 
DoE-proposed Bill and the Pledge are morally and educationally suspect. As 
discussed in Chapter 7 it is important to emphasise that states have an important role 
to play in educating for citizenship and democracy. However, a democratic state of 
education recognises that educational authority is distributed among communities: 
parents, teachers, students and professional educators. According to Gutmann: 
 
A democratic state is therefore committed to allocating educational authority 
in such a way as to provide its members with an education adequate to 
participating in democratic politics, to choosing among a range of good lives, 
and to sharing in the several sub-communities, such as families, that impart 
identity to the lives of its citizens (Gutmann, 1987, p. 42).  
 
Unfortunately, citizenship education in South Africa since 1994, as reflected in key 
educational instruments, has been shown to rest on fairly minimalist assumptions, 
with restricted emphasis on political involvement and participation that is seen as 
required by citizenship. Chapters 5 and 6, respectively, dealt with the broad 
distribution of educational authority among citizens: Firstly the ‘progressive’ parent-
teacher-student structures were built on educational relationships based on 
participatory democracy; secondly, and which is why the right to a free and 
compulsory education system was linked to the struggle for a united, non-racial and 
democratic citizenship in South Africa; and thirdly consequently, a defence of 
compulsory citizenship education within the framework of theories of participatory 
democracy was used as a basis for policy recommendations and the implementation 
of future programmes and/or projects in the area of education for democratic 
citizenship in South African schools.  
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However, the state-proposed Bill of Responsibilities and the national School Pledge’s 
(2008) do not offer possible strategies for getting from where we are to where we 
ought to be. It is evident that both documents fall short of the proposed official 
compulsory citizenship education in South African schools as shown in the previous 
chapter. When compulsory citizenship education is given a more ‘maximal’ or 
‘active’ definition, schools ensure that burgeoning citizens’ characters are developed 
through critical and creative thinking and reasoning, while at the same time 
contributing to the democratic project that seeks the common good in South Africa’s 
democracy. In other words, this is an account of citizenship education that values 
individual autonomy and consolidates democracy in South African schools. By 
contrast, as we have seen, the Bill of Responsibilities and the School Pledge present a 
forceful case for resting educational authority exclusively with a centralised state, 
especially if schools — as they are often caricatured — are mere instruments of the 
ideological apparatus of state.  
 
McLaughlin (1992) acknowledged the complexity contained within the concept of 
education for citizenship: 
 
It is the absence of agreement about … public virtues and the common good, 
which gives rise to the various disputes about ‘citizenship’ and ‘education for 
citizenship’ which have been alluded to. With regard to the educational task, 
this lack of agreement constitutes a challenge to those seeking to justify a 
‘maximalist’ approach, to specify the concrete shape it should take, to defend 
it against accusations of exercising illicitly centripetal influences and to 
provide confident answers to questions such as whether education for 
citizenship can transmit a particular way of life (McLaughlin, (1992, p. 243).    
 
In Chapter 4, I mentioned that Ramphele (2001) explored the complexities of 
defining citizenship and challenges the tendency to assume that there is one form of 
citizenship in post-1994 South Africa. Furthermore, I examined competing concepts 
of citizenship, which show the challenges posed for democratic education in post-
apartheid South African schools. In post-apartheid South African education policy, 
there is also a need for a wide ranging national debate about the most appropriate 
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education for citizenship that should guide the values proclaimed as appropriate for a 
democratic society. South Africa needs a programme of action that secures the 
commitment of a significant proportion of the population: students, teachers, parents 
and the wider community. The debate about ‘forms’ of education for citizenship will 
arguably never be closed and, indeed, ought to remain alive at this time and in the 
future. If we are to live our Constitution and our Bill of Rights rather than just hear it 
interpreted for school learners, the DoE’s responsibility will be to teach South 
African youth to think, and not to impose rote compliance or to indoctrinate them. 
The values prescribed and enforced in the Bill of Responsibilities and the School 
Pledge run the risk of closing down, rather than opening up, a meaningful debate 
about values that South Africans have desired for generations, and still aspire to.  
 
 
8.6 Citizenship education in South African schools: ‘the new patriotism’ or 
cosmopolitanism 
In the absence of the adage “think globally, act locally”, patriotism, that is, blind 
identification or pride for the uniqueness of one’s country, arguably makes sense. 
However, the discussion in the previous chapters of the ‘classical theory’, especially 
its emphasis on participation and its concept of citizenship has shown that  
 ● norms of universal moral respect and reciprocal recognition imply that 
citizens can be taught to put themselves in the place of others in making both 
moral and political judgements (Benhabib, 2002);   
●  the basic principles of democratic citizenship education are neither western nor 
(South) African but apply to any part of the globe (Enslin and Horsthemke, 
2004);  
●  the Advisory Group’s notion of a ‘successful’ citizenship education in schools 
is one that teaches participatory democracy and active citizenship not only in 
the context of the United Kingdom or the European Union but, indeed, in a 
global context (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998); 
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●  the United Nations’ global policies on compulsory citizenship education 
enable every child to form generative relationships and to know his/her 
rights and responsibilities at any level, local, national, regional or global. 
 
In contemporary debates, the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ is often used to refer to the 
community of human beings, i.e. moral and political ties that bind citizens of nation 
states like South Africa to the rest of the world. A cosmopolitan vision, for example, 
underpins the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The Preamble of the 
Declaration proclaims: “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family… a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations” (United Nations, 1948). Put differently, 
cosmopolitanism yields ethical norms that ought to govern relations of the human 
family. With regard to this conception of cosmopolitanism, there are three reasons for 
being particularly reluctant to teach patriotism or national pride in post-apartheid 
South African schools as a component of citizenship education. First, the conception 
of patriotism as a citizenship education programme brings to mind an ideology 
characterising South Africa’s fairly recent past that I have not yet discussed in this 
thesis: the ideology of Christian Nationalism. Second, the Bill of Responsibilities and 
the national School Pledge are likely to exhibit elements of democratic nationalism.
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Third, cosmopolitanism as a philosophical project implies that education for 
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 According to Crick (1964) the meaning of democratic nationalism is found in the coincidence of its 
two parent terms, ‘democracy’ and ‘nationalism’. As a national project, democratic nationalism has 
three main features.  First, “it maintains that an identified population has a unique set of characteristics, 
which identify it as a nation” (Cashmore, 1994, p. 224). Second, it embraces the notion of national 
sentiment which refers to loyalties of the people towards the nation rather than the world. Third, and 
consequently, it asserts the primacy of national identity over the claims of globalisation, universalism 
or cosmopolitanism. In South Africa, the 1996 Constitution maintains that South Africa is a 
democratic state committed, at least in theory, to “government [being] based on the will of the people” 
(p. 1, addition mine), on the one hand, and the Bill of Responsibilities and the national School Pledge 
promote national pride and nation-building, and a sense of common citizenship, on the other. In brief, 
the notion of democratic nationalism is applicable in post-apartheid South Africa, given that 
nationalism can also be found in locations that have the appearance of being rigorously democratic. In 
support of this claim alongside the vow of allegiance, the national anthem is taught and sung in South 
African schools. Furthermore, in a democratic society, imposed uniformity (daily recitation and 
singing) does not encourage young people to be cosmopolitan in their outlook.  
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citizenship and democracy in South Africa should recognise that learners have a 
common humanity and a sense of solidarity with others on the globe.   
 
In this section, I will examine CNE, its history and its basic beliefs. I will not discuss 
specific programmes in apartheid South Africa which were designed to promote 
Christian National beliefs, that is, the Nationalist Youth Preparedness Programme and 
the Veld Schools. I have already discussed these citizenship education programmes in 
Chapter 4. During the 1930s and 1940s Afrikaner nationalism grew, and CNE 
constituted a substantial part of this growth. In 1948 the Institute for CNE published a 
well-known pamphlet setting out Christian education policy. The introduction of the 
pamphlet stated 
 
that Afrikaans-speaking children should have a Christian-Nationalist 
education, for the Christian and Nationalist spirit of the Afrikaner nation must 
be preserved and developed. … By Christian, in this context, we mean 
according to the creeds of the three Afrikaner churches; by Nationalist we 
mean imbued with the love of one’s own, especially one’s own language, 
history, and culture. … Nationalism must be rooted in Christianity (Federasie 
van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereenigings, 1948, p. 1).  
 
A Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS) describes these 
schools as follows: 
 
At these schools, Dutch was the medium of instruction for most subjects at the 
primary level, although in the CNE high schools in towns English continued 
to be the main medium of instruction. … In all CNE schools there was a 
strong emphasis on Christian teaching according to the Calvinist doctrine. … 
The majority of Dutch-Afrikaner children were sent to these schools (SPRO-
CAS, 1971, p. 72). 
 
There are a number of points to make about the Christian National Education as a 
dominant ideology under the National Party government. First, CNE points out that 
white education had a specific political goal — Afrikaner nationalist struggle or 
nationalism, “to fight the perceived challenges of British imperialism and a black 
majority in South Africa” (Leatt et al, 1986, p. 72). Second, Afrikaner nationalism 
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was imprinted through language and cultural heritage, history and traditions, so as to 
inculcate a spirit of patriotism in white schools. Third, as a policy for white 
Afrikaans-speaking children, the CNE notion of citizenship education invariably 
reinforced the apartheid race-based understanding of citizenship. Lastly, Christian 
National Education was, in effect, a set of national political projects disguised as 
‘patriotic’ education projects.  
 
The National Education Policy Act (39) of 1967 also reflected the Afrikaner ideology 
of Christian-Nationalism: 
 
education in schools maintained, managed and controlled by a department of 
State (including a provincial administration) shall have a Christian character, 
but that the religious conviction of the parents and pupils shall be respected in 
regard to religious instruction and ceremonies … education shall have a broad 
national character (Republic of South Africa, 1967, p. 376). 
 
According to Malherbe (1977), in 1971 the Minister of Education defined Christian 
National Education in the following way: 
 
Christian Education in schools shall have a Christian character founded on the 
Bible and imprinted … through religious instruction as a compulsory non-
examination subject. National Education in schools shall have a broad 
national character which shall be imprinted … through the conscious 
expansion of every pupil’s knowledge of the fatherland, embracing language 
and cultural heritage, history and traditions, national symbols … participation 
of pupils in national festivals, and their regular honouring of the national 
symbols, so as to inculcate a spirit of patriotism, founded on loyalty and 
responsibility towards the fatherland, its soil and its natural resources (see 
Malherbe, 1977, pp. 147-148).
 
 
 
The above discussion of CNE contributes to the discussion of patriotism, nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism in many ways. First, its shows that teaching patriotism has been 
the force behind the development of Christian National character in the apartheid 
South African schools. Secondly, reminiscent of the CNE, through the Bill and the 
School Pledge the National Religious Forum and the democratic government 
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emphasise the importance of national loyalties above that of humanity in general. 
Thirdly, given the influence of Christian-Nationalist government conception of 
citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa, there is arguably a tension between the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’s (1996) ‘cosmopolitan’ goals and the 
Bill and the Pledge’s ‘democratic national’ goals. Fourthly, against the backdrop of 
apartheid Christian-National based citizenship; it will be argued that a blend of 
patriotism and cosmopolitanism is appropriate for a successful education for 
citizenship and democracy in post-apartheid South Africa.
56
 Lastly, the erstwhile 
institution of CNE alerts policy-makers of the dangers of unintended functions of the 
school, that is, the “development of compliance and submissiveness”, even from 
citizenship education initiatives that claim to speak to democratic national audience 
(Hamm, 1989, p. 56).  
 
In Chapter 4, I mentioned that the rejection of the volk’s ‘ethnic nationalism’ gave 
rise to the emergence of a popular notion of democratic citizenship associated with 
the Charter tradition in the 1950s. This analysis and discussion of citizenship 
education programmes point to the contested notions of citizenship in South Africa 
that have also affected post-apartheid citizenship education policy, as well as the 
conditions under which it has to be implemented. Although the Bill of 
Responsibilities and the patriotically-tinged School Pledge are built on the democratic 
concept of citizenship echoed in the Constitution of South Africa (1996), section 2 
and 3 of this chapter have shown that the documents are prescriptive and promote 
national pride, if not unquestioning loyalty, to the state. Furthermore, the Bill of 
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 This ‘balanced’ approach for teaching citizenship education requires that patriotism and 
cosmopolitanism be treated as controversial issues. This help to mitigate negative effects of patriotism, 
such as the prescriptive and dictatorial tone and dictating or demanding unquestioning obedience from 
learners in South African schools. I would like to reiterate three features that underpin the defence of 
compulsory citizenship education in post-apartheid South Africa. In Chapter 7 I argued that 
compulsory citizenship education can be justified on the grounds that  
● it promotes individual freedom, the pursuit of the general enlightenment;    
●  it builds social cohesion–the political goal or common good in post-apartheid South Africa; 
●  it guarantees South African learners the freedom to opt out of ‘official’ compulsory 
citizenship education initiatives like the Bill of Responsibilities and the patriotic Schools 
Pledge.   
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Responsibilities and the national School Pledge do not embrace cosmopolitan ideals, 
i.e. they place allegiance to South Africa ahead of universal humanity. 
 
What, if anything, might be said in favour of teaching patriotism in post-apartheid 
South African schools? In his chapter ‘Should Schools Teach Patriotism’ (2008), 
Brighouse identified four reasons for seeking to promote patriotism in present-day 
societies, reasons that provide a useful framework for further analysis in post-
apartheid South African schools:  
● Obligation: People do, in fact have special obligations to put their 
compatriots first, and they will be more likely to discharge these obligations if 
they are taught a sense of national identification. 
● Solidarity: Patriotic identification helps to underpin the sense of social 
solidarity we need to achieve in order for people to be willing to make the 
sacrifices necessary to achieve and maintain a just distribution of liberties, 
opportunities and resources in society. 
● Citizenship: People who have come to identify with their compatriots will 
find it easier to develop and exercise the traits of the good citizen. In 
particular, it will be easier for them to modify their demands with reason if 
they acknowledge those they are arguing with as people with whom they 
identify.  
● Flourishing: Identification with a particular place and the people in it is an 
important component of human flourishing. Being connected to other people 
makes a vital contribution to most people’s sense of well-being, and by 
encouraging patriotic sentiment helps to feel that sense of connection with the 
people in their immediate vicinity (see Brighouse, 2008, p. 102).      
 
It is important to note that Brighouse’s four cornerstones strongly resemble the centre 
of teaching patriotism in the Bill of Responsibilities. Firstly, the Bill’s preamble 
reminds South African learners of their obligation, namely duties and responsibilities 
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to themselves and their fellow learners. Secondly, the Bill conveys to the youth that 
they have a responsibility to build solidarity, that is, “a common sense of belonging 
and national pride” (Department of Education, 2008, p. 1). Thirdly, “the right to 
citizenship expects [learners] to be good and loyal South African citizens” 
(Department of Education, 2008, p. 4). Lastly, in order for a democratic state to 
flourish, that is, to bring prosperity and secure individual liberties, learners are urged 
to “accept the call of th[e] Bill of Responsibilities, and commit themselves to take 
their rightful places as active, responsible citizens of South Africa” (Department of 
Education, 2008, p. 5). The discussion of Brighouse contributes to the proposed 
compulsory citizenship education initiatives in South African schools in two ways. 
First, the concept and criteria of patriotism inculcate norms of social behavior 
exclusively focused on promoting national obligation, solidarity and citizenship. 
Secondly, Osler and Starkey’s (2005) argument, that our lives and those of others are 
linked globally as well as locally, renders Brighouse’s notion of human flourishment 
or fulfillment questionable, at least in post-apartheid South African schools.  
  
There are two difficulties with teaching patriotism in South African schools. First, at 
the core of patriotism is a sense of obligation, solidarity and identification with one’s 
nation, South Africa — the very opposite of Benhabib’s (2002) norms of universal 
moral respect and reciprocal recognition envisioned in the Advisory Group on 
Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools in Britain and 
the United Nations global policies on compulsory citizenship education, as discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 7, respectively. Second, the South African Constitution of 1996 
seeks to: “build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as 
a sovereign state in the family of nations” (Republic of South Africa, p. 1). However, 
a tension between South Africa’s pledge to democratic universalism claim, on the one 
hand, and the Bill and the national School Pledge’s conceptions of patriotism, on the 
other, is likely to undermine cosmopolitan citizenship and, by implication, learning 
for cosmopolitan citizenship. It is for the reasons listed above that post-apartheid 
citizenship education policy should allow for the problematisation of teaching 
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patriotism; namely, it should allow a place in the curriculum for teaching patriotism 
in South African schools, but that it should be taught as a controversial issue. 
 
In the discussion that follows, I argue that the recent citizenship education initiatives, 
especially the School Pledge, exhibit features of what Crick (1964) term democratic 
nationalism. According to McLean (1995), nationalism is related to patriotism since 
the term nationalism “contains a different dimension to mere patriotism, which can be 
a devotion to one’s country or nation devoid of any project for political action” (p. 
334). In other words, patriotism stimulates and informs nationalism, although the 
term is not always nationalistic as interpreted by the National Party during apartheid 
South Africa. In the context of this chapter, the concept democratic nationalism refers 
to a democratic nation built on national “shared values, habits and practices that 
assure respect for one another’s rights and regular fulfilment of personal, civic and 
collective responsibilities” (Etzioni, 1995, p. 155). In South Africa, democratic 
nationalism describes patriotism, i.e. love of country “that the citizens feel as their 
own business… love coupled with self-interest and pride … political love translate[d] 
… into the practices of participatory democracy” (Viroli, 1995, p. 181).  
 
The fact that nationalism emerges at the time that South African education policy 
claims to promote and consolidate democracy in schools is of significance. The two 
terms, ‘democracy’ and ‘nationalism’, imply that even long-established democracies 
or those in transition to democracy require of its citizens to think and act locally. In 
other words, cosmopolitanism is likely to be presented as unpatriotic and in 
opposition to the endeavour of forging a democratic national character. This 
portrayal, I will argue, is unlikely to contribute to the “build[ing of] a united and 
democratic South Africa ... as a sovereign state in the family of nations” (Republic of 
South Africa, p. 1). The chapter will now present a case against democratic 
nationalism, dangers of nationalism, even from initiatives that purport to democratic 
universalism in South African schools. In short, patriotism stimulates and informs 
nationalism in South Africa’s democracy.  
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In post-apartheid South Africa, the Bill of Responsibilities and the national School 
Pledge have several commonalities with Afrikaner nationalism. These are the 
common features between Afrikaner nationalism and democratic nationalism:  
●   they both aim to forge a national character based on forced obedience, if not 
unquestioning loyalty, to the Republic of South Africa;  
●  national citizenship education programmes are not neutral, open education 
initiatives; rather they have a particular political purpose — that is, to spread a 
particular nationalist worldview;  
●  they lack genuine engagement and robust debate on government policies with 
regard to citizenship education in South African schools;  
● in the final analysis, both conceptions of education for citizenship lack the 
strength and impetus to cross national boundaries and be truly cosmopolitan 
in practice.  
 
In Chapter 5, I mentioned that what is emerging in post-apartheid education policy in 
South Africa is a concept of citizenship education consisting of complex and 
contradictory elements that provide both continuity and discontinuity with what 
preceded the historic 1994 democratic elections. In brief, South Africa does not have 
a settled concept of citizenship to draw on, and by implication education for  
citizenship and democracy too, is still at a formative stage.57 I think there are some 
dangers inherent in these ‘patriotic’ educational projects in post-apartheid South 
African schools. According to Crick (1964), democratic nationalism is problematic 
because it reflects at once the two greatest weaknesses in the claims for nationalism: 
“the assumption that there are objective characteristics by which nations are known, 
                                                 
57
 In post-apartheid citizenship education policy, with the restoration of equal citizenship and the 
establishment of a non-racial democracy, one might have thought that the idea of citizenship 
education, explicitly built on the tradition of democratic participation, would be seen as vital in order 
to bring together those previously divided. In theory, the Constitution (1996) embraces an updated 
version of the Athenian prototype of democracy, and its notion of citizenship. In practice, however, 
South Africa’s emergent, post-1994 conception of citizenship tends toward a ‘transformed’ citizen able 
to overcome the apartheid divide, i.e. race and ethnicity-based contested notions of citizenship in South 
Africa, without committing to the provision of the tools necessary for such transformation (both 
internal/personal and external/political), in pursuit of a modified version of the prototypical concept of 
democratic citizenship envisioned in the Freedom Charter. 
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and the assumption that there can be any single criterion of the proper unit of 
population to enjoy its own government” (Crick, 1964, p. 75). This chapter is critical 
of the concept of compulsory citizenship education that underpins the post-apartheid 
South African schools.  
 
To recall from Chapter 7, I argued that within the theoretical framework of the 
Athenian version of democratic citizenship, compulsion in post-apartheid South 
Africa schools can be justified on the grounds that: 
● it promotes individual autonomy, a citizen’s ability and inclination to act for 
him-/herself;  
●  it builds social cohesion–the political goal or common good in post-apartheid 
South Africa; 
●  it does “not infringe upon the wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the 
learner” (Hamm, 1989, p. 38);  
●   education policies by the United Nations world body indicate that the right to 
education, often associated with compulsory attendance, and the notion of 
citizenship education are not in conflict with one other. 
 
In contrast, the Bill of Responsibilities and the national School Pledge undermine 
compulsory citizenship education by:  
●    nurturing ‘patriotism’, or blind loyalty to the Republic of South Africa;  
●  dictating or demanding unquestioning obedience from learners in South 
African schools;   
●  infringing on individual freedom to opt out of ‘official’ school compulsory 
citizenship education namely all schoolchildren are required to recite the 
pledge of allegiance to the Constitution and the Republic of South Africa;  
●  not embracing cosmopolitan ideals, that is, they place allegiance to South 
Africa ahead of universal humanity. 
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Given the two contending conceptions of compulsory schooling, I contend that the 
Bill of Responsibilities and the national School Pledge have no educational 
significance in post-apartheid South African schools. By contrast, cosmopolitan 
norms, to use Benhabib’s (2006) words, are “a promising emergence of new political 
configurations and new forms of agency, inspired by the interdependence citizenship 
— never frictionless but ever promising — of the local, the national, and the global” 
(p. 74). In the discussion that follows, I argue that citizenship education initiatives, 
such as the School Pledge, are unlikely to educate for cosmopolitan citizenship.  
 
In her essay ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ (1994), Nussbaum argues that 
“emphasis on patriotic pride is both morally dangerous and, ultimately, subversive to 
the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of justice and equality” 
(p. 1). The concern I have with the conceptions of citizenship in the Bill and the 
Pledge is that co-nationals are not the only “justice-oriented citizens”, in Westheimer 
and Kahne’s (2004) words. Put differently, “the demos is not an ethnos, and those 
living in our midst and who do not belong to the ethnos are not strangers either; they 
are rather cohabitants … our co-citizens of foreign origin (Benhabib, 2006, p. 66). As 
demonstrated by the recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa, “a policy of 
encouraging identification with co-nationals for the purposes of getting them to treat 
each other better may risk making it harder for them to treat foreigners justly as an 
unintended side-effect” (Brighouse, 2008, p. 104). Therefore, promoting patriotism 
on citizenship grounds may also cause learners to abandon their duties to non-South 
Africans, or foreigners, to be precise. Though the forces of democracy gave birth to 
the Bill of Responsibilities and the national Schools Pledge, this should not blind 
South Africans to the need for critical engagement with them both at a theoretical and 
practical level. South Africa is a democratic state ‘in the family of nations’. Clearly, 
South Africa ought not just to pay lip service to this cosmopolitan norm of 
democracy.     
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What are cosmopolitan citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship education? 
Cosmopolitan citizenship: 
 
is based on a feeling of belonging and recognition of diversity across a range 
of communities from the local to the global. … Cosmopolitan citizenship 
requires consideration of the meaning and implications of belonging to a 
world community and an appreciation of the nature and scope of common 
human values. … Learning for cosmopolitan citizenship therefore requires the 
development of a global awareness, an understanding of and commitment to 
human rights, and opportunities to act with others to make a difference (Osler 
and Starkey, 2005, p. 78).  
 
There are two points worth noting about Osler and Starkey’s (2005) examination of 
cosmopolitan citizenship and education. First, education for cosmopolitan citizenship 
is likely to give South African learners a sense of belonging and recognition of their 
common humanity. Second, the examination is useful in distinguishing a universal 
compulsory schooling, and compulsory citizenship education that promotes 
democratic universalism in South African schools, on the one hand, and the Bill of 
Responsibilities and the national School Pledge that place allegiance to South Africa 
ahead of universal humanity, on the other. In other words, a cosmopolitan notion of 
compulsory schooling that combines a commitment to humanistic principles and 
universal democratic norms challenges the Bill of Responsibilities and the national 
School Pledge’s nationalistic conceptions of compulsion that emphasise the primacy 
of the nation state.   
 
Although she is not writing about South Africa, Nussbaum (1994) also recommends 
education for cosmopolitan citizenship on the grounds that 
• universal humanity is valuable for self-knowledge; 
• global problems require international cooperation; and 
• cosmopolitan citizenship accommodates both local loyalties and ethical 
recognition of the whole of humanity (Nussbaum, 1994, pp. 5-7).  
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In the case of South Africa, in particular, education for cosmopolitan citizenship has a 
lot to offer in terms of filling the gaps identified in the criteria used to analyse and 
judge post-apartheid citizenship education policy: 
1. a cosmopolitan democracy is useful in showing that a lack of conceptual 
clarity, coherence and consistency in citizenship and citizenship education is 
not a South African phenomenon; that is, citizenship (and by implication 
citizenship education) as an idea and a practice, is constantly subject to 
contestation, changes and redefinition worldwide;  
2. unlike a post-apartheid South African education for citizenship that does not 
guide the practice in terms accessible to the school’s democratic community, a 
cosmopolitan citizenship education appeals to universal moral norms; that is, 
citizenship education is likely to be a status, a feeling and a practice that is 
enjoyed by a significant proportion of its democratic audience in schools and 
beyond;  
3. contrary to a post-apartheid education for citizenship that is unable to 
articulate the practice of a substantial form of student representative 
democracy, cosmopolitan education provides opportunities for South African 
learners to influence decisions made outside of the republic by questioning 
regional, continental and global democratic institutions;  
4. in a sense, active, critical and enquiring cosmopolitan learners are able to 
respond to a changing world, a world in which South Africa is closely 
intertwined with the rest of the globe; and  
5. a cosmopolitan education is significant because it alerts South African 
learners of the existence of an ethic that transcends blinkered patriotism or 
loyalty to one’s nation state.   
 
So, as we saw in the above defense of cosmopolitan education, it is a discussion of 
the negotiation between universal and particular, between status (to be a citizen) and 
practice (to act as a citizen), between the ‘taught’ and the ‘caught’ notions of 
citizenship. Learners will understand that human problems experienced in South 
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Africa are trans-national and trans-cultural in scope. Furthermore, they will realise 
that cosmopolitan citizenship does not deny the importance of national obligation, 
solidarity and identification; rather, it recognises universal human values as its 
standard to educate for citizenship and teach democracy in South African schools. In 
brief, to borrow from Osler and Vincent (2002), “education for cosmopolitanism is 
about enabling [South African] learners to make connections between their 
immediate contexts and the global context; it encompasses citizenship as a whole” (p. 
124; addition mine). In this context, education for cosmopolitan citizenship is not in 
tension with citizenship education in South Africa. On the contrary, as the 1996 
Constitution claims, cosmopolitanism allows learners to practice citizenship within 
and between nations. In their current form the Bill and the School Pledge do not give 
support to cosmopolitan ideals that require South Africa learners to learn, cooperate 
and interact with fellow pupils in other parts of the world.  
 
It is evident, then, that citizenship education in South African schools vacillates 
between the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’s (1996) ‘cosmopolitan’ 
goals and the Bill and the Pledge’s ‘democratic national’ goals. The tension between 
the Bill claims “to extend out friendship and warmth to all nations and all the peoples 
of the world in our endeavour to build a better world” (Department of Education, 
2008, p. 1), on the one hand, and the national School Pledge calls on learners to 
“declare that we shall uphold the rights and values of our Constitution and promise to 
act in accordance with the duties and responsibilities that flow from these rights” 
(Department of Education, 2008), on the other, is not helpful either. It would appear, 
then, that “the requirement that children recite the Pledge of Allegiance … a ‘daily 
act of patriotic observance’” (Brighouse, 2008, p. 95) is likely to render post-
apartheid compulsory citizenship education policy instruments conceptually 
incoherent. As it were, the documents do not rearticulate the meaning of democratic 
universalism as espoused in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996).  
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8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter began by describing the Bill of Responsibilities and the new National 
School Pledge’s approach to citizenship education for a post-apartheid South Africa. 
The national Department of Education’s Bill of Responsibilities and the national 
Schools Pledge stem from the desire to respond to the constant threat of school-based 
violence in South African schools. There are profound problems with the Bill and the 
Pledge’s implicit notions of citizenship and citizenship education. The Bill is likely to 
produce obedient and loyal citizens, not active, critical and inquiring South African 
citizens. Similar to the 2000 Pledge, the new vow is intended to nurture ‘patriotism’, 
or loyalty to the Republic of South Africa. There is a lack of genuine engagement and 
robust debate on public values, which should undergird the practice of a substantial 
form of compulsory citizenship education in South African schools. Instead, the Bill 
and the Pledge yield another form of compulsion, one that enforces compliance and 
passivity in South African schools. Unless post-apartheid citizenship education policy 
ceases to be confined to vertical relations between individuals and power/state and 
recognises that South African learners should have a common humanity and a sense 
of solidarity with others on the globe, the future of citizenship education in South 
African schools does not hold much promise. Indeed, I think if we have to come to 
the point where education policy makers, if they are at all serious about the future of 
citizenship education in South African schools, must find a way of putting differing 
interpretations of education for citizenship on the table for debate and synthesis. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
What are the conceptions of education that enable the creation of democratic citizens?   
In a democratic polity, citizenship education can be said to have one aim only: to 
foster active, critical and inquiring individuals able to contribute to the common 
welfare of society. It is this prototypical concept of active citizenry, with regard to 
education for democratic citizenship that I find still relevant in post-apartheid South 
African schools. This maximal concept of citizenship sees schools as inseparable 
from community engagement, i.e. citizenship education in relation to democracy 
requires a range of forms of learning both ‘taught’ and ‘caught’, or ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ schools. Where are we in terms of citizenship education in a democratic 
South African society?  
 
Are the South African education policy and subsequent curriculum development 
conceptually coherent? Does the concept of education for citizenship speak to its 
intended democratic audience? What about the concept of student participation and 
representation? Does it embrace a representative model of democracy? Does it cover 
opportunities for teaching about citizenship in schools and beyond? Is it able to foster 
active, critical and inquiring individuals capable of building, strengthening and 
consolidating South Africa’s democracy? Are compulsory schooling and compulsory 
citizenship education based on participatory democracy or on forced obedience, if not 
unquestioning loyalty, to the state? Does education policy offer possible strategies for 
getting from where we are to where we ought to be? The anti-apartheid struggle, and 
its concept of “People’s Education for People’s Power” that embodies the Athenian 
notion of people’s power, sheds light on these questions. 
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Since its origin, both the classical and revisionist writers have pointed to the problem 
of practice, of the realisation of the democratic ideal. Fundamental to the attack of 
‘the classical theory of democracy’ is that democracy is both unfeasible and 
undesirable — indeed, an illusion. However, a substantial body of philosophical work 
constituting variations on the Athenian prototype of democracy, deliberative 
democracy and participatory forms of representation, indicate the relevance, 
effectiveness and practicability of the Athenian concept of citizenship, and correlated 
notion of education in modern democratic societies. Looking back to the discussion 
of democracy in the times of the Greek city-state of Athens in Chapter 2, we find that 
theories of democracy (re)affirmed and (re)established a defensible theory of 
participation as a viable model of democracy.  
 
In the classical canon of democratic theory, Pericles (Thucydides, 1972) saluted a 
maximal Athenian prototype as the best possible regime. Later theorists of the 
prototypical, maximal concept of democracy, such as Rousseau (1968) and Mill 
(1975), showed that citizens’ active participation in a democracy is likely to be 
educational, that is, to contribute to the education of the people’s intellectual, moral 
and practical capacities. In the face of extant scepticism, contemporary theorists of 
deliberative democracy, such as Budge (1993), Benhabib (1996) and Cohen (1989), 
have also shown that participation and the decision-making role of ‘the people’ 
furnish realistic, feasible principles. The discussion of Pericles (Thucydides, 1972), 
Marshall (1950) and McLaughlin (1992) in Chapter 3 resulted in endorsing a 
maximal concept of citizenship and citizenship education that is both democratic and 
active/ participative in its orientation.  
 
However, post-apartheid South African education policy does not embrace an 
updated version of the Athenian prototype of citizenship as a foundation for 
citizenship education in schools. I have demonstrated that a set of state policy 
instruments that include the White Paper on Education and Training, the South 
African Schools Act, Curriculum 2005 (in its original and revised versions), the 
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‘Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy’, the Guides for Representative 
Councils of Learners, and the proposed Bill of Responsibilities and the new national 
Schools Pledge, lack an adequate conception of participatory democracy and active 
citizenship in a number of arguments which will now be summarised. 
 
One of the central points made here is that South African education policy documents 
undermine democratic participation and active citizenry, conceptions first developed 
and put into practice in the Greek city-state of Athens. This argument is pursued in 
Chapter 4 which shows the tension in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (1996) between ‘symbolic’ and ‘substantive’ conceptions of citizenship and, 
by implication, of citizenship education. Unfortunately, post-apartheid South African 
citizenship and citizenship education put more emphasis on the ‘transformative’ 
goals, as compared to the ‘democratic’ project. Consequently, the democratic 
elements are tentatively expressed and outweighed by the general transformative 
orientation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). In the final 
analysis, post-apartheid citizenship education policy’s lack of conceptual clarity, 
coherence and consistency can be attributed to the conflicting forms and conceptions 
of citizenship in South Africa. 
 
What is the significance for my enterprise of the arguments in Chapters 5, 6 and 8? 
As far as Chapter 5 is concerned, the significance is that policy on citizenship 
education has become more minimal and less participatory than that envisioned in the 
anti-apartheid struggle and originally enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa 
(1996). Against this background, the South African education policy’s conception of 
education for citizenship does not guide the practice in terms accessible to the 
school’s democratic community, namely parents, teachers and students, non-teaching 
staff, the principal and co-opted members. Put differently, post-apartheid citizenship 
education policy does not speak to its intended democratic audience. As it stands, 
South African education policy does not pursue active community engagement with 
sufficient rigour and consistency.  
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To elaborate, the White Paper on Education and Training (1995) reflects a conception 
of popular participation, which appeals to the collective strength of the community 
with respect to policy formulation and curriculum development, on the one hand, and 
relies on the national Department of Education experts to give advice on matters 
relating to democratic participation and representation in South African schools, on 
the other. At the heart of the South African Schools Act (1996) lies the idea of 
democratic governance and partnership, but the Act fails to assign more than a 
minimal and conditional role to the School Governing Body members. Curriculum 
2005 (1997) embraces an updated/modified version of the Athenian prototype of 
democracy, and its notion of citizenship, but this prototypical, maximal concept is 
given a subsidiary status in South African schools. The ‘Manifesto on Values, 
Education and Democracy’ does not encourage a maximalist interpretation of 
citizenship education. The document’s concept of citizenship education mirrors that 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), which vacillates between 
‘transformative’ goals and democratic goals. The expunging of Citizenship or Civics 
education from the Revised National Curriculum Statement (2002) suggests that the 
minimalist conceptions of education for citizenship, as reflected in the original 
Curriculum 2005 documents, still persist. 
 
In brief, educational policy developments during the period of ‘consensus seeking’ 
exhibit a trend towards ‘retreat’, i.e. the centering and narrowing of the educational 
policy agenda of the anti-apartheid struggle and its concept of “People’s Education 
for People’s Power” that embodies a prototypical, maximal conception of education 
for citizenship in South African schools. The post-apartheid South African education 
policy approach favoured by the government — a top down, vertical logic — 
tampered with the radical ideas of the anti-apartheid movement. The discontinuities 
between the vision of the anti-apartheid struggle of participatory democracy, on the 
one hand, and policy development after the transition, on the other, can also be 
attributed to a lack of conceptual clarity, coherence and consistency in post-apartheid 
South African educational policy. 
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A key point that is made in Chapter 6 is that the Guides represent in significant 
respects retrieval of the earlier, less democratic forms of student representation in 
South African schools, thus reinforcing post-apartheid citizenship education policy’s 
conceptual incoherence. Many black school students viewed the elite prefect system 
as part of the overall apartheid education system. Within the national educational 
struggle orbit, prefectship was resented and rejected in predominately black schools. 
Alternatively, black students found space in democratic SRCs for self-definition, for 
organising, and participating in a microcosm of democratic self-governance. The 
Guides’ selection of democratic citizenship education, namely its attempt to provide a 
‘third way’ between the competing prefect system and SRCs’ traditions, has also to 
be understood in the context of a negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy, a 
compromise that ultimately led to the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 1994. 
Its apparent commitment to democratic student representation does not articulate the 
practice of a substantial form of student representative democracy. It does not 
envisage citizenship education that is enjoyed by a significant proportion of the South 
African learners. Consequently, state policy does not cover opportunities for teaching 
citizenship in schools and beyond, that is, there is no longer a mass democratic 
movement that brings together a number of students, political and organisational 
strands.    
 
On the contrary, the Guides provide a minimal and conditional role for student 
representation. The Guides seems to suggest that 1) without MECs’ guidance, support 
and control, ‘student government’ is neither feasible nor desirable in post-apartheid 
South African schools; 2) student participation and representation in school 
governance requires judgement, skill and rational commitment, essential attributes 
that only the TLOs possess; and 3) ultimately, the post-apartheid South African 
education policy’s selection of citizenship education – following a top down, vertical 
logic – dilutes the Student Representative tradition. The SRCs’ concept of democratic 
student representation in schools has been diluted in the Guides for Representative 
Councils of Learners. In short, the Guides do not encourage learners to promote and 
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deepen democracy in South African schools, namely democracy as understood in the 
tradition of the Greek city-state of Athens. Neither the tradition of prefectship nor the 
RCLs have much to contribute to the development of citizenship education in South 
Africa. This is arguably better achieved if we rediscover the SRCs’ rich traditional 
voice and give learners once again the power to speak.  
 
The argument that concludes Chapter 7 is that state-regulated compulsion that 
embraces a modified version of the Athenian prototype of citizenship education is 
neither exclusive nor repressive, but promotes enthusiastic individuals who bring 
their particular will into harmony with the general will. Underlying this claim is the 
consideration that within the framework of the Athenian concept of democracy, and 
its emphasis on the educative potential of learner participation, state regulated 
compulsory schooling can be justified as an essential component of the curriculum in 
post-apartheid South African schools. Drawing on the discussions in Chapter 2 and 3, 
Chapter 7 maintained that compulsory schooling and compulsory citizenship 
education promotes individual autonomy, a citizen’s ability and inclination to act for 
him-/herself, on the one hand; and builds social cohesion — the political goal or 
common good in post-apartheid South Africa, on the other. Importantly, unlike state 
compulsory schooling that relies on coercion and force, the modified version of 
Athenian democratic citizenship guarantees South African learners the freedom to opt 
out of ‘official’ school democracy projects.  
 
In Chapter 8, I argued that although the Bill of Responsibilities claims to promote an 
‘active, responsible citizen’, it ultimately sets out to foster obedient and loyal South 
African learners. Similar to the 2000 Pledge, the new vow is intended to nurture 
‘patriotism’, or loyalty to the Republic of South Africa. The Bill appears to echo the 
apocalyptic stereotype of the youth who are dangerous, irresponsible, uncaring, 
reckless and ungovernable, a conception criticised already by Seekings (1993). 
Unsurprisingly, the authors of the document are preoccupied with stability and 
‘normality’ in South African schools. I contend that the Bill of Responsibilities might 
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be seen as demanding and indeed dictating unquestioning obedience from learners in 
South African schools. On the whole, the Bill is reminiscent of the British 
colonialists’ prefect system and the Christian National Education programmes that 
are incompatible with the maximal concept of democracy reflected in the model of 
democracy developed in the Charter tradition — envisioned in the anti-apartheid 
struggle movement — and enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa (1996).  
 
The proposed Bill of Responsibilities and the School Pledge do not promote active, 
critical and inquiring individuals able to build, strengthen and consolidate democracy 
in South African schools. On the contrary, compulsory citizenship education is based 
on forced obedience, if not unquestioning loyalty, to the Republic of South Africa. 
Citizenship education in post-apartheid South Africa do not offer possible strategies 
for getting from where we are to where we ought to be. Instead, the Bill of 
Responsibilities and the School Pledge reinforce, rather than improve on, existing 
state policy instruments that undermine democratic participation and active citizenry. 
The goals of citizenship education in South Africa would be better served by 
cosmopolitan ideals, that is, preparing South African learners to act in a local, 
national and global scale.  
 
In conclusion, current South African education policy and subsequent curriculum 
development do not meet the criteria which I suggested in Chapter 1 should be used 
to analyse and judge post-apartheid citizenship education policy. Post-apartheid 
citizenship education policy is not consistent with 1) an updated/ modified version of 
the Athenian prototype of democracy, especially its democratic zeal for participation; 
2) McLaughlin’s (1992) maximalist conception of citizenship, and of citizenship 
education; 3) the model of democratic citizenship developed in the anti-apartheid 
movement, with roots in the Freedom Charter tradition; and 4) global trends in liberal 
democracies that support the claim that learning democratic citizenship is not limited 
to formal school curriculum, but also requires active community engagement. All of 
these, I have argued, are essential parts of a successful citizenship education for and 
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in a democratic South African society. Given this background, the most likely destiny 
for the anti-apartheid struggle, and its concept of “People’s Education for People’s 
Power” is that it will be “celebrated but not translated into a radical rethinking of 
liberation theory”, a betrayal of the model of democratic citizenship of the liberation 
movement, with roots in the Freedom Charter tradition (Gibson, 2001, p. 72). For all 
the struggle, suffering and sacrifice for democracy and citizens’ rights, citizenship 
education in post-apartheid South Africa seems a disappointment.  
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